Libya’s PM tries to reshape armed alliances across Tripoli

Libya’s Tripoli is undergoing a new phase in its security arrangements beyond the redistribution of forces of “the Government of National Unity,” led by current Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, with its network of armed alliances transforming.

These arrangements coincide with renewed activity on the military track of the US initiative for a solution in Libya, as part of Washington’s reordering of its priorities.

Last Thursday, 30 July, an official letter from the Dbeibah government to the Deterrence Apparatus announced the resumption of contacts between the two sides after more than a year of tension.

The government tasked the force with redeploying around its headquarters inside Mitiga Air Base, north of Tripoli, signalling that the Government of National Unity has begun reorganising the security landscape inside the Libyan capital.

Cautious contacts 

Multiple government and security sources confirmed this process, telling The New Arab that “cautious contacts” have resumed between the government and the “Deterrence Apparatus” as part of a broader vision to recalibrate the balance among armed groups in Tripoli in a way that serves the government’s interests.

The sources also revealed parallel contacts between the government and the “444 Brigade”, which holds influence south of the capital and whose relationship with the government has cooled over recent months.

Although the “Deterrence Apparatus” responded to the government’s assignment by deploying its units around the Souq al-Jumaa area, where its main headquarters is located, this deployment coincided with another carried out by units of the “111 Brigade”, the government’s principal military ally, at positions close to those of the “Deterrence Apparatus”.

The simultaneous deployments reflected mutual caution between the two sides despite the resumption of communication channels.

The Souq al-Jumaa area, which includes Mitiga Air Base, is the main headquarters of the “Deterrence Apparatus” and one of the most sensitive parts of the Libyan capital. It houses the state’s most important institutions, including the Central Bank, the National Oil Corporation and the telecommunications company, while also bordering the government’s main headquarters.

Tensions between the government and the “Deterrence Apparatus” date back to the security operation carried out in May 2025, during which the government succeeded in toppling the “Stability Support Apparatus”, the largest armed faction in the capital.

It failed, however, to eliminate the “Deterrence Apparatus”, although the operation targeted both groups after they moved beyond government control. This was followed by several months of acute tension, during which the government failed to bring the force under its authority or reduce its influence.

These developments coincide with a clear shift in the priorities of the US initiative.

After the initiative faltered on the political track, particularly following the meeting organised by US presidential adviser Massad Boulos, who leads the initiative, between representatives of the government in Tripoli and the “General Command” in Benghazi in Malta on 6 July last year to launch understandings on forming a joint executive authority, Washington shifted towards giving greater priority to the military track.

The aim is to strengthen both sides’ positions on the ground and establish them as the only two parties to the conflict ahead of resuming efforts to build a power-sharing executive authority.

Limits of coordination between Tripoli and Benghazi

Following the reduction in Boulos’ public role, the US chargé d’affaires in Libya, Jeremy Berndt, has recently taken a more prominent position by coordinating direct meetings between military leaders in Tripoli and Benghazi.

In the middle of last week, Berndt also coordinated a visit by a US congressional delegation to Libya, during which it met military leaders in both cities.

At the conclusion of the visit, he announced that both sides had agreed to establish a “permanent joint operations room” to coordinate counterterrorism efforts and border monitoring, alongside the creation of a joint air command.

The United States will provide technical and advisory support in a move that reflects tangible progress on the military track sponsored by the US initiative.

According to the same sources, the government sought, through its understanding with the “Deterrence Apparatus”, to use the force’s influence to reduce protests over deteriorating living conditions that have taken place in Tripoli in recent weeks—this was particularly important because the Social Council of the Souq al-Jumaa area, which represents the “Deterrence Apparatus'” social base, has been leading those protests.

The intensity of the protests has indeed declined since deterrence apparatus units began deploying around the area.

However, the sources stressed that these understandings extend beyond their immediate security dimension.

They come within the context of efforts to reorganise security arrangements inside Tripoli and rebuild the armed alliances on which the government relies, in parallel with consultations between its representative, Deputy Defence Minister Abdul Salam Zoubi, and representatives of the “General Command” in eastern Libya within the military track of the US initiative.

Those consultations include the proposal of Zoubi’s name for the defence portfolio under any future political settlement.

The sources added that the US side informed the Dbeibah government of its concern, alongside the concern of regional parties, over the continuing security chaos inside the Libyan capital and the government’s inability to impose full control over it amid strained relations with some armed groups.

They also pointed to worrying security conditions in the cities surrounding Tripoli, particularly Zawiya, where recurring armed clashes continue to complicate the security landscape in western Libya.

Since the government toppled the “Stability Support Apparatus”, it has sought to impose control over the capital by relying on the armed forces that contributed to the operation’s success.

These are the “General Security Forces Apparatus”, which exerts influence over sites in central and western Tripoli, the “111 Brigade”, which is deployed in areas inside the capital and to its east, and the “444 Brigade”, whose influence is concentrated in the south of the capital.

These changes strengthened the positions of the commanders of those formations within state institutions.

The commander of the “111 Brigade”, Abdul Salam Zoubi, was promoted to the post of deputy defence minister, while the operation also strengthened the influence of interior minister Imad Trabelsi, who also heads the general security forces apparatus.

By contrast, relations between the government and the commander of the “444 Brigade”, Mahmoud Hamza, became strained. Hamza was promoted to head the military intelligence apparatus, a position that did not provide much influence as to what he wielded on the ground.

Meanwhile, the “Deterrence Apparatus” remains outside government control and a constant source of concern because of its presence in the Souq al-Jumaa area, one of the most densely populated parts of the capital and home to a large number of sovereign and government institutions.

The map of military alliances inside the capital has changed several times.

When the government entered Tripoli in February 2021, it found a group of the most prominent armed formations already in place: the “Stability Support Apparatus”, the “Deterrence Apparatus” and the “General Security Apparatus”, alongside the “111”, “444”, “777” and “Nawasi” brigades, whose affiliations were divided between the Ministries of Defence and Interior.

However, this landscape changed after the government appointed by the House of Representatives, then led by Fathi Bashagha, attempted to enter the capital in May 2022 to carry out its duties from within Tripoli with the support of the “Nawasi” and “777” brigades.

Armed groups in Tripoli, led by the “Stability Support” and “Deterrence” apparatuses, fought intense clashes against them for an entire day, ending with the elimination of their military presence.

Thereafter, the map of influence was limited to the remaining armed formations, each of which established control over a geographical and institutional sphere within Tripoli.

The role played by the “Stability Support” and “Deterrence” apparatuses in those confrontations expanded their influence within the capital and its institutions until they became a source of concern for the government.

This prompted the government to launch the security operation in May last year targetting both forces. Following the operation, the government became largely dependent on the general security forces apparatus and the “111 Brigade”.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.