Time to Rethink Russia Policy in Japan
In an earlier column, I argued that Japan’s diplomacy toward Russia should be grounded in two forms of realism.
The first is the need to critically reassess the assumption that taking a conciliatory approach toward Russia will lead to progress in peace treaty and territorial negotiations.
The second is to rethink “realism” from Japan’s perspective. Realism in international relations is generally discussed from the standpoint of great powers. Japan, however, is not a great power and must consider what a realistic foreign policy looks like from its own position.
Putin’s Landing on Etorofu
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s landing on Etorofu Island in the Northern Territories on August 13 illustrates the need for the first form of realism. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration has maintained Japan’s sanctions on Russia and support for Ukraine, but has refrained from taking a harder line than previous governments.
At the same time, the administration has avoided holding a summit with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy or sending cabinet ministers to Ukraine. By contrast, it has allowed what effectively amounts to an economic mission to Russia, as well as the dispatch of university students there.
Yet despite these efforts to avoid antagonizing Moscow, Putin still landed on Etorofu, one of the four islands claimed by Japan.
The idea that greater engagement with Russia could break the deadlock over a peace treaty and the territorial dispute was also central to Shinzo Abe’s approach to Moscow. However, Abe’s Russia diplomacy ultimately produced no progress on the core territorial issue.
It also failed to achieve another stated goal: preventing Russia from moving closer to China. Instead, China-Russia ties deepened during and after this period, eventually expanding into the military sphere.
Close Coordination Between China and Russia
The Takaichi administration’s approach to Russia risks repeating the same mistake. It has pursued greater engagement with Moscow than recent Japanese governments, yet Russia’s stance toward Japan has only hardened. This suggests the policy’s underlying assumptions need reconsideration.
Putin’s visit marked the first time in 16 years that a Russian head of state had set foot on the Northern Territories, and the first time Putin himself had done so. Given the political significance of such a move, the question is why Moscow chose to make it now.
There is nothing inherently wrong with keeping communication channels open. But if Moscow interprets Japan’s engagement efforts as a sign of weakness, Tokyo needs to reconsider its approach.
The circumstances surrounding Putin’s visit are also significant. Moscow gave Tokyo no advance notice of the landing, but did inform Beijing. Moreover, Putin arrived on Etorofu shortly after China and Russia concluded a joint maritime patrol.
Within hours of the landing, the Chinese and Russian ambassadors to Japan issued a joint statement pledging to “defend the outcomes of World War II.” Taken together, these developments suggest that Putin’s landing on Etorofu was closely coordinated with China.
One possible counterargument is that Japan simply has not gone far enough in its engagement with Russia. Some might argue that lifting sanctions on Moscow and ending support for Ukraine could pave the way for the return of the Northern Territories.
But would such an approach really solve the problem? More importantly, would it serve Japan’s national interest as a country that is not itself a great power?
Japan seeks the return of the Northern Territories because it regards their occupation as the result of a past violation of its sovereignty.
It would therefore be contradictory for Tokyo to overlook Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty today in the hope of resolving its own territorial dispute.
And if Japan’s sovereignty were violated again in the future, on what grounds could it expect other countries to condemn it?
Before landing on Etorofu, Putin met with the commander of Russia’s Pacific Fleet and criticized Japan for imposing sanctions and treating Russia as a threat without, he claimed, seriously examining the conflict’s background.
Putin has also described Japan as a country “with limited sovereignty.” From his perspective, Tokyo’s sanctions on Russia and support for Ukraine are therefore likely seen not as independent Japanese policy choices, but as measures taken at Washington’s behest.
Japan Must Defend the International Order
But has Russia itself seriously considered why so many Japanese continue to support sanctions on Moscow and aid to Ukraine more than four and a half years into the war?
Public support for remaining engaged in a distant conflict reflects a broader concern: the international order on which Japan’s security depends is under threat, and Japan cannot simply stand by when that order is violated.
This principle should also guide Japan’s diplomacy toward Russia. As a country whose security depends heavily on a rules-based international order, Japan has a strong interest in opposing attempts to undermine it.
So far, the Japanese government has limited its response to Putin’s landing to a diplomatic protest. Decisions over precisely what measures to take, and how far to go, are ultimately best left to Japan’s diplomatic professionals.
At a minimum, however, Tokyo should consider measures similar to those it took after then-President Dmitry Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island in 2010, including temporarily recalling its ambassador.
Otherwise, Japan risks sending the message that each successive visit to the disputed islands will provoke a weaker response than the last. Three weeks have now passed since Putin’s landing. The Japanese government should not let the issue—or its response—fade away.
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Putin Visit to Etorofu Ends Image of Openness to Japan
(Read the article in Japanese.)
Author: Yu Koizumi, Associate Professor, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo