The war in Sudan spills over into Chad and sparks a debate on Turkey’s role

The war in Sudan has taken a further, dramatic turn for the worse. It has entered an even more dangerous phase following its spillover into Chad, a development that is fuelling fresh concerns about the regional dimension of the conflict. The Chadian army has accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of striking a convoy within Chadian territory. According to the General Staff in N’Djamena, the attack took place at around 8 pm on 20 August in the Mourdi department, in the eastern province of Ennedi-Est, near the border with Sudan. Aircraft and drones believed to belong to the SAF or their allies are said to have pursued and bombed the convoy for over 100 kilometres across the border. According to the Chadian authorities, the vehicle was carrying reinforcements destined for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which the Sudanese army regards as a rebel group. The United States has condemned the attack, calling for an end to all external support for the parties to the conflict. Massad Boulos, senior adviser to the US President on Arab and African affairs, stated that Washington opposes the spread of violence beyond Sudan’s borders and that there is no military solution to the crisis. “The parties must immediately agree to a humanitarian ceasefire, protect civilians and allow unhindered humanitarian access,” said the US Special Envoy. Boulos also called for the United Nations arms embargo – currently limited to Darfur – to be extended to the whole of Sudan, accusing foreign powers of contributing to the escalation. “The United Nations Security Council must also act urgently to ensure that the arms embargo and sanctions regime reflect the reality of today’s conflict and hold to account those who are fuelling and expanding this war. External financial and military support for the parties to the conflict must cease,” he concluded. Washington has repeatedly warned that external support is exacerbating the conflict and that the increasing use of armed drones risks further undermining any prospect of peace.

The origins of the clashes

The war began on 15 April 2023, when fighting between the SAF and the RSF erupted against the backdrop of the Sudanese political transition crisis and the dispute over the integration of the RSF into the regular army. The attack on Chadian territory now brings two crucial issues back into the spotlight: on the one hand, the geographical expansion of the war; on the other, the SAF’s growing reliance on foreign support for its air capabilities, particularly through the use of Turkish drones.

The report by Le Monde and Ankara’s role

According to an investigation by the French newspaper Le Monde, Turkey has established itself as the main military backer of the Sudanese army since the start of the war. The newspaper claims that Ankara has supplied Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones, along with training personnel. The newspaper also reports that Saudi Arabia has financed the purchase of Turkish drones and Pakistani weaponry intended for the SAF. The report forms part of a broader context of growing political rapprochement between Turkey and the Sudanese military leadership. On 7 August, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, which stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all of them. According to Le Monde, however, cooperation on the Sudanese issue predates this agreement. Riyadh is reported to have financed supplies of Turkish drones and Pakistani weapons for the Sudanese army, whilst Islamabad is said to be involved in a $1.5 billion contract comprising fighter jets, armoured vehicles and drones. Since the end of 2024, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s and Akinci drones have been added to the SAF’s expanding air arsenal. The Sudanese Armed Forces have also deployed Iranian Mohajer-6 drones, whilst the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have deployed Chinese CH-95 and FH-95 systems, confirming the growing influence of foreign military technology in the conflict.

Drone tracking

There is currently no conclusive evidence linking a Bayraktar drone to the raid in Chad. However, the presence of Turkish military technology in the Sudanese war appears to be increasingly well documented. In March 2025, The Washington Post reported that the Turkish company Baykar had supplied the Sudanese army with military equipment worth at least $120 million, including TB2 drones and hundreds of warheads. The investigation, based on contracts, correspondence, records and visual material, also documented the presence of Baykar personnel providing technical support in Sudan. In May 2026, Chatham House analysed reports of Turkish drone supplies to the SAF, whilst also noting Ankara’s denial regarding direct deliveries. The report took on an even more prominent political dimension the following June, when President Recep Tayyip Erdogan received the head of the Sudanese army, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Ankara. The Turkish presidency reported that the two countries aim to expand cooperation in sectors such as trade, agriculture, energy and defence. More generally, the expansion of Turkish weapons systems is beginning to be evident in numerous countries in the region. Not only Libya, but also Burkina Faso, Mali (Aselsan supplies a wide range of systems) and Somalia, where in January 2026 Turkish jets carried out bombing raids against al-Shabab strongholds.

Strategic interests and reconstruction

Turkey’s involvement in Sudan, therefore, now goes beyond the mere issue of individual military supplies. Ankara is consolidating its relations with the leadership of the SAF, whilst continuing to present itself as a diplomatic interlocutor in the conflict. The ties between Turkey and Sudan, moreover, are rooted in a long-standing relationship. The 2017 meeting between Erdogan and Omar al-Bashir had already demonstrated Ankara’s strong strategic interest in Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Sudan’s future reconstruction will require substantial investment in infrastructure, energy, agriculture and other key sectors, whilst the country’s position on the Red Sea and its mineral resources enhance its strategic and commercial value. Foreign powers are therefore influencing not only the way in which the war is being fought, but also the interests that will converge on Sudan in the post-war period.