U.S.-Saudi Strikes Gave Iraq’s Armed Factions a New Claim to Defend Sovereignty
In this context, the government cannot merely rely on condemnation of the strikes. After the attack, the Iraqi National Security Council reaffirmed the state’s exclusive authority over weapons and said only constitutional institutions may respond to threats. Baghdad may hope to reject external force while enforcing a unified chain of command that prevents factions from using Iraqi territory against another state. This resolves the apparent contradiction: The strikes strengthened factional rhetoric in the short term, but the government can still turn consensus on sovereignty into reform if it clarifies that defending Iraq’s borders does not legitimize unauthorized arms.
Externally, Saudi Arabia’s direct military role departs from recent trends in bilateral relations with Iraq. Since reopening its Baghdad embassy in 2015, Riyadh had enhanced relations through diplomacy and economic engagement. The two sides fostered cooperation through investment agreements, growing trade through Arar, a Gulf electricity interconnection and continued political coordination. This allowed the Kingdom to present itself as a partner in Iraq’s development and an alternative to U.S.-Israel-Iran polarization. Using force inside a country Saudi Arabia had sought to win over therefore created a new test at a particularly inopportune moment, when Baghdad was trying to contain regional escalation.
Riyadh invoked its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, claiming it did not seek escalation but would protect its interests. Yet the political cost was immediate: Al-Zaidi postponed a planned visit to Riyadh, giving critics ammunition to recast Saudi Arabia from an economic partner to a violator of Iraqi sovereignty.
The operation also sets a regional precedent. A Gulf state showed its willingness to strike Iraq when it believed Baghdad could not stop threats emanating from Iraqi territory. That may produce short-term deterrence, but it expands the confrontation and weakens the de-escalatory logic of the Saudi-Iranian agreement announced in Beijing in 2023. It also reinforces a destructive cycle: Limited Iraqi control invites intervention; intervention gives armed actors a rationale for retaining weapons; and those weapons invite further intervention.
Three scenarios now stand out.
First, individual PMF-affiliated factions could retaliate against American or Saudi interests, drawing Iraq deeper into the regional conflict. Second, the government could use the broad defense of sovereignty to accelerate security-sector reform. That outcome is possible, but only if Baghdad separates condemnation of the external attack from accountability for unauthorized operations and applies one legal standard across all armed formations.
The third, and absent further escalation, most likely scenario is a managed stalemate: Iraq avoids open war but fails to achieve a full monopoly on arms. The underlying tensions remain concrete rather than abstract: competing chains of command, incomplete integration of PMF-affiliated units, contested attribution of cross-border attacks and the readiness of neighboring states to act unilaterally when they distrust Iraqi enforcement. Any new incident could reactivate this cycle.
Breaking it requires Baghdad, Riyadh and Washington to establish mechanisms for joint investigation, verification and rapid information-sharing on cross-border attacks. Iraq, for its part, should reaffirm, not reinvent, the existing Sept. 30 schedule and pair it with weapons inventories, accountable command arrangements and judicial enforcement. The central problem is not the absence of legal language protecting sovereignty; it is the gap between formal authority and effective control.
Washington and Riyadh have likely made a serious strategic miscalculation. By acting as Baghdad attempted to consolidate control over arms, they weakened the government’s message, allowing armed factions to claim the mantle of sovereignty. A strike can destroy sites and capabilities, but if it increases the domestic legitimacy of the actors it targets, the strategic balance sheet may remain negative.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.