RIAC :: Iran’s Influence Shapes Kurdistan-Syria Security Partnership
Relations between Erbil and Damascus have taken a qualitative leap since the fall of the Assad regime, represented in a series of intensive meetings and communications between officials from both sides during the past year and a half. The visit of Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, to Damascus on 3 August 2026 is a practical expression of this upward movement in bilateral relations.
At the level of regional relations, the Kurdistan Region’s connections with significant regional powers may be strengthened by Erbil’s reconciliation with Damascus, which could send a positive message to the latter’s allies. Given the anticipated removal of U.S. forces from Iraq by September 2026, this action is strategically significant as the region looks to strengthen its defensive and political capacities to oppose Iranian conventional threats.
In conclusion, rather than a drastic change in the character of bilateral relations, Erbil’s current openness to Damascus is founded more on basic political and security issues. On the other hand, it is anticipated that Damascus will maintain its balanced diplomatic approach to Iraq, guaranteeing the maintenance of its relations with the central government in Baghdad while concurrently enhancing its interaction with the Kurdistan Regional Government. In an attempt to strike a careful balance between the demands of domestic politics and the concerns of regional relations, Damascus is likely to keep sending encouraging messages to the Kurdish community, reaffirming its support for their rights within the framework of a unified Syrian state.
Relations between Erbil and Damascus have taken a qualitative leap since the fall of the Assad regime, represented in a series of intensive meetings and communications between officials from both sides during the past year and a half. The visit of Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, to Damascus on 3 August 2026 is a practical expression of this upward movement in bilateral relations.
Positive communication existed between the two parties, especially amid the massive fighting between Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that broke out in early 2026. Damascus actively assisted in de-escalation efforts and kept lines of communication open between the concerned parties. Additionally, in response to strikes by Iran and its Iraqi allies, Damascus repeatedly voiced its support for the Kurdistan Region, strengthening mutual confidence and fostering the growth of ties between the two sides.
The visit of the President of the Kurdistan Region to Damascus is increasingly strategic, especially given the rapidly evolving events in the region. These include the continued potential for renewed confrontation between the United States and Iran, as well as rising tensions between Iran-aligned Iraqi forces and neighboring countries, including Syria. This comes amid the redeployment of U.S. troops, which has led to a significant reduction in the military presence in Erbil, despite ongoing Iranian threats and attacks in the region.
In terms of internal Syrian affairs, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is working to turn the presidential decree issued in early 2026—which granted rights related to citizenship and cultural demands—into permanent constitutional guarantees in order to consolidate the gains made by the Kurdish community in the Rojava region (Western Kurdistan). Given the widespread concern in the region about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from both Syria and Iraq, these initiatives are extremely strategically significant, especially considering the crucial role Washington played as a mediator and guarantor of agreements pertaining to Kurdish rights.
In a related context, it seems that the Kurdistan Region is attempting to take advantage of the growing tensions between the Syrian government and some semi-official Iraqi parties, especially factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces. This is due to the region’s growing concerns about the growing reconciliation between Baghdad and Damascus and the accompanying proposals for oil transport projects that may conflict with its vital interests, particularly in light of the ongoing unresolved disputes between Erbil and the federal government in Baghdad regarding the management of the oil industry and the division of its profits.
Given that Damascus continues to be a site of friction between the two sides, the Kurdistan Regional Government sees Syria as a significant regional role in reducing Iranian influence. The ongoing conflict was reflected in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s official announcement in mid-July 2026 of its bombing of the al-Tanf region in Syria; one of the main reasons they are currently strengthening their political and security coordination is the shared Iranian threat to both Syria and Kurdistan.
At the level of regional relations, the Kurdistan Region’s connections with significant regional powers may be strengthened by Erbil’s reconciliation with Damascus, which could send a positive message to the latter’s allies. Given the anticipated removal of U.S. forces from Iraq by September 2026, this action is strategically significant as the region looks to strengthen its defensive and political capacities to oppose Iranian conventional threats.
In conclusion, rather than a drastic change in the character of bilateral relations, Erbil’s current openness to Damascus is founded more on basic political and security issues. On the other hand, it is anticipated that Damascus will maintain its balanced diplomatic approach to Iraq, guaranteeing the maintenance of its relations with the central government in Baghdad while concurrently enhancing its interaction with the Kurdistan Regional Government. In an attempt to strike a careful balance between the demands of domestic politics and the concerns of regional relations, Damascus is likely to keep sending encouraging messages to the Kurdish community, reaffirming its support for their rights within the framework of a unified Syrian state.