The politics of splits: South Sudan’s parties head to elections divided
South Sudanese woman casting a vote during elections in 2010.
Photo credit: UN
South Sudan is approaching its first anticipated general elections since independence, but the closer the country gets to the ballot box, the more its political parties appear to be falling apart.
The ruling SPLM, the SPLM-IO, SSOA, OPP, Former Detainees, and other opposition movements have all experienced internal disputes, rival leadership claims, defections and competing factions.
This raises a simple but uncomfortable question: If political parties cannot govern themselves democratically, how can they convince South Sudanese that they are ready to govern a country?
South Sudan became independent from Sudan in 2011 with enormous expectations. But within two years, the ruling SPLM descended into a political crisis that eventually contributed to the outbreak of civil war in December 2013.
President Salva Kiir and his then deputy, Dr. Riek Machar, became the central figures in that confrontation. Machar was removed from his position as SPLM deputy chairman and vice president alongside other senior officials amid accusations of insubordination and an alleged attempt to challenge Kiir’s leadership.
Machar subsequently formed the SPLM-IO, turning what had initially been an internal SPLM disagreement into a broader political and military opposition movement.
The 2013 conflict was followed by the 2016 violence, another peace process and eventually the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.
Yet the pattern appears to have survived the agreements.
South Sudan has repeatedly negotiated peace between political elites without resolving the political culture that keeps producing elite fragmentation.
The SPLM-IO: From alternative government to multiple centers of power
Perhaps nowhere is this more visible than inside the SPLM-IO.
Following the detention and house arrest of Riek Machar in Juba in 2025, the movement fractured into competing camps.
One faction emerged around Stephen Par Kuol, who presented himself as interim chairman and remained engaged with the transitional government and peace implementation mechanisms.
Another faction rallied behind Oyet Nathaniel, who left the country and rejected Par Kuol’s claim to the leadership. The division eventually moved beyond political statements into disputes over parliamentary representation, appointments and control of the movement.
In May, the SPLM-IO factions publicly clashed over the removal of 47 opposition lawmakers from parliament, with the Par-aligned faction supporting the move and the Oyet-aligned faction condemning it.
The split has now taken an even more institutional form. The Par faction was registered by the Political Parties Council as the IO Party, while the original SPLM-IO movement associated with Machar remains outside the electoral framework. The PPC said the registration was part of its preparations for the December elections. But even this has not settled the dispute.
As recently as September, Oyet Nathaniel and Secretary-General Regina Joseph Kaba were reported to have suspended each other, with both sides questioning the constitutional authority of the other. This is more than a leadership quarrel.
It raises a fundamental democratic question: if a political movement cannot peacefully resolve who has authority to sign a letter, suspend an official or speak on behalf of its membership, how will it accept an election result that could determine the future of the entire country?
The SSOA has not escaped the same problem
The South Sudan Opposition Alliance was created as a coalition of opposition parties and became an important signatory to the 2018 peace agreement. But the alliance itself has fractured.
A faction aligned with Vice President Hussein Abdelbagi separated from the camp associated with former Vice President Josephine Lagu. The division has affected parliamentary representation and the alliance’s political position on the implementation of the peace agreement.
The fragmentation has also had consequences beyond party offices. In January 2026, more than 1,000 SSOA fighters were reported to have defected to the SPLA-IO in Jonglei, illustrating how political fragmentation can have security implications when political organizations retain armed constituencies.
This is one of South Sudan’s most dangerous political habits: political disagreement rarely remains political.
A disagreement over leadership can become a dispute over government appointments. A dispute over appointments can become a dispute over armed forces. And a dispute over armed forces can eventually become a security crisis.
OPP: Opposition unity becoming another casualty
The Other Political Parties grouping was supposed to provide space for parties outside the main SPLM and SPLM-IO camps.
Instead, it too is experiencing fragmentation.
The recent crisis within the National Alliance of Political Parties, an OPP grouping, is perhaps the clearest contemporary example.
After National Alliance chairman Kornelio Kon Ngu announced his intention to challenge President Kiir in the December election, eight political parties withdrew confidence in him, accusing him of exceeding his mandate, making unilateral decisions and failing to consult member parties. The rival camp rejected the move and continued to insist that Kon remained the legitimate chairman.
The irony is difficult to miss.
A political alliance established to provide an alternative to the dominant political establishment is now fighting over the same questions that have plagued the country’s larger parties: Who has authority? Who speaks for the party? Who controls the structure? Who gets the nomination?
Even more concerning is that more than 100 members of OPP parties recently crossed over to the ruling SPLM, citing political alignment and what they described as the national interest.
That movement raises another question: are political parties becoming vehicles for political bargaining rather than institutions built around competing ideas, programs and national visions?
Even the SPLM is not immune
It would be easy to portray fragmentation as a problem belonging exclusively to opposition parties. It is not. The ruling SPLM has also experienced internal challenges.
The departure of veteran SPLM figure Nhial Deng Nhial in October 2025, and the creation of the South Sudan Salvation Movement represented one of the most significant challenges from within the ruling party’s historical establishment.
Nhial accused the SPLM leadership of abandoning the vision associated with its founding leader, Dr. John Garang, and called for a political renewal and free elections.
But the new movement has struggled to translate its announcement into a visible political force with comparable institutional reach.
That experience is revealing.
In South Sudan, announcing a new political movement is considerably easier than building a political institution. A press conference can create a headline. A statement can go viral. A social-media page can attract followers.
But democracy requires more.
It requires structures.
It requires membership.
It requires internal elections.
It requires financial transparency.
It requires policy.
It requires the ability to disagree without destroying the organization.
And it requires leaders who can lose an internal contest without declaring the institution itself illegitimate.
The Former Detainees/FDs and the problem of representation
The Former Political Detainees, another signatory group under the peace agreement, have also experienced internal tensions.
Recent disagreements following remarks associated with Vice President Rebecca Nyandeng have reportedly spilled into questions over who legitimately speaks for the group.
The controversy surrounding Chief Whip Hakim Garang and the move by senior FDs figures including Gier Chuang, Madut Biar and Majak D’Agoot to revoke his membership has exposed another uncomfortable reality: even groups that were once united by a common experience are not immune to internal political competition.
The question is not whether disagreements should exist. They should.
The question is whether political institutions have mature mechanisms for managing disagreement.
Democracy does not mean political parties never disagree. Democracy means disagreement does not automatically become political warfare.
USAP: When a party has two leaders
The United Sudan African Party provides another example.
The party has been caught in a leadership dispute involving Joseph Malek Arop and Ajang Bior Duot, with competing claims over who legitimately controls the organization.
The dispute has reached the courts and the Political Parties Council, with rival camps issuing competing statements about the status of the party leadership.
It is difficult to imagine a stronger metaphor for South Sudan’s wider political problem than a political party preparing for elections while simultaneously arguing over who actually owns the party.
If the party cannot determine its own chairman, how will its supporters determine whom they are voting for?
NDM and the question of internal democracy
Even veteran opposition movements have not escaped the pattern.
Earlier this year, members of Dr. Lam Akol’s National Democratic Movement announced his removal and named Majup Biel Turuk as interim chairman, accusing Lam of violating party rules.
The NDM rejected the move, arguing that the individuals involved lacked constitutional authority to remove the chairman and insisting that only the party’s National Delegates Congress could do so.
Lam has since returned to Juba and declared the NDM ready to participate in the December elections, provided credible electoral conditions are established.
But the episode again leaves a troubling question:
How democratic are South Sudan’s political parties if their constitutions become weapons cited by competing factions rather than rules respected by everyone?
The bigger problem is not the number of factions
South Sudan currently has dozens of registered political parties. In June, the Political Parties Council said the registration of five additional parties brought the number of fully registered political parties to 39.
Political pluralism is not inherently a problem.
In fact, a healthy democracy should allow citizens to organize around different ideas.
The problem is when political parties are divided not over policies, but over positions.
Where is the debate about education?
Where is the debate about healthcare?
Where is the debate about unemployment?
Where is the debate about corruption?
Where is the debate about the economy and the collapsing purchasing power of ordinary citizens?
Where is the debate about federalism, decentralization, constitutional reform, land, climate change, humanitarian assistance and the future of the oil economy?
Too often, the political conversation appears to begin and end with:
Who is chairman?
Who gets the seat?
Who controls the faction?
Who gets the appointment?
Who represents whom?
That is not yet the politics of a mature democracy.
It is the politics of political survival.
The election is coming, but is democracy ready?
The government and political parties continue to prepare for the December 22 elections. The Political Parties Council has set registration deadlines, approved an election code of conduct and continue registering parties for participation in the electoral process.
But the electoral calendar alone does not make an election democratic.
Credible elections require political parties capable of competing peacefully.
They require voters who believe their vote matters.
They require candidates who can accept defeat.
They require institutions that are trusted by both winners and losers.
They require security forces that remain politically neutral.
And they require political leaders to understand that losing an election is not losing the country.
South Sudan has already seen what happens when political competition becomes existential.
The country has paid for it with lives, displacement, destroyed livelihoods and broken trust.
The current fragmentation should therefore be treated not merely as political drama but as an early warning.
The United Nations has repeatedly warned that political fragmentation, stalled peace implementation and insecurity continue to threaten the country’s transition. The Security Council Report has also noted that the prolonged transitional process and fragmentation have undermined confidence in the peace agreement.
Civil society organizations have similarly warned that renewed fighting could disrupt election preparations and urged inclusive political dialogue involving all parties to the peace agreement.
What happens after the election?
This may be the most important question of all.
South Sudan’s political leaders have spent years negotiating transitional governments.
But democracy is not simply about moving from a transitional government to an elected government.
It is about changing the rules of political competition.
If the same culture of factionalism continues after the elections, the country may simply exchange one transitional arrangement for another political crisis.
The danger is that political parties could become temporary coalitions assembled around individuals rather than permanent institutions built around ideas.
And if that happens, elections may produce a government without producing democracy.
The public is watching
Ordinary South Sudanese have heard promises before.
They have heard commitments to peace.
They have heard promises of elections.
They have watched agreements signed, revitalized, extended and amended.
They have watched politicians leave one party and establish another.
They have watched factions emerge, disappear and reappear under new names.
They have watched former allies become opponents and former opponents become government partners.
What many citizens now want is not another political arrangement.
They want stability.
They want roads.
They want schools.
They want hospitals.
They want jobs.
They want justice.
They want their children to grow up without war.
And above all, they want to believe that their vote can change something.
That is why the political class must understand the seriousness of the moment.
South Sudan cannot build a democratic state with undemocratic political parties.
The first election since independence could become a historic opportunity to begin a new political culture, one where parties compete on policies rather than personalities, where leaders respect their own constitutions, where internal disagreements are settled through institutions rather than public accusations, and where political defeat does not automatically become a national crisis.
But it could also become another chapter in the country’s long history of political fragmentation.
The choice is now before the political class.
Will South Sudan’s parties enter the elections as democratic institutions prepared to compete, win or lose peacefully?
Or will they enter the ballot box carrying the same factional disputes, personal rivalries and power struggles that have defined the transitional period?
The country is approaching its first election. But before South Sudan asks whether its people are ready to vote, its political parties must answer a more uncomfortable question:
Are they ready for democracy?