What comes after the thaw in Algerian-Malian ties? | Hatim Betioui

If the visit of Lieutenant General Abdoulaye Maïga, the Malian Prime Minister, to Algeria last Monday serves as an indicator that the Algerian-Malian crisis has entered a phase of easing tensions and normalization — after having reached the point of a complete rupture — and marks the culmination of a process that began last July with the restoration of diplomatic ties, the return of ambassadors, and the reopening of airspace between the two countries, the question that arises now is: Has this visit, being the first by a senior Malian official to Algeria since the eruption of the crisis, resolved all the outstanding contentious issues between the two nations?

To answer this question, one must recall several events and return to late March 2025, when Algeria downed a Malian drone. That incident sparked the crisis between the two countries, even though its roots trace back to deeper disagreements that began when the military came to power in Mali on August 18, 2020, over differing visions on how to address the crisis in the north of the country, particularly the Tuareg issue and the Azawad region.

For years, Algeria played a pivotal role in the Malian file as the sponsor of the “Algiers Peace and Reconciliation Agreement,” which was forged in 2015 between the Bamako government and the armed movements in the north. However, the Malian military junta, led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, terminated the agreement in January 2024, accusing the other parties of failing to implement their commitments and alleging that Algeria engaged in hostile actions after hosting figures associated with the Azawadi movements — a move Bamako viewed as interference in its internal affairs. In response, Algeria stated that its contacts fell within its mediation role to implement the agreement.

The collapse of the agreement revealed the depth of the rift between the two countries. While Algeria viewed it as a mechanism to resolve northern Mali’s crisis through dialogue and reconciliation while preserving Malian territorial integrity, Bamako opted for a military approach. Its forces succeeded in recapturing the strategic city of Kidal in November 2023, framing the move as a victory for national sovereignty.

Concurrently, Mali’s foreign alliances shifted drastically: its relations with France and Western nations deteriorated, while its military cooperation with Russia—and later with the Russian “Africa Corps”—strengthened. Algeria viewed this growing cooperation with displeasure, particularly since it traditionally considered itself Moscow’s primary strategic partner in the region.

The downing of the Malian drone was merely the straw that broke the camel’s back, plunging bilateral relations into an open diplomatic crisis. Its fallout extended to Burkina Faso and Niger—members alongside Mali in the Alliance of Sahel States—after they expressed solidarity with Bamako, thereby lending the dispute a regional dimension.

There is no doubt that the crisis with Mali represented one of the most prominent manifestations of the decline of Algerian influence in the Sahel region. Consequently, Algeria found no alternative but to ease tensions with Bamako, enlisting the help of the Russians, who contributed to bridging viewpoints between both sides owing to their influence with the Malian authorities.

It can be argued that the crisis has ended diplomatically, or nearly so; however, it remains premature to assert that it is resolved politically and strategically, given the existence of three files capable of reigniting tensions at any moment:

First, the Algiers Peace Agreement, as its revival in its previous form has not been announced to date.

Second, the issue of Azawad and the Tuareg, amid ongoing confrontations between Bamako and northern armed movements, which makes any Algerian move in this regard a potential source of renewed friction.

Third, divergent conceptions of regional security; Bamako relies on a military approach and its alliances with Russia, whereas Algeria traditionally adheres to a doctrine based on political dialogue, non-interference, and respect for state sovereignty.

The paradox here is that this approach becomes unacceptable to Algeria, and is abandoned, when it comes to its dispute with Morocco over the Moroccan Sahara issue. Political dialogue with Rabat remains suspended, and Algeria continues to sponsor the separatist Polisario Front, supplying it with weapons and equipment and hosting its fighters on its territory for five decades.

Ultimately, it appears that Algeria and Mali have become increasingly convinced of the necessity of resuming diplomatic dialogue, realizing that prolonged rupture carries far greater costs than any alternative state of relations. While Algeria cannot ignore security developments in a neighboring country sharing a border exceeding one thousand kilometers, Mali, for its part, cannot disregard Algeria’s geographical and political weight in the northern Sahel, even if it perceives significant risks emanating from it.

In essence, Maïga’s visit remains a litmus test for the seriousness of this reconciliation and the extent of both nations’ ability to transition from “restoring relations” to “rebuilding trust,” thereby turning a new page in bilateral ties and regional security and political balances across the Sahel.