China’s Show of Strength in the South China Sea Reveals Its Weakness

In recent years, the South China Sea has become one of the most contested regions in global politics, where minor incidents often have major consequences. What might appear to be routine encounters between coast guards or fishing vessels can quickly escalate into diplomatic crises, drawing in presidents, foreign ministers, and international alliances. 

The July 20 clash between Chinese and Philippine forces at the Second Thomas Shoal is a vivid example of how minor confrontations can ripple outward, shaping regional unity, testing alliances, and exposing the deeper insecurities behind China’s assertive posture.

In the days leading up to the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting on July 20, what should have been a routine diplomatic gathering was overshadowed by a dramatic clash at the Second Thomas Shoal. China Coast Guard personnel physically confronted Philippine Navy sailors, and reports claim a baton was used against a Filipino serviceman.

The incident immediately sparked accusations from both sides. Manila accused Beijing of aggression, while Beijing insisted the Philippines provoked the confrontation. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. responded swiftly, summoning China’s ambassador for a stern reprimand. 

At the same time, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who was in Manila to promote goodwill, was forced to admit that relations stood at a “critical crossroads.”

A Decade of Coercion in Disputed Waters 

This was not an isolated event. For nearly a decade, China has responded to minor disputes in the South China Sea with force rather than diplomacy. Philippine resupply boats have been targeted with water cannons, vessels have been rammed near the Scarborough Shoal, and Vietnamese fishermen have reported laser strikes. 

Each incident may seem small, but together they have created a larger problem for Beijing. Instead of strengthening its position, these actions have united Southeast Asian nations against China and handed the United States a diplomatic advantage without Washington needing to act.

Strength on Paper, Insecurity in Practice 

The question is why China, a rising power with clear long-term advantages, continues to behave this way. Economically, militarily, and geographically, China is in a strong position. It has time on its side. Yet its actions resemble those of a country desperate to prove itself. 

The answer lies partly in domestic politics. China’s leadership has built a narrative of national rejuvenation, promising that the country will never again be bullied as it was during the “century of humiliation.” 

To sustain this story, the government must regularly show strength. A retreat, even in a minor skirmish, would be seen as betraying the entire narrative. Nationalist rhetoric, once used to gain legitimacy, now binds the leadership to constant displays of toughness.

A Fragmented Chain of Command 

There is also a bureaucratic dimension. China’s maritime forces the Coast Guard, the maritime militia, and the PLA Navy do not operate under a single command. Each has overlapping responsibilities and incentives to prove its resolve. Officers often act to impress their superiors, not necessarily to follow a grand strategy. 

The baton strike at the Second Thomas Shoal was likely not a Politburo directive but a local decision driven by career ambitions. The result is a pattern of aggression created by accumulation, even when escalation was not intended.

From a strategic perspective, China does not need these confrontations. Its artificial islands are already built and militarized. Its coast guard fleet is larger than the combined fleets of its neighbors. Its economic weight ensures long-term influence. A patient China could simply wait, gradually entrenching its control through fishing fleets, dredging, and administrative measures that avoid headlines. 

Instead, incidents like the July 20 clash achieve the opposite. They push the Philippines closer to the United States, weaken ASEAN’s neutrality, and encourage countries like Japan, Australia, and India to coordinate against China’s maritime ambitions. Every viral video of a baton strike or water cannon blast strengthens China’s rivals more than years of quiet diplomacy ever could.

A Crossroads of China’s Own Making 

A confident China would act differently. It would allow Philippine resupply missions to proceed without interference, avoid dramatic incidents, and focus on building influence through economic ties and steady naval presence. This approach would make China appear predictable and consistent, qualities that benefit a stronger power. Yet China rarely chooses patience. Its assertiveness seems compulsive, driven by domestic politics and bureaucratic incentives.

Leaders cannot separate genuine national interests from the need to perform strength for domestic audiences. When Wang Yi warned that relations were at a “critical crossroads,” he was likely sincere. But the truth is that China keeps arriving at this crossroads by choice, not necessity. 

If Chinese strategists truly believe history favors them in the South China Sea, they should act like it. Great powers secure in their future do not need to prove it every few months with coast guard clashes. The countries that do usually reveal insecurity beneath their loud rhetoric.

The July 20 incident was more than a clash between sailors. It symbolized how China’s short-term compulsions undermine its long-term advantages. By choosing confrontation over patience, Beijing risks uniting its rivals and weakening its own position in the very waters it seeks to dominate.

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Author: Professor Pema Gyalpo