BAGHDAD – Iran’s Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani arrived in Baghdad on Monday at the head of a high-level military and security delegation for an unannounced visit, according to an informed source, at a sensitive moment for Iraq as it weighs the future of Iran-aligned armed factions and the security of its oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz.
Qaani held talks with Iraqi officials and leaders of the Coordination Framework, the main alliance of Shiite political forces, as well as commanders of armed factions, the source told Shafaq News. His meetings included talks with Badr Organisation leader Hadi al-Amiri, with further discussions with political and faction leaders expected during his visit.
The talks were centred on two major issues, according to the source: the future of weapons held by Iran-aligned Iraqi factions amid growing political and official pressure to place all arms under state control, and the possibility of ensuring that Iraq can continue exporting crude through the Strait of Hormuz despite the wider regional military crisis.
The timing of Qaani’s visit is particularly significant because Iraq’s political leadership has set September 30 as a deadline for bringing weapons under the authority of state institutions.
At a meeting on August 5, the State Administration Coalition, which brings together Iraq’s main Shiite political forces, stressed the need for all weapons to be held by the state and warned that groups carrying out activities that threaten national security outside official institutions would be treated as operating outside the law.
The deadline has exposed divisions among Iraq’s powerful armed factions. Some groups have signalled a willingness to reorganise their relationship with the state, while others, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, have rejected giving up their military capabilities.
Those factions have linked any discussion of their weapons to the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq and guarantees that the country can defend itself against external attacks.
Qaani’s presence in Baghdad suggests Tehran is closely watching the debate over the future of the factions, whose military and political influence has long been an important component of Iran’s regional network. The issue has become increasingly sensitive for Baghdad, which is seeking to strengthen the authority of state institutions while avoiding an internal confrontation with heavily armed groups.
Iraqi security and military forces have meanwhile raised their state of readiness, with leave cancelled for a number of commanders and officers amid concerns about possible tensions or armed confrontation with factions resisting pressure to surrender or restructure their weapons.
The measures followed a period of heightened tension in Baghdad after threats of retaliation against Saudi Arabia. Political contacts subsequently helped calm the situation and opened the way for diplomatic efforts to contain the dispute rather than allow it to develop into a military confrontation.
Amiri’s participation in Qaani’s meetings is also significant given his position within Iraq’s Shiite political and factional landscape and his ability to communicate with competing sides.
Amiri has called on factions to put Iraq’s “higher national interest” first and delay any military response in periods of heightened regional tension, while also stressing the need to maintain readiness. That position reflects the difficult balance facing Iraq’s political and armed groups between domestic priorities and their longstanding regional alignments.
The oil issue gives Qaani’s visit an additional economic and strategic dimension.
Iraq relies heavily on oil revenues, while the Strait of Hormuz is a critical route for the country’s crude exports. Iran effectively closed the waterway to most commercial shipping following US and Israeli strikes on February 28, initially disrupting Iraq’s principal export route and reducing shipments to around 800,000 barrels per day.
Tehran later granted Iraq an exemption allowing Iraqi oil tankers to transit the strait, but exports have remained constrained by the broader closure and regional instability.
For Baghdad, maintaining a secure route through Hormuz is therefore not simply a shipping issue but a question of economic stability and state finances. For Tehran, the issue gives it leverage over one of the region’s most strategically important energy routes.
The inclusion of the oil question in Qaani’s discussions points to Iran’s broader interest in Iraq’s role in the regional energy equation, particularly while tensions over Hormuz remain unresolved.
The visit also comes against a backdrop in which Qaani’s trips to Baghdad have historically coincided with important turning points in Iraqi politics and security, including government formation, attempts to restrain or redirect militia activity and periods of heightened regional confrontation.
The outcome has varied from one episode to another. Such visits have in the past preceded orders for restraint by armed factions, but they have also been followed by intensified attacks on US positions in Iraq and Syria.
For now, however, the immediate focus is on whether the latest visit produces any movement in the dispute over the factions’ weapons and Iraq’s ability to maintain oil shipments through Hormuz.
The possibility that Tehran could seek to use access to the strait as leverage in discussions over the future of Iran-aligned factions remains an important question, although there is no public evidence that such a linkage has been agreed.