Why the attack on General Shub touched a nerve in Somalia’s political elite

By: Mohamed Mukhtar Ibrahim
Tuesday September 8, 2026

The reported attempt to kill General Mahad Abdirahman Aden “Shub,” the former commander of the Somali Custodial Corps, in Doolow has touched a particularly sensitive nerve in Somalia’s political establishment. An attempt on anyone’s life is deeply troubling, and General Shub, regardless of his political position, deserves the protection of the law.

But the reaction to his reported targeting also raises a difficult question about how Somalia responds to violence: why does an attack on a prominent member of the political and security elite generate such immediate and powerful condemnation when the far greater suffering of ordinary Somalis can pass with comparatively little political attention? Since the Federal Government intervened in Southwest State to challenge former President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, around 200 people have reportedly been killed and nearly 1,000 injured, although these cumulative figures require independent verification.

Yet the reported attack on General Shub prompted strong condemnation from senior political figures, including former presidents Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Farmaajo, among others who do not necessarily share his political position. This contrast is uncomfortable, but it offers an important window into Somalia’s political settlement—and into the unwritten rules that govern how far political competition can go.

General Shub is not simply another individual caught up in Somalia’s violence. He is part of the political and security elite. His targeting appears to have threatened an unwritten red line within Somalia’s political settlement: powerful groups may compete aggressively for political power, resources and influence, but there are limits to how far that competition should go against members of the elite. At its core, a political settlement is a relationship of power that makes political order sustainable. It does not eliminate competition; rather, it creates enough rules, understandings and mutual restraint to prevent competition from becoming a struggle for physical survival.

This helps explain the reaction to the attack on Abdirahman Abdishakur in December 2017. The attack of a prominent opposition leader generated enormous political outrage. The reaction was not necessarily because everyone supported Abdishakur. It was because an attack on a senior political figure was seen as crossing a boundary that could eventually threaten everyone within the political class.

There is something uncomfortable about this distinction. Since the beginning of Somalia’s civil war, the number of senior political and elite figures deliberately killed is relatively small when compared with the enormous number of ordinary Somalis who have lost their lives. Even when deaths caused by Al-Shabaab and other armed actors are included, the contrast remains striking. Ordinary citizens have often carried the greatest burden of violence, while powerful actors have developed informal mechanisms that provide them with a degree of political and physical protection.

The logic behind this is partly self-interest. Each wants security, resources and influence, but each fears that another actor could become too powerful. The Federal Government wants to consolidate authority; the current Southwest administration led by Adan Madobe wants to preserve its political position; the former administration led by Laftagareen and its networks want to remain politically relevant; and other actors want guarantees that they will not be excluded. None can completely trust the others, but all have an interest in preventing political competition from becoming unrestricted violence.

This is why the reaction to General Shub matters. The question is not whether everyone agrees with him. The question is whether Somalia’s political system can continue to function if political opponents begin to believe that losing a political struggle could put their physical survival at risk. If that happens, compromise becomes much harder. Political actors will have stronger incentives to arm themselves, seek external protection and fight pre-emptively rather than negotiate.

The real challenge for Southwest State is therefore not simply who controls Baidoa or the security forces. It is whether Adan Madobe, Laftagareen’s political network, the Federal Government and other powerful actors can solve their differences and establish a new political equilibrium. They need a settlement in which actors can lose political power without fearing that they will lose their security or their ability to participate in politics.

The irony is that Somalia’s political settlement has often protected the powerful more effectively than the powerless. But the principle behind the elite bargain remains important: political competition must have limits, and political defeat must not become a death sentence. The broad condemnation of the attack on General Shub suggests that Somalia’s political elite still recognise this red line. The danger is what happens if that red line is crossed repeatedly.

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Mohamed Mukhtar Ibrahim can be reached by email at [email protected]