Why Iraq’s Southern Wasteland Has Become a Security Concern for Saudi Arabia

A vast stretch of open, flat terrain runs for roughly 814 kilometers (506 miles) along Iraq’s border, from Anbar Province in the west to Muthanna in the south. Sparse in water and largely uninhabited, it is, from a military planning perspective, one of the region’s most suitable landscapes for concealing anything that needs to remain hidden.

That same geography has become a source of growing concern for Saudi Arabia.

At the heart of the region lies the desert of Muthanna Province, where large-scale agricultural projects are now being managed by Al Muhandis General Company, the economic arm of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The company is named after Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis, the PMF’s deputy commander, who was killed alongside Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad in early 2020. The U.S. has long designated the Quds Force, the IRGC’s external operations arm, as a terrorist organization.

Al Muhandis General Company was established with government approval in November 2022, shortly after the formation of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s government. It was officially registered with Iraq’s Ministry of Trade in February 2023, with  100 billion Iraqi dinars (about $75 million) in capital, wholly owned by the PMF.

Weeks after its registration, the company launched what it called the “One Million Tissue-Cultured Palm Trees” project in the Samawah desert, south of Muthanna. At the inauguration ceremony, PMF Chairman Faleh al-Fayyadh said the initiative was intended to make the force “a partner in reconstruction and development,” adding that all the PMF’s economic activities would be carried out through Al Muhandis Company.

The project’s executive director outlined ambitions that extended far beyond palm cultivation. The plan envisions reclaiming two million dunams of land—terrain described as abandoned, rugged and littered with old minefields—while drilling groundwater wells and introducing jojoba trees imported from Egypt because of their ability to withstand harsh desert conditions.

The first phase covered 400 dunams—equivalent to about one million square meters—and included the planting of 20,000 palm trees. Al Muhandis was not the only entity expanding into the desert; the Imam Hussein Shrine in Karbala announced that it completed procedures to acquire one million dunams in the Salman subdistrict, the Iraqi district closest to the Saudi border, for an integrated agricultural project. Other companies also launched wheat and palm cultivation projects across the same area.

Within three years, the Muthanna desert became a major zone of economic activity, with most of it controlled by entities affiliated with the PMF and operating close to Saudi Arabia’s frontier.

The Saudi Project That Never Materialized

The story did not begin with Al Muhandis Company. As early as 2018, Iraq and Saudi Arabia discussed a large-scale Saudi agricultural investment in the deserts of Anbar and Samawah as part of efforts to activate the Iraqi-Saudi Coordination Council. Officials spoke at the time of developing up to one million hectares, presenting the initiative as an economic gateway to rebuilding relations between the two countries.

The plan quickly ran into fierce political resistance.

In 2020, opponents denounced government approval for Saudi investment in the Samawah desert  as “politically and publicly unacceptable,” while lawmakers warned it could amount to “economic colonization.”

The campaign intensified in 2022. The State of Law Coalition, led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, called for the cancellation of a license that would have granted Saudi Arabia 150,000 dunams in Iraq’s western desert.

Qais al-Khazali, leader of the Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq, described the project as “malicious,” arguing that it represented Israeli investment disguised as a Saudi venture and warning that it posed “extremely dangerous” security risks. Tribes organized gatherings in Muthanna to oppose the project.

In August 2025, Iraq’s Parliament failed to reach a quorum for a session that had been expected to approve an Iraq-Saudi investment law. Media outlets close to Iran-aligned factions portrayed the collapse of the session as  “foiling an attempt to sell off the Samawah desert.”

Why Riyadh Is Concerned

Saudi Arabia’s concerns have little to do with palm trees or wheat.

In October 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Al Muhandis General Company and Baladna Agricultural Investments. In a statement, The U.S. Treasury said Kataib Hezbollah, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S., had established Al Muhandis Company as an economic front for its activities and that it was controlled by Abdul Aziz al-Mohammadawi, better known as Abu Fadak, the PMF’s chief of staff. According to the Treasury, the company was used to divert state funds into commercial front companies that financed armed factions and weapons-smuggling operations coordinated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S.

Baghdad expressed regret over the sanctions and established a national committee to review the decision.

But for Saudi Arabia, the U.S. designation reinforced an assessment it had already reached: that the entity dominating Iraq’s southern desert was not simply an agricultural company, but part of a military-economic network linked to Tehran and operating along the kingdom’s northern border.

At the same time, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government, in office for only a few months, finds itself facing an almost impossible equation. Caught between domestic armed groups and mounting external pressure, it is searching for ways to contain Iraq’s overlapping security crises while curbing the influence of armed factions.

According to information obtained by MBN from sources within the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, al-Zaidi is seeking to transfer revenues generated by Al Muhandis Company from the PMF to the Ministry of Agriculture, part of a broader effort to weaken the financial networks that sustain Iraq’s armed factions.

The 40-Day War: What Was Made Public and What Was Not

Between Feb. 28 and April 8, 2026, the United States and Israel fought a roughly 40-day war against Iran. Saudi Arabia was far from untouched.

On March 2, a drone strike targeted the Ras Tanura refinery, the kingdom’s largest, followed by a second attack two days later. Saudi Aramco suspended operations and began searching for alternative export routes as oil prices surged.

Explosions were also reported east of Riyadh, while two drones targeted the U.S. Embassy in the capital. Iranian strikes hit radar installations supporting THAAD missile defense systems in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. Riyadh said it had intercepted 10 drones and two cruise missiles, reporting two civilian deaths and 12 injuries.

But what was not publicly disclosed may be more significant in explaining Saudi Arabia’s subsequent actions.

Iraqi sources who spoke to MBN said the kingdom absorbed far heavier attacks during the 40-day conflict than officials acknowledged publicly. According to those sources, Riyadh deliberately downplayed the scale of the strikes to avoid escalation and to preserve the image of stability underpinning its economic transformation agenda.

MBN could not independently verify those claims.

Meanwhile, two Iraqi security sources told MBN that the Saudi Air Force carried out undisclosed strikes during the conflict against launch sites inside Iran as well as positions held by Iran-backed factions inside Iraq. In March 2026, a series of unexplained airstrikes targeted PMF sites in Kirkuk, Nineveh and Anbar, although no party claimed responsibility.

Earlier, in 2024, Baghdad and Riyadh held their first broad border security talks in a decade. According to accounts of the discussions, the talks focused on reinforcing the frontier with fencing, concrete barriers and advanced surveillance systems, while keeping armed factions away from the border area.

Sources familiar with Saudi security measures told MBN that those efforts have gone beyond physical fortifications in recent years. According to the sources, Saudi Arabia established a heavily restricted security zone extending roughly five kilometers from the border and issued orders authorizing border forces to fire on anyone entering the area. Riyadh has not officially confirmed those measures, and MBN could not independently verify the information through a second source.

When Riyadh Crossed the Border

On July 27, 2026, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Ministry said it had intercepted drones launched from Iraqi territory that were attempting to strike oil facilities in the Eastern Province and Riyadh. The ministry blamed what it described as “Iranian-backed terrorist militias.” Baghdad opened an investigation and asked Saudi authorities for additional information.

Before the investigation produced any results, Saudi Arabia acted.

Before dawn on July 29, Saudi armed forces, coordinating with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), carried out strikes against PMF positions in seven Iraqi provinces: Baghdad, Wasit, Nineveh, Basra, Kirkuk, Karbala and Diyala.

The PMF said at least 20 people were killed and 32 wounded. Five members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were also reported killed at the Abu Muntazer al-Mohammadawi camp in Diyala.

CENTCOM said the strikes came in response to more than 30 drone attacks over a 72-hour period and followed more than 600 attempted attacks targeting U.S. personnel and facilities between February and April.

It marked the first time Saudi Arabia had publicly acknowledged carrying out military strikes inside Iraqi territory and shows that the kingdom may be more willing to protect its interests militarily as regional conflict continues.

Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.