The Limits of Russia’s Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive

The devastating coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and the Tuareg-dominated separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), that began on April 25, have highlighted the limited capabilities of the Malian junta and its Russian mercenaries, the Africa Corps, to fend off the insurgency. As the junta in Bamako contends with the tactical alliance between JNIM and the FLA, the Islamic State Sahel Province’s presence across the Ménaka and Gao region, and widespread intra-jihadi violence, Russia is positioned to remain a partner for the embattled and isolated military government. However, the consolidation of Africa Corps around Bamako, trading northern territory and strategic cities for regime protection, raises questions about whether Russia has the resources for a genuine counterinsurgency or if it instead focuses narrowly on junta survival. In the immediate term, the junta will continue to look to Moscow, and in particular the Africa Corps, for aid. However, the unprecedented threat posed by the alliance between JNIM and FLA will require additional resources. JNIM, for its part, appears to view its trajectory toward power in Mali as inevitable, warning the Russians to lay down their arms for the good of “a balanced and effective future relationship.” The limited protection offered by Africa Corps to the Malian junta is also a reality check for the other Alliance of Sahel States (AES) members, Niger and Burkina Faso, which face a similarly complex terrorist threat landscape and have likewise traded in Western partnerships for Russian aid in recent years.

Since the onset of coordinated JNIM and FLA attacks, the Russian government has clarified that its partnership with the Malian government continues and has backed the narrative that the Africa Corps successfully fended off a coup by insurgents. Similarly, the Minister Delegate for Defense and Veterans Affairs, General Oumar Diarra, has highlighted that the strategic partnership between Mali and Russia will continue. Nonetheless, much of the Russian partnership appears to be about regime protection and security rather than a sustainable counterinsurgency campaign. As The Soufan Center Senior Research Fellow Wassim Nasr stated in an interview with the CTC Sentinel, the events of the last weeks “will consolidate the relationship because the objective of the relationship is to preserve the junta.” This aligns with the Africa Corps’ movement within Mali: in the past week, the remaining Africa Corps personnel have consolidated around Bamako and evacuated the North. This is becoming an important flashpoint: JNIM announced on April 28 that it is imposing a blockade on all routes into the Malian capital, and on May 6, it launched a new wave of attacks that included an arson attack on trucks carrying food supplies en route to the capital. The pressure campaign is reminiscent of the fuel blockade JNIM has imposed on the capital since September 2025.

Wave after wave of attacks by JNIM, closing in on the capital, have prompted rallies in recent days by junta supporters to call for joining forces with the military against the insurgent groups. The junta’s official stance shows no overtures towards negotiations with JNIM and FLA for now. Instead, further alienating Western governments, Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulay Diop has stated that the coordinated attacks were part of a “foreign-backed” scheme supporting the armed groups operating in Mali’s North. He also accused Ukraine of supporting terrorism in what he has described as a “hybrid war” against the Alliance of Sahel States. Meanwhile, JNIM has sought to incite Malians to rise up against the Junta. While the long-term goals of FLA and JNIM are unclear, the partnership is, for now, effectively further weakening the government. In the longer term, the current converging interests may break down: JNIM’s Islamist agenda and the FLA’s Tuareg nationalist aims are historically incompatible, and if one party perceives the other as an obstacle to its objectives, it may break down.

Mali is rich in natural resources and attracts significant foreign investment, exploiting a range of different natural resources. It is one of Africa’s largest gold producers, and is home to both artisanal and industrial mining companies. Mali also has large lithium deposits, which are being exploited by various foreign companies. The northern region of Mali, which is now once more under the control of the FLA and JNIM, was until recently considered for joint Russian-Mali uranium exploitation. Control of the country’s mineral wealth is inseparable from both great power competition and the expansion of terrorist groups in the Sahel: its vast reserves of gold, lithium, and uranium attract competing bids from China, Russia, and Western mining giants while also fueling the jihadist insurgencies that exploit these resources.