Latin America’s China Dilemma: Lessons From Peru and Colombia’s Presidential Elections  – The Diplomat

The recent results of Latin America’s electoral super-cycle (2025–2026) suggest that China has become an increasingly important feature of regional politics. While Beijing’s overall popularity in the region is at an all-time high, Latin Americans are voting in candidates who position themselves as U.S.-aligned and, at times, China skeptics. 

The ideological pendulum seems to be swinging to the right, and with it, the region’s place in the broader China-U.S. geostrategic competition is shifting. Even Peru and Colombia, where China policy did not initially appear likely to become a decisive electoral fault line, have elected candidates who are expected to distance their governments from Beijing, at least rhetorically, and move closer to Washington. But in both countries, deep economic ties with China will continue to constrain any significant strategic realignment.

Once in office, then, many of these governments fail to live up to Washington’s expectations. Rather than distancing themselves from Beijing or limiting Chinese investment, they more often adopt a more pragmatic approach in their relations with China while shifting their diplomatic rhetoric closer to the United States. 

Honduran President Nasry Asfura campaigned on re-establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan and severing ties with Beijing. Nearly a year into his presidency, however, no such shift has occurred. 

Chilean President José Antonio Kast, who was seen at the U.S.-backed Shield of the Americas Summit while still president-elect, did cancel a controversial Chinese submarine cable project. Still, the broader relationship with China has remained rather stable, with Foreign Minister Francisco Pérez Mackenna making a visit to China in August.

Even the sale of Chilean copper – a critical mineral of strategic concern for Washington – to Chinese importers is at its highest level in nine months. 

How will these trends play out in Peru and Colombia, which installed new presidents in July and August, respectively?

Peru

In Peru, the election of right-wing politician Keiko Fujimori to the office of president appears on the surface to be the ideal outcome for Washington. Over the last decade, Peru has been plagued by political instability, with China playing a role in the most recent constitutional crisis. These dynamics suggest that the new administration in Lima would favor closer ties with the U.S. and distance itself from China. 

Although Washington will certainly have leverage with the new administration, it remains uncertain whether Fujimori will take a hard line against Beijing. There are two factors that make this unlikely: Fujimori’s political background and Peru’s deep economic ties with China. 

Keiko Fujimori is the daughter of the late Alberto Fujimori, a former Peruvian president turned authoritarian ruler, whose constitutional reforms and self-coup are considered by many as the source of the continued political instability that Peru has suffered for most of the 21st century. Alberto Fujimori fundamentally reoriented Peru toward Asian markets during the 1990s, laying the foundations for today’s economic relationship with China. 

Keiko Fujimori was elected on a platform built under her father’s controversial and authoritarian legacy, one that coupled gross human rights violations with economic growth. Some experts suggest that she will continue her father’s legacy on the China question by adopting a pragmatic approach of political alignment with Washington and economic engagement with Beijing. 

After all, China remains Peru’s largest trading partner and a major investor across strategic sectors, including mining, energy and infrastructure. For its part, Beijing sees in Lima a strategic anchor, particularly considering Chinese state-owned shipping company COSCO’s investment in the Chancay Port. 

The reversal of a Peruvian court ruling that initially curbed state oversight over Chancay port showcases that Lima’s China policy is at a crossroads. Whether Peru would follow Panama’s path and take back the Chancay port or adopt a more equidistant approach to both superpowers will depend on decisions made by Fujimori – and, most importantly, on Peru’s Constitutional Tribunal upcoming ruling on oversight rights over the port. 

Colombia

In Colombia, Abelardo de la Espriella’s presidential victory brought another rightward shift in the region’s electoral politics. De la Espriella has pledged to prioritize relations with democratic states within the Western hemisphere, vowing to sever diplomatic ties with both Nicaragua and Cuba and saying that his administration will have “no ties whatsoever with tyrannies.” It remains to be seen whether the same ideological approach will shape relations with a non-democratic superpower like China. 

De la Espriella has also promised to normalize relations with the United States following the cooling of bilateral ties and rifts between President Gustavo Petro and U.S. President Donald Trump. The U.S. remains Colombia’s top trading partner with longstanding commercial, political and military ties in Bogotá. 

And yet, de la Espriella’s foreign policy doctrine does not seem to be distancing from Beijing as expected. One of his stated priorities is to commercialize Colombia’s foreign policy by turning ambassadors and diplomats into “gestores comerciales,” or facilitators of trade. 

The balance de la Espriella’s government is trying to strike was recently put to a test on X. China’s ambassador to Bogotá, mirroring the now largely defunct “wolf warrior diplomacy,” publicly questioned the Colombian vice president’s motives after China was not invited to a meeting with a group of states that gave humanitarian assistance to the South American nation after an earthquake. Although the vice president quickly de-escalated the exchange and asked the ambassador to convey his concerns through adequate diplomatic channels, this incident illustrates how difficult it is to balance out an actor that perceives itself as being cornered throughout the region by its peer competitor.   

It appears that under de la Espriella, Colombia’s economic relations may become increasingly compartmentalized from broader geopolitical disagreements. If that is the case, Beijing can adjust by narrowing its engagement with Bogotá to trade and investment, preserving the economic relationship, and avoiding more sensitive ideological disputes. 

What’s Next? 

Peru and Colombia have set the table for Latin America’s biggest election of the year: the October general election in Brazil. The results could prove to be consequential for China’s standing in Latin America. As it stands, Beijing has signaled support for continuity with current President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who is running for re-election. His main rival, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the son and political heir of former President Jair Bolsonaro, has positioned himself closer to Trump-aligned forces and a more explicitly pro-U.S. foreign policy. 

Senator Bolsonaro has sharply increased his criticism of Brazil’s relationship with China during Lula’s term, even accusing the current president of “bootlicking China” and subverting national sovereignty. He believes that Brazil has become dependent on China, with Brasilia acting as a mere exporter of raw materials while receiving high-tech goods. 

His broader plan consists of leveraging Brazil’s critical minerals and rare earth reserves to partner with the U.S. and to reduce U.S. dependencies on Chinese supply chains. Bolsonaro’s criticism of China, combined with Argentine President Javier Milei’s recent trip to Brazil to campaign on his behalf, sharpened Beijing’s concern about the country’s electoral outcomes. 

In that context, Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed support for Lula in “opposing external interference,” while the two leaders also agreed on the need to speed up negotiations on a Mercosur-China agreement.   

Conclusion

China policy featured in the electoral politics of Peru and Colombia, and the Brazilian presidential elections are next. The results of Latin America’s 2025-2026 electoral super cycle, together with developments in Cuba and Nicaragua, where U.S. pressure is set to increase in the upcoming months, suggest that China’s space for political maneuver is shrinking. 

But this doesn’t mean that the region is on the verge of a clean realignment. As shown by developments in Honduras, Chile, and Argentina, political alignments are one thing, and commercial ties are another. The latter, at times, can obscure the former. 

Beijing can no longer assume that deep economic ties will shield it from electoral backlash, sovereignty concerns, or pressure from Washington. At the same time, its role in trade, infrastructure, mining, and investment gives it a resilience that campaign rhetoric alone cannot easily undo. 

If Peru, Colombia, and Brazil teach us anything, it is that the future of China’s role in Latin America will be shaped less by campaign promises than by the region’s ability to create alternatives. Without those alternatives, even the most China-skeptical governments will remain constrained by the economic map they inherit.