Why Somalia’s Constitutional Crisis Threatens the Horn of Africa

Since the first week of June, Somalia has been in turmoil as federal government forces clashed with militias aligned with opposition leaders. Initially, the protests began over the term extension and constitutional amendments, and later escalated into violence. Meanwhile, Somalia is already battling terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. At the same time, many regions, including Somaliland, are seeking separation from Somalia. Given Somalia’s already fragile condition, the recent clashes hint at a very precarious future.

Despite the familiar context, the latest crisis appears more dangerous than previous ones, as the future of Somalia’s political system, the cohesion of the Somali state, and the stability of the already volatile Horn of Africa are all at stake.

The current political crisis is not only of the same nature but also of the same causes. Similar tensions erupted in 2021, when then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmaajo, attempted to extend his term. Like Groundhog Day, every incumbent party before the election attempts to modify the constitution in the name of transformative reforms – and every time, the opposition party rejects it, accusing the government of an authoritarian approach. Despite the familiar context, the latest crisis appears more dangerous than previous ones, as the future of Somalia’s political system, the cohesion of the Somali state, and the stability of the already volatile Horn of Africa are all at stake.

Somalia’s Constitutional Crisis

The roots of the recent unrest lie in March, when President Mohamud attempted a controversial constitutional overhaul that extended the terms of both the president and parliament from four to five years, allowing him to remain in office for an additional year. The other, rather crucial, reform attempted in this constitutional change is to replace Somalia’s clan-based indirect electoral system with a one-person, one-vote model.

Somalia has not held a direct nationwide election since 1969. On 20 August 2012, when the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was established, the country adopted an indirect arrangement for choosing its president. Under this system, clan elders would select parliamentarians, who would then elect the president. As the country emerged from decades of civil war, this hybrid system of select and elect worked well to maintain political balance. However, the system was designed as a temporary solution. Over time, not only did it endure, but it became a corrupt system of elite bargaining and bribes in which parliamentary seats can effectively be bought, with prices ranging from hundreds of thousands to over a million dollars.

Universal suffrage is necessary to democratise Somalia so that every ordinary citizen can enjoy equal rights. While the opposition also agrees with this goal, their protest stems from the undemocratic process of democratising the country. The constitution was passed in parliament without consulting the opposition, resulting in an opposition boycott. As doubts over the electoral commission’s partiality in overseeing future elections loom large, there is a fear that the incumbent will always win. Conducting a nationwide election while Al-Shabaab effectively controls large parts of the country would also pose logistical challenges.

According to the 2012 constitution, Somalia consists of seven federal member states. Many of them have been unhappy with Mogadishu’s increasing tendency to centralise. While Puntland has withdrawn recognition of the federal government, Jubaland continues to operate with considerable autonomy. Meanwhile, Somaliland has acted as a de facto independent state since 1991, building its own institutions over three decades. More recently, South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle have also come into conflict with Mogadishu, accusing it of interfering in local political processes and attempting to install loyalist leaders.

Conducting a nationwide election while Al-Shabaab effectively controls large parts of the country would also pose logistical challenges.

While the 2021 clash resulted in severe violence and was followed by a political compromise under intense international pressure, the stakes are higher this time. While the political infighting continues, a larger threat, Al-Shabaab, continues to grow its influence. In recent years, the group has established itself as one of Africa’s most resilient insurgencies, controlling territory, collecting taxes, conducting bombings, and exploiting weaknesses in state authority. Therefore, any political instability would strengthen the group, as attention and resources get diverted. A very similar situation was witnessed in Mali in 2021, when different secessionist and Jihadist groups attempted to take control of the country, taking advantage of post-coup instability.

Implications for the Horn of Africa

The current instability in Somalia could further destabilise the already volatile Horn of Africa. Given the region’s location along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, it could impact maritime trade, which is already suffering from the Hormuz crisis. Beyond trade disruption, an unstable Somalia would result in refugee flows, cross-border militancy, piracy, and security challenges for its neighbours.

Neighbouring countries, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, are therefore following developments closely, as both have substantial security interests in Somalia. A weakened federal government could create new opportunities for extremist networks operating across East Africa. At the same time, growing tensions between Mogadishu and the federal member states could complicate regional diplomatic efforts and deepen existing geopolitical rivalries and proxy wars in the Horn of Africa.

Growing tensions between Mogadishu and the federal member states could complicate regional diplomatic efforts and deepen existing geopolitical rivalries and proxy wars in the Horn of Africa.

What Lies in the Future for Somalia?

Although mediation by clan elders and pressure from international actors temporarily prevented wider confrontation this time, the underlying dispute remains unresolved. This disagreement over electoral procedures could significantly impact the distribution of power within Somalia’s fragile federal system and lead to a de facto balkanisation.

The collapse of Yugoslavia and Afghanistan can serve as a stark warning for Somalia. As in Yugoslavia, Somalia is engaged in a constitutional debate over federalism versus regional autonomy. At the same time, it faces an active insurgency that can exploit political divisions and weak state institutions, similar to Afghanistan.

Somalia may not get Balkanised just yet; it can become a dangerous battlefield where the federal government, federal member states, clan militias, and different terrorist groups are all competing for authority.

Somalia stands at a crossroads. It can choose either gradual reform, which would lead to direct elections, but at the expense of greater authority for Mogadishu, or further decentralisation, which could lead to deeper fragmentation and further erosion of central authority. Somalia may not get Balkanised just yet; it can become a dangerous battlefield where the federal government, federal member states, clan militias, and different terrorist groups are all competing for authority. The path to a stable Somalia would involve protracted discussions, negotiations, and unpleasant compromises from all sides.

Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

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