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Haiti, Erik Prince, and the Cost of Privatized Security


During the night of August 23, 2026, armed gangs attacked Kenscoff, a mountain community overlooking Port-au-Prince. By the end of the assault, at least 47 people had been killed, including five children. Twenty-two others were injured, dozens were abducted, and homes were set on fire.

Their deaths compel Haiti to confront a difficult question: Seventeen months after Erik Prince’s Vectus Global became involved in the country’s anti-gang operations, what measurable improvement in public security have Haitians actually received?

Prince Established His Own Standard

Vectus Global began operating in Haiti in March 2025, supporting a Haitian government task force that used armed drones against gangs.

Prince later told Reuters that he expected to regain control of major roads and territory from gangs within approximately one year. He also identified a practical benchmark for success: the ability to travel from Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haïtien in an ordinary, nonarmored vehicle without being stopped by gangs.

Seventeen months have now passed. Can an ordinary Haitian citizen safely make that journey today? Perhaps a private security contractor traveling under protection or a government convoy secured by armored vehicles can travel that road, but not a mother traveling with her children, a farmer bringing produce to market, a merchant transporting goods, or a student moving between cities.

That is the measure of security that truly matters.

This is not to suggest that every operation by Vectus Global has failed. If gangs have been pushed back, roads reopened, territory recovered, or attacks prevented, those achievements should be acknowledged and documented.

But tactical successes cannot substitute for the fundamental objective: making Haitian civilians safer.

The tragedy of Kenscoff makes that distinction painfully clear. If the overall strategy is succeeding, how could armed groups still organize an attack capable of killing 47 people in one night, abducting dozens, burning homes, and terrorizing an entire community?

The Human Cost of the Drone Campaign

The drone campaign by Haitian law enforcement and Vectus Global also raises serious questions.

Human Rights Watch reports that at least 1,243 people were killed in 141 armed-drone operations between March 1, 2025, and January 21, 2026. Among them were at least 17 children and 43 adults reportedly not belonging to criminal groups. Another 738 people were injured.

In an investigation of a September 2025 strike in Simon Pelé, Human Rights Watch found that 10 people who were not members of criminal groups were killed, including nine children between the ages of three and twelve.

Haiti desperately needs to dismantle the gangs. But fighting criminal violence cannot mean abandoning accountability for innocent lives.

Who verifies the intelligence? Who authorizes the strikes? Who operates the drones? Who investigates civilian deaths? And who is accountable when the wrong people are killed?

What Is Haiti Paying For?

The financial arrangement raises another fundamental question. Prince declined to disclose to Reuters how much the Haitian government would pay Vectus Global.

If Haitian public resources are financing private security operations, Haitians have the right to know how much has been paid, what services were promised, what performance requirements were established, and what happens when those objectives are not achieved. This is basic public accountability.

Prince also said that, after security was stabilized, his company would help design and implement a system to tax goods imported across Haiti’s border with the Dominican Republic. That moves the discussion beyond fighting gangs to questions of Haitian sovereignty.

Customs revenues, border administration, and taxation are core responsibilities of a sovereign state. Haiti may need international expertise and assistance, but assistance should strengthen Haitian institutions so that Haiti becomes less dependent on outsiders—not transform institutional weakness into permanent dependence.

When Security Becomes a Business

Vectus Global is a private company. Haiti’s interest is to dismantle the gangs, arrest their leaders, restore state authority, protect the population, and end the emergency as quickly as possible. If that happens, the need for extraordinary private security services diminishes. If insecurity continues, demand for those services can continue.

That does not prove that Prince or Vectus deliberately wants Haiti’s crisis to continue. But the potential conflict of interest makes transparency essential.

Are payments tied to measurable results? Are there deadlines? Are there financial consequences when objectives are not achieved? Does a longer operation generate additional revenue? Who independently evaluates Vectus’s performance? And what terminates the mission?

The Haitian government can begin answering those questions with one straightforward action: publish the agreement with Vectus Global. The two sides need to disclose the financial terms, payments, performance requirements, deadlines, and termination provisions. They need to explain the rules governing lethal force and accountability for civilian casualties. And they need to disclose the terms of any future Vectus role in Haiti’s customs or tax collection.

Haiti Needs Security—and Sovereignty

Haiti’s gangs are criminal organizations terrorizing the population. They must be dismantled, and their leaders must be brought to justice. But everyone exercising power in Haiti—the Haitian government, private contractors, foreign governments, and international organizations—should ultimately face the same test: Does what they are doing serve the Haitian people?

Prince established his own benchmark. Seventeen months later, he should be prepared to demonstrate the results in the form of secure roads, permanently recovered territories, and dismantled gang structures.

If Vectus cannot demonstrate security improvements proportional to the time, authority, and resources entrusted to it, Haiti should reconsider the arrangement. Haiti’s security must serve the Haitian people—not make their suffering anyone’s permanent business model.



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