Is Sudan heading for partition?

Numerous proposals have been advanced for a new system of government. Among them is decentralisation based on states that administer their own affairs and benefit first from their own resources, before the centre (based in the capital, Khartoum) swallows them up, as has happened throughout Sudan’s modern history. Yet the civil war has created a new reality.

If rejecting the old governance model meant secession and partition, some seemed prepared to pay the price. This reflects the reality of the war, which is now the most geographically extensive in Sudan’s history. Unlike others, this civil war erupted in the centre, rather than the periphery. The RSF has mounted the country’s most powerful and sustained armed challenge to the authority of the Sudanese army. 

Spectre of partition

The war has forced many Sudanese, including politicians and civil society activists, to align themselves either with the army or the RSF. Both sides have promised their supporters a crushing victory. By adopting the rhetoric of war, politicians are entrenching the idea of partition. Those who reject war, including most of the Civil Democratic Alliance of the Revolutionary Forces (known as Sumoud), favour the unity of Sudan, but these anti-war forces (which have themselves splintered after disagreements) have limited influence over the course of the conflict.

Among the arguments advanced by Tasis is that civilians in Darfur and large parts of Kordofan have been deprived by the SAF of basic rights, including access to identity documents and education. They also argue that Darfuris were collectively treated as an RSF social constituency and subjected to SAF attacks. Such efforts to deepen Sudanese political and social tensions could culminate in separation and partition.

In a recent speech marking Army Day 2026, SAF commander Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced an initiative for reconciliation and dialogue, but he said this did not extend to the RSF (or its Tasis political arm), whom he pledged to eliminate. It therefore appeared limited to his allies and those who reject war. Excluding those who control Darfur and Kordofan would amount to a stark entrenchment of division and invite a reaction, reinforcing the RSF areas’ sense of marginalisation.

The army has given tacit approval to the use of racist and regionalist language against communities regarded as close to the RSF. This only aids those calling for secession and self-determination, mirroring the dynamic that took hold in South Sudan, whose citizens ultimately chose separation from the north and from the centre (Khartoum). The RSF also employs racist and regionalist language, which helps prepare the ground for the country’s eventual division.

Incentives to split

Foreign intervention in Sudan’s war is ongoing. States’ interests are shaped above all by Sudan’s geopolitical position. It borders eight countries across largely open natural frontiers, with a 1,000km Red Sea coastline. The sea is an increasingly important maritime corridor, given the recent closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Every state is guided by its own interests, whether Sudan fragments or remains united. Egypt, to Sudan’s north, wants to secure its southern border. Countries to Sudan’s west have overlapping tribal interests. Countries bordering the Red Sea want to safeguard navigation.

Sudan’s neighbours are concerned about the prospect of partition given its consequences for security. If Sudan becomes a zone of chronic fragility, this could breed terrorism and fuel wider regional conflicts. Yet partition is a familiar outcome of armed conflict, with past examples throughout the world. The prospect of Sudan’s breakup is closely tied to the war’s outcome. The danger of secession can be averted only by ending the fighting and addressing its consequences, including the rhetoric of mobilisation, incitement, racism, and regionalism.

Some have an interest in the war continuing. Commanders, politicians, and businessmen aligned with the warring factions have acquired material and political stakes in the conflict. Their gains may even expand in the event of partition, particularly in western Sudan, a region rich in minerals with good agricultural land. These interests and networks of influence could cross borders.

To avoid partition, a danger that draws nearer every day, Sudan urgently needs a peace that rests on consensus and accommodates the interests of all sides. This cannot come from the outright victory of one party over the other. An outcome of that kind would leave the prospect of renewed war once the defeated side had recovered its strength.

South Sudan provides a warning. Fighting ceased for roughly a decade after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, only to resume in 1983. That renewed war ended in secession. If Sudan is to avoid the same fate, it must reach political understandings broad enough to satisfy Sudanese society, address historical grievances, and open a genuine path towards reconciliation. Easier said than done.