The New Government in Iraq and the Future of Strategic Rapprochement with Türkiye

T

he political crisis in Iraq, which lasted for approximately six months, was partially resolved on May 14, when Ali Faleh Kazem Al-Zaidi’s government secured a partial vote of confidence in parliament. However, it would be an oversimplification to view the situation in Baghdad merely as a delayed government negotiation. For whilst politics in Iraq may appear to be functioning today, the balance that sustains the system is becoming increasingly fragile.

The presidential election process laid this bare. For months, a two-thirds majority could not be secured in parliament. The election of Nizar Amedi, the candidate of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as president cleared the way for the government; however, the resulting picture points to a period in which new power distributions are becoming visible rather old balances continuing. Indeed, the fragmentation within the Shia political sphere, the intensifying rivalry between the KDP and the KYB, the emergence of more pragmatic networks among Sunni political actors, and the internal divisions within groups aligned with Iran all indicate that the political landscape in Baghdad has shifted.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim that the system has completely collapsed. Indeed, in the new framework, the presidency remains with the Kurds, the premiership with the Shias, and the speakership of parliament with the Sunnis. However, it is evident that the political balance underpinning this structure no longer reflects the old Iraq. In the current order, alliances are formed more flexibly, the political arena is becoming more fragmented, and actors are acting more pragmatically. Yet the state apparatus is failing to centralize to the same extent.

It is possible to interpret this emerging picture as a form of ‘asymmetric continuity’. In other words, the system continues, but the political algorithm that sustains it is changing. Indeed, as the sphere of representation expands, decision-making capacity becomes increasingly fragile. The manner in which the Zeydi government was formed also demonstrated this. Of the 23 ministers, only 14 were able to secure a vote of confidence in parliament. The confidence votes for some ministers were postponed, some candidates withdrew, and others were outright rejected. For Iraq, the issue is no longer merely forming a government; it is about establishing a state structure that functions, can make decisions, and possesses the capacity to exercise sovereignty over the country.