Yemen: Where the United Arab Emirates Succeeded Where Others Failed
By Dr.François Frisonroche
Paris – Since the outbreak of the war in Yemen, several regional powers have become involved in the conflict, each pursuing different strategies, deploying different resources, and working with different local partners. After more than a decade of war, many of these experiences can now be assessed by the results achieved on the ground, rather than solely through official political statements.
The fundamental question, therefore, is this: who succeeded in building a local partnership capable of fighting and holding territory, and who continued to rely on official institutions weakened by corruption, tribal and political divisions, and a lack of military effectiveness?
In southern Yemen and along the western coast, the United Arab Emirates adopted, from the early years of the war, an approach largely based on building direct partnerships with local forces. It supported the Southern Resistance and contributed to the training, professionalization, and arming of military and security formations that later became some of the most organized and influential forces on the ground.
The Emirati choice was therefore not based solely on official status or international political recognition, but on criteria directly linked to the realities of war: who is capable of fighting? Who can liberate territory? And who can protect it once it has been liberated?
The Battle Began in Aden
It was in Aden, Yemen’s “temporary capital,” that the first major turning point took place.
After the Houthis and their allies entered the city in 2015, the Southern Resistance fought fierce battles with the support of the Arab Coalition, including troops and armored vehicles from the United Arab Emirates. These clashes ended with the Houthis being driven out of Aden, before operations expanded into other parts of the South.
More structured military and security formations later emerged from that resistance. Local resistance groups gradually evolved into forces capable of conducting large-scale military and security operations.
The confrontation was not limited to the Houthis. It also extended to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, particularly in the governorates of Aden, Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramout.
The Emirati experience thus evolved from providing military support to helping build a local partnership equipped with leadership, military capabilities, logistical organization, and, above all, a genuine motivation to fight.
From Aden to the Gates of Hodeidah
This experience did not stop at the borders of the South. On the western coast, Yemeni forces backed by the United Arab Emirates made significant military advances. In 2018, the fighting reached the outskirts of the port city of Hodeidah.
Anti-Houthi forces were then close to altering the balance of power around one of the Red Sea’s most important ports and strategic locations. The offensive, however, was halted amid international pressure and a diplomatic process that culminated in the signing of the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018.
Several years later, the paradox is striking. Yemen’s Red Sea coast and the port city of Hodeidah have become central to the crisis surrounding threats to international shipping in the Red Sea. The Houthis have used coastal areas under their control to launch attacks against vessels.
A legitimate question therefore arises: what would the security of the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait look like today if the Battle of Hodeidah had been carried through to its conclusion in 2018?
It is impossible to say with certainty what would have happened in a scenario that never occurred. But one thing is clear: keeping this strategic coastline under Houthi control later gave the group the ability to influence a security equation that is no longer merely Yemeni, but international.
Saudi Arabia: Betting on the Government and the Official Army
By contrast, Saudi Arabia relied more heavily on Yemen’s internationally recognized government and its official military institutions.
In theory, this choice appears understandable: there is a legitimate government, a Ministry of Defense, an army, military regions, brigades, and an official chain of command. But wars are not won on organizational charts.
Over the years, the government military establishment suffered from divisions, corruption, conflicting loyalties, poor management, and the absence of a unified military strategy. The gap between troop numbers listed in official records and the actual capabilities available on the ground became one of the clearest manifestations of this crisis.
The acknowledgment came from within the institution itself. Yemen’s current Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Taher Al-Aqili, revealed the existence of around 300,000 fictitious military names or duplicate registrations within the forces stationed in liberated governorates, out of a total of approximately 720,000 names, according to several sources.
When the issue involves hundreds of thousands of fictitious, repeated, or duplicated names, it is no longer simply a matter of individual cases of corruption. It becomes a structural dysfunction that directly affects the military institution’s ability to conduct war.
Billions of Dollars in Support… Yet Frontlines Retreated
This is where one of the greatest paradoxes of the Saudi experience in Yemen becomes apparent. Despite years of political, financial, and military support, government forces failed to achieve a sustained strategic advance toward Sana’a. On several occasions, the opposite occurred, to the Houthis’ advantage.
Large areas of Al-Jawf Governorate fell into Houthi hands, while Marib came under repeated offensives and lost several districts during different phases of the war.
Instead of advancing from Marib and Al-Jawf toward Sana’a, large sections of the frontlines turned into defensive positions and zones of attrition.
More seriously, these years of stagnation gave the Houthis the time they needed to develop their military capabilities, missiles, and drones, transforming from an armed group engaged in a domestic war into a force capable of threatening international navigation in the Red Sea.
The United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, chose its partners on the ground. The fundamental difference in the Emirati approach was that Abu Dhabi did not bet exclusively on existing institutions. Instead, the UAE sought local partners who possessed both the motivation and the capacity to fight.
In the South in particular, the local factor proved decisive. A fighter who sees his city, his land, and his political future as being directly at the heart of the battle has a different motivation from a soldier whose name may appear on the lists of a weakened military institution without always knowing where his command is located or what strategy it is pursuing.
This is one reason why southern formations were able to fight intense battles against the Houthis while simultaneously taking part in operations against Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
One may politically disagree with the Southern Transitional Council or with the future of the “Southern Question.” But it is difficult to ignore the fact that southern forces have become an unavoidable military and security reality on the ground.
This is precisely the heart of the Emirati experience: building a partnership with an actor that possesses territory, leadership, weapons, and genuine motivation, rather than with a partner whose main asset is international recognition alone.
From War Against the Houthis to Seeking an Agreement With Them
By contrast, Saudi priorities gradually evolved. After years under the slogan of retaking Sana’a and ending the Houthi takeover, Riyadh increasingly shifted toward seeking a political settlement and a roadmap that could bring its confrontation with the Houthis to an end.
The problem, however, is that the Houthis are no longer simply one Yemeni party whose dispute can be contained within the framework of a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. Their military and political ties with Iran, as well as their integration into Tehran’s regional network of influence, mean that any settlement between Riyadh and the Houthis now depends on considerations that extend far beyond Yemen’s borders.
Yemeni Defense Minister Taher Al-Aqili himself stated in July 2026 that the Houthis were exploiting Yemen’s geographic position to threaten international navigation in service of the political and military agenda of their Iranian backers.
This is where the limitations of betting on a bilateral agreement become apparent. Saudi Arabia may be able to negotiate an end to attacks targeting its territory or borders. But a much more difficult question remains: can bilateral arrangements truly separate the Houthis from Iran’s broader strategic calculations in the Red Sea and the wider region?
The South and Peace With the Houthis
Southern forces, foremost among them the Southern Transitional Council led by Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, viewed with suspicion any settlement that might consolidate the Houthis as the dominant military force in northern Yemen without providing a fundamental answer to the Southern Question.
From the southern perspective, a peace deal that preserves the Houthi military arsenal while postponing resolution of the conflict’s fundamental issues may amount to little more than a truce that delays another war rather than a genuine solution capable of ending it.
It was in this context that differences between Riyadh and its southern allies gradually began to evolve into a political and military crisis, especially as competition intensified over Hadramout Governorate and the future of the South.
The events that unfolded in Hadramout and the clashes witnessed in the southern arena nevertheless require documented analysis, away from conflicting narratives, particularly regarding the direct responsibility of different actors and the number of casualties.
But the political consequence is clear: any confrontation between forces supposedly belonging to the anti-Houthi camp gives the Houthis another opportunity to consolidate their position.
An Internationally Recognized Government… But Where Is the Territory It Governs?
Yemen today faces a particularly stark paradox. On the one hand, there is a government that enjoys international recognition but has suffered for years from limited direct presence and influence on the ground. On the other, there are southern local forces that control territory, bases, fighters, and real influence.
This is where the gap between legal legitimacy and effectiveness on the ground becomes apparent. International recognition gives the government political and diplomatic legitimacy. But recognition alone does not create an effective army, liberate a city, or protect a frontline.
In war, political legitimacy must be backed by genuine power on the ground capable of defending it. Otherwise, it risks gradually becoming more of a diplomatic reference than an actual authority.
A Military Success That Was Not Fully Exploited
The United Arab Emirates succeeded militarily in building its local partnerships. When military outcomes alone are assessed, one reality remains particularly visible: the forces in which the UAE invested through training, organization, and armament achieved concrete results on the ground at several decisive moments, from Aden and the fight against Al-Qaeda and ISIS to the western coast and the outskirts of Hodeidah.
These results did not disappear when the UAE reduced its direct military presence, because a significant part of the Emirati investment consisted precisely of building local forces rather than permanently deploying Emirati troops on the ground.
The Problem Was Not a Lack of Money
The Yemeni experience also shows that the crisis was never simply about a lack of support. Enormous sums of money, weapons, and resources were poured into the war. Yet the results varied greatly depending on the structures into which those resources were invested.
This is the fundamental difference between financing an institution and building a force. On paper, an army may number several hundred thousand soldiers. But that figure loses its military value if a significant proportion of the personnel are fictitious, duplicated, or registered multiple times, as noted above.
By contrast, a smaller force can prove far more effective on the ground if it is organized, has a unified command, knows its territory, and pursues a clearly defined objective.
The statements by Defense Minister Taher Al-Aqili regarding fictitious names and duplicate registrations give this comparison even greater weight, because they come from the highest level of the government military institution itself, rather than from its opponents.
Yemen: Where the United Arab Emirates Succeeded Where Others Failed
After more than a decade of war, perhaps the main lesson is that Yemen cannot be managed from outside solely through diplomatic relations, international recognition of a government, and political decisions imposed from elsewhere.
Yemen is a complex society. Forces with local roots, leaders present alongside their fighters, and the ability to defend their territory are the ones most likely to endure. The United Arab Emirates understood the importance of the local and tribal factor early on. It chose its partners, contributed to their training, armament, and organization, and largely linked its support to their ability to achieve concrete results on the ground.
The Saudi experience encountered a different problem. Riyadh invested for years in a government and official military institutions, but the scale of that support did not translate into proportionate military results. Today, the current Minister of Defense himself is revealing the scale of the accumulated dysfunctions.
After all these years, the outcome presents a historical paradox: the Houthis, whose domination of northern Yemen by force the war was initially intended to end, have become a force capable of threatening international navigation in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, while the forces that reached the outskirts of Hodeidah and came within steps of changing the map of control along the coast saw their offensive halted before it could be completed.
Between a government that has long suffered from a weak effective presence on the ground and southern forces that fought both the Houthis and terrorist organizations while building genuine military and security influence, the importance of choosing the right local partner becomes clear.
The UAE left behind forces that remain present and influential on the ground, while other actors are still searching for ways to reform institutions in which they invested years of support.
The United Arab Emirates succeeded in Yemen, in one essential aspect of its involvement, because it invested in partners capable of fighting and holding territory. The contrasting experience demonstrated that international recognition, money, and weapons are not enough when leadership, organization, and accountability are absent.
Perhaps this is the most important lesson of the entire Yemen war: it is not enough for your ally to be recognized on paper; in a country like Yemen, that ally must be present on the ground and capable of defending it.