The Petro Administration’s Worst Legacy for Colombia’s Left

When Gustavo Petro took office in 2022, the Colombian left reached national power for the first time with a message that had been built over decades around the fight against corruption.

More than a policy platform, that banner became one of its greatest political assets and the foundation of a moral authority from which it consistently challenged traditional governments, accusing them of clientelism, the misuse of public funds, and the capture of state institutions.

Just days before the end of this administration, that political capital appears deeply eroded. The scandals surrounding the Petro government have not only damaged the administration’s image but also threaten to leave a far deeper mark on Colombia’s left as a whole.

The greatest damage lies not only in the emergence of alleged corruption cases but in the loss of credibility of a political movement that made exposing corruption one of the pillars of its identity.

The Petro administration’s worst legacy for Colombia’s left

For years, the left—with Gustavo Petro as one of its leading figures—occupied a privileged place in Colombia’s public debate as one of the most persistent voices against misconduct in government.

From Congress, local administrations, academia, and social movements, it built much of its legitimacy by exposing irregular contracts, clientelist networks, and the political use of public resources—practices commonly associated with governments traditionally led by people born into the country’s economic and political elite.

That message resonated with a public weary of the scandals that had marked successive administrations. The promise that political change would also bring ethical change was one of the key factors behind Petro’s and the Historic Pact coalition’s victory in 2022.

However, the experience of governing has ultimately weakened precisely that distinguishing asset. Today, the left can no longer present itself with the same authority as the political force free from the traditional vices of power, because its first national administration has also been marked by allegations and investigations involving government officials and people close to the Executive Branch.

The case involving the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGRD), considered the largest corruption scandal of the Petro administration, triggered an institutional crisis that continues to produce judicial and political consequences.

That episode has been followed by other recent controversies, including investigations involving former DAPRE director and current head of the Adaptation Fund, Angie Rodriguez, as well as allegations against Juliana Guerrero, a young adviser—with no academic credentials and elevated from obscurity without any plausible merit—who gained influence during the administration and whose name has since become linked to an alleged corruption case.

Yet the real political impact of these episodes goes far beyond each individual investigation. Any administration can face inquiries into possible wrongdoing, particularly one of this size. What ultimately determines the political cost is its ability to prevent misconduct, respond swiftly, and accept responsibility when allegations emerge.

On that front, the Petro administration leaves behind a deeply questioned record. Delayed responses, contradictions among government officials, and the constant political confrontation surrounding every allegation ultimately reinforced the perception that the government was more concerned with defending itself than with upholding the ethical standards it had promised—in other words, following exactly the same patterns of behavior that it had criticized while in opposition.

A cost that extends beyond Petro

That erosion will not end when Gustavo Petro leaves office. The greatest consequence will fall on Colombia’s left in the years ahead, especially when it once again seeks to denounce corruption involving other political forces.

The argument that the left represented a moral alternative to the traditional parties loses credibility when its first experience governing the country also ends under the shadow of investigations, scandals, and questions over the management of public resources.

Paradoxically, this government’s greatest negative legacy for the left may not be its immediate electoral impact—in fact, Ivan Cepeda won 12.7 million votes, 1.5 million more than Petro received in 2022—nor even the loss of power, but rather the weakening of a political identity built over decades.

Corruption is no longer seen as a problem exclusive to “the others.” It has also become an internal challenge—poorly managed and even more poorly confronted. Without self-criticism, with policies designed to protect its own, and while dismantling decades of work.

From now on, every allegation against future administrations will inevitably be measured against the memory of the Petro government. That comparison will be used by its opponents and will make it more difficult for the left to regain the moral authority that for so long allowed it to serve as the country’s leading watchdog over those in power.

The left’s chances of returning to power in 2030 remain completely open, especially because the incoming administration promises to revive—in an even more aggressive form—the exclusionary and class-based policies that historically defined the past. The era of populist right-wing movements will pass in Colombia, as it will in the rest of the world.

Even so, the left’s worst political legacy from its time in government will not be the public deficit it generated, nor even the social frustration stemming from its failure—due to the actions of entrenched economic power structures—to fulfill many of the promises Colombians voted for in 2022. Rather, it will be the realization that, when it comes to judging corruption and the moral standards of some of its own members, the bar proved to be just as low as it was under the right-wing governments that dominated Colombia’s republican history.

Squandering in just four years the ethical capital that had distinguished the left for decades will not be easy to reverse. Corruption investigations may eventually be closed or end in convictions or acquittals, but the loss of credibility is often far more enduring than any judicial process.