The writing on the wall: The urgent need for political agreement in Somalia

By: Afyare A. Elmi
Monday July 20, 2026

On Monday, July 20, 2026, there will be another round of discussions facilitated by the international community between the government and the opposition. Two proposals are essentially on the table.

Summary of Proposals

In 2019, former President @M_Farmajo’s government presented the proposal currently being used by President @HassanSMohamud’s administration. The government’s constitution and its 2024 Election Law diverge on several points. This proposal entails one national constituency, party-based open-list proportional representation, and a single central election commission. The 2024 legislation stipulates competition among three parties, while its new constitution states that associations will compete, and any party reaching the 10% threshold would become a recognized party. Additionally, citizens would choose parties, and those parties would own the seats (with no defection allowed). Finally, a central election commission appointed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) would manage all elections.

The opposition’s proposal is rooted in the 2020 parliamentary proposal prepared by a committee led by former MP Abdullahi Arab. This proposal is based on the First Past the Post electoral formula, reserving seats for the clans and sub-clans that occupy them, with each seat located in a city close to the traditional home of the respective sub-clan. Citizens would be free to vote for any seat they choose, electing candidates rather than parties. The election commission would be divided among three entities: the FGS, Federal Member States (FMS), and the opposition.

Rhetoric aside, neither proposal offers a one-person, one-vote system; both are indirect.

Commentary

The government proposal is impractical for several reasons. The primary contention now revolves around three questions: What electoral formula will be used? Will voters elect parties or individual candidates? What is the district (constituency) magnitude?

The government favors Open-List Proportional Representation, where voters choose parties within one national constituency. In contrast, the opposition supports First Past the Post, where citizens choose candidates, with constituencies defined by the sub-clans that own the seats, resulting in 275 clan constituencies.

The government’s 2024 legislation and its constitution are not aligned regarding the role of parties. However, both the three-party proposal in the legislation and the 10% threshold in its constitution cannot be implemented within the available time frame, even if extended for another year. Local elections that produce three parties cannot occur in time. The threshold-based proposal will also face significant implementation challenges due to the multitude of associations, many of which are not even registered. Numerous structural, political, and cultural impediments hinder the use of parties in the upcoming electoral process.

Furthermore, the government’s proposal is committed to maintaining the 4.5 clan power-sharing model. Thus, its single-national constituency proposal cannot fit within this framework and would result in a gerrymandered outcome. Additionally, a party-based, one-national constituency would empower political party bosses to replace clan constituencies, allowing them to select and dismiss MPs at any time, potentially leading to further polarization and community grievances. The legislators elected through the party system will be accountable to the party and its boss, not to the clan-constituency that owned the seat. Major cities, particularly Mogadishu, would disproportionately influence outcomes, disadvantaging peripheral and rural regions and creating an imbalance. The government’s proposal would only make sense if it abandoned the 4.5 clan power-sharing model.

Several prerequisite tasks remain unfinished before the election. The constitution is contested; the government supports its own version, while the opposition insists on the 2012 constitution. The census has not been completed, citizenship laws and political districts have yet to be established, and large parts of the country remain inaccessible due to security or political reasons. Any election conducted based on one national constituency would exclude many communities.

On the other hand, the opposition’s proposal is more practical, although it may require a technical extension of at least one year. Under this proposal, each seat will be contested in the city where the sub-clan resides, with seats reserved for the clans occupying them. Any person interested in voting for a particular seat can do so. This does not fundamentally change the clan dynamics, as most voters for a given seat would come from the same community. This is a tribal society, and that must be acknowledged, even if some enlightened urban Somalis choose to vote outside their communities.

Considering the aforementioned questions, for the long term and after the census is completed, political districts established, and the country secured, a case can be made for multi-district, list proportional representation. For now, since we are still in the power-sharing phase, there is no option other than First Past the Post based on existing clan-communal constituencies. Both camps agree to reserve each seat for the community that currently owns it. Therefore, the government’s argument for one national constituency and party-based proportional representation cannot withstand scrutiny. There is one seat in each communal constituency, and one person will be elected from each clan-constituency. Regarding the election commission, the FGS, FMS, and opposition must all be part of a newly formed, credible election commission that can fairly arbitrate the contest.

Possible Scenarios

There are two scenarios: like in 2020, the government and opposition may shelve both proposals and opt for delegate-based, indirect elections that could be organized within a few months.

The second scenario is that they agree on one of the proposals above. The government’s proposal may take a long time to implement, and its outcome may be heavily contested. Simply put, legislators will be chosen by and held accountable to party bosses, which is problematic.

The opposition’s proposal is more practical, but it will also lead to a technical extension of at least one year from now. If that is the case, a government of national unity and its roadmap will be necessary.

In short, the government and opposition must recognize the writing on the wall and reach a political agreement. The stakes are too high.

________________________

Afyare A. Elmi
Research Professor, City University of Mogadishu