Juntas, Russia and the jihadist march towards the Gulf of Guinea [PART 1]

On Aug 18, 2026

A French officer discussing with a Malian soldier during the joint Franco-Malian Opération Éclipse (Opération Barkhane / Mali War).

Photo. Éric B./French Army / Wikimedia Commons

The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States was intended as a response to the failure of the existing model of cooperation with Europe and a vision of a security triumvirate. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger removed Western troops, withdrew from the structures of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), established a confederation, and turned towards the Russian Federation. The problem is that while the partners have changed, the situation in the region has not.

Since 2022, jihadist organisations have expanded their control over further rural areas, moving closer to cities (including the capital, Bamako), and JNIM Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) has shifted its activities towards Benin, Togo, and northern Ghana. After all these years, the Sahel is not safer; instead, it has become more closed off, more militarised, and practically impossible to stabilise.

However, the most significant change in recent years is not the withdrawal of France itself or the rise of Russian influence. It is the emergence of a space where two threats are developing simultaneously. On one hand, the Russian Federation utilises military regimes to seize influence, gain access to raw materials, and weaken the West’s position. On the other hand, jihadist organisations are occupying further territories and border zones. Russia and JNIM are fighting each other, but both entities benefit from the same phenomenon: the inefficiency of African states and the lack of a coherent international strategy from NATO and the EU, which were, after all, present on the continent for so many years.

The appearance of Al-Qaeda in the region is linked to the return of fighters leaving Afghanistan to their countries of origin. Historically, the formal initiation of the branch’s activities only took place after the civil war in Algeria, which lasted from 1992 to 2002. At that time, one of the most radical sides of the conflict, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat; GSPC), decided to join Osama bin Laden’s initiative. Similar trends could be observed in other regions of the world at the time, such as the Caucasus. The GSPC took part in fighting in North Africa but was defeated by the Algerian army. In 2007, the GSPC joined Al-Qaeda’s international network, becoming Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The group exploited the civil wars in Libya and Mali to relocate, moving the majority of its operations to the Sahel region. After initial successes in 2012–2013 and the creation of an Emirate by fundamentalists, the French intervention, Operation Serval, deprived AQIM of its controlled strongholds, which eventually led to the fragmentation of the entire structure. In 2017, the component elements of AQIM that had been defeated in 2013 attempted to consolidate once again due to prolonged fighting with the French and the emergence of the Islamic State in the region. Since then, AQIM has acted as Al-Qaeda’s chief command in West and North Africa, while JNIM, established in March 2017, serves as the armed wing slowly creating its own foundations of statehood.

In 2026, JNIM became the most important Al-Qaeda structure in the central Sahel. According to the US National Counterterrorism Center, the organisation has at least 6,000 members. It has expanded its operations from northern and central Mali to a significant part of Burkina Faso, western Niger, and the borderlands of Benin and Togo.

Alliance of Military Regimes

The path to the creation of theAlliance des États du Sahel, or the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), began with a series of coups d’état. In Mali, the military seized power in 2020 and subsequently carried out another coup in 2021. In Burkina Faso, two coups occurred in 2022, while in Niger, the legitimate authorities were overthrown in July 2023 (the president remains imprisoned). Each time, the military’s argument was similar: politicians were allegedly failing to deal with terrorism, remained too dependent on the French Republic, and were unable to regain control over the state.

In September 2023, the three regimes signed the Liptako-Gourma Charter, creating a mutual defence mechanism. In July 2024, they transformed the alliance into a confederation intended to coordinate foreign and economic policy as well. Subsequently, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger withdrew from ECOWAS, and their departure became formally effective on 29 January 2025. The organisation maintained some travel and trade concessions, as an immediate severance of these ties would have primarily impacted the population rather than the military leaders. Significantly, ECOWAS decided against an attack on Niger (which had been the original plan).

The AES has achieved political success. The three juntas survived regional pressure, collectively resisted demands to return to constitutional order, and built a narrative of regaining sovereignty. The confederation cannot be considered purely a propaganda project, as the states coordinate some decisions, develop joint forces, and present a united front to foreign partners. In 2025, a joint corps of 5,000 soldiers was created. This does not mean a single system of command, reconnaissance, and border control has been established, but military potential exists. The question arises: is it for defence?

The security balance is significantly worse than in previous years. The juntas won the dispute over who should decide their policy, but they have not won the war for their countries. The states maintain control of the capitals, most large cities, and main military bases, while JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel have expanded their influence networks in rural areas. They control routes, impose taxes, blockade towns, and decide on access to local markets. This is the primary paradox of the Sahel juntas: the more loudly they speak of sovereignty, the less control they exercise over their own territory. Currently, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger each control no more than 50% of their own territory.

The Collapse of the Missions

The French Republic entered Mali in 2013, launching Operation Serval. The immediate objective was to halt the jihadist offensive moving south and prevent a threat to Bamako. The operation brought swift results, as the most important cities in the north were recaptured and part of the infrastructure of Al-Qaeda-linked groups was destroyed. However, success did not translate into a lasting political and social solution; therefore, in 2014, Serval was replaced by Operation Barkhane, covering Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania (G5 Sahel).

At its peak, approximately 5,100 French soldiers participated in Barkhane, supported by the forces of the G5 Sahel states as well as European and US partners. The French utilised virtually every asset at their disposal: combat aircraft, helicopters, air transport, Reaper drones, and extensive reconnaissance capabilities. The annual cost of the operation was estimated at €1 billion. It was the largest French military operation in Africa, and its scale demonstrates how many capabilities vanished after the withdrawal.

It cannot be said that Barkhane did not achieve successes. Commanders were eliminated, equipment was destroyed, and the terrorists’ freedom of movement was restricted. In 2020 alone, over 1,200 terrorists were neutralised. On the other hand, dozens of French soldiers died during the operation, a fact still held against French politicians today. The problem was that while the military could recapture a town, it was unable to replace the administration, courts, and local services. Tactics were often effective, but stabilisation remained virtually imperceptible. Thus, the military level is one thing, but the social and organisational level is another.

Barkhane was intended to remain outside Malian politics, but this proved impossible. The operation became a protective umbrella for the elites in Bamako, who benefited from foreign support without implementing necessary reforms. At the same time, some Malians did not understand why France was fighting jihadists but not resolving the conflict with separatists in the north. Accusations of neo-colonialism grew, and Russian propaganda effectively amplified the message that France’s presence served only to maintain influence. Interestingly, at a crucial moment, the French were even accused of genocide against Malians.

France’s withdrawal ended a multi-year fight against terrorism. Furthermore, it marked the end of an ineffective campaign that possessed enormous military potential. Aviation, reconnaissance, transport, and command experience disappeared—assets that the armies of the Sahel states could not replace. Mali also demanded the termination of the MINUSMA mission, whose mandate expired in 2023. The UN mission did not conduct offensives against JNIM, but it protected some cities, monitored the situation, and ensured a presence in areas where state administration was exceptionally weak. Its departure created another vacuum.

The G5 Sahel collapsed, key European Union missions ended, and Niger also brought about the withdrawal of American forces and the loss of the US drone base in Agadez. This does not mean that the previous model of Western presence was ideal. However, it must be explicitly stated that the dismantling of the European-American presence has restricted the capacity to fight jihadists and separatists.

Look out for PART 2 of the analysis, which will be published soon

Credit: Source link