The future of ASEAN-Russia relations amid growing geopolitical volatility – Asia News Network

KUALA LUMPUR – Over four years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, dominant Western narratives of Moscow facing increasing diplomatic isolation, stifled by a shrinking list of reliable trade partners, continue to persist.

This has driven Russia’s ‘pivot to Asia’, with aims of expanding trade and diplomatic efforts, especially across the Global South.

Across Southeast Asia, many forecast that Russia’s relationship with the region will only continue to grow.

Earlier this year, Russian government sources cited how its trade with Asean has risen by nearly 60% over the past decade, amounting to an overall total of US$22 billion.

When Asean leaders gathered in Kazan in June, further agreements were also signed to strengthen Russia’s relationship with Asean – including through increased energy, agriculture, defence, and technological frameworks. 

Malaysia, for example, had reportedly agreed on a 20-year oil and gas partnership with Russia, while countries such as Vietnam had already begun cooperations with Moscow much earlier to establish the Ninh Thuan 1, its first nuclear energy plant.

In a world with increasingly frequent supply chain disruptions, and an increasingly volatile geopolitical climate, Asean’s decision to diversify and seek alternative energy sources only appears as the most pragmatic option.

However, analysts have also raised caution over Russia’s reliability as a long-term trade partner – while highlighting how, despite a forecasted increase in trade and strategic cooperation, Russia’s economic presence throughout the region remains relatively minimal.

Dr Le Hong Hiep, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Vietnam Studies Programme at Singapore’s Yusuf Ishak Institute (ISEAS) explained that Asean’s continued engagement with Russia is instead driven primarily by strategic exposure.

“Cooperation across specific sectors is likely to evolve in different directions. Defence ties, for example, appear to be on a downward trajectory.

“Russia accounted for more than 80 percent of Vietnam’s arms imports between 1995 and 2021, yet Hanoi placed no major new orders in 2025, has turned to Israel to modernise its tank fleet, and is exploring South Korean suppliers for future procurement.

“The war in Ukraine has also exposed weaknesses in Russian military technology, production capacity, and supply chains – and Vietnam has taken note,” he said.

Instead, Dr Le emphasised on the strengthening relationship between the two countries through its nuclear and energy cooperation sectors – describing the revived nuclear Ninh Thuan 1 as the latest ‘flagship project’ of Vietnam-Russia relations. 

Describing it as the most technologically ambitious and longest-term undertaking the two countries have pursued since the Cold War, he highlighted how the project was also “at the heart of” Vietnam and Russia’s 2026–30 Strategic Partnership Plan signed by To Lam and Putin in Moscow in May.

Further emphasising Russia’s growing role in the country’s energy sector, Dr Le said the project’s revival is happening at a very significant timing.

“Vietnam abandoned its nuclear power programme in 2016 because of cost and safety concerns, but revived it after this year’s Hormuz-related energy shock highlighted the country’s vulnerability to fuel supply disruptions.

“Meanwhile, uncertainty surrounding US tariff policy has further enhanced Russia’s appeal. As several Vietnamese officials have remarked, albeit somewhat backhandedly, Russia has become the more predictable partner,” he added.

However, Dr Le also stressed how the biggest challenge for Vietnam’s growing relationship with Russia is that “its growing deepening cooperation is unfolding under sanctions pressure that Vietnam cannot fully escape.”

“Hanoi and Moscow have reportedly routed some arms-related payments through energy joint ventures such as Rusvietpetro to reduce exposure to US secondary sanctions.

“Yet such workarounds are likely to become increasingly difficult as US and European enforcement intensifies. The relationship (between Hanoi and Moscow) is therefore likely to deepen, but along a narrower range of sectors – and at the cost of greater legal, financial and diplomatic risks that Hanoi would prefer to avoid,” he highlighted.

Meanwhile, Joanne Lin Weiling, also an ISEAS Senior Fellow, and Coordinator for its Asean Studies Centre, said while Russian energy can be useful as part of a diversified supply mix for Asean, it should not be treated as a “long-term anchor.”

“Sanctions, restricted banking and payment channels, and such matters make transactions more complicated. Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries may also demonstrate that Russia’s energy infrastructure is exposed to wartime disruption.

“That does not make Russia unusable as a supplier, but it reinforces the point that Asean should hedge, not over-rely, on it,” she highlighted.

Separately, Malaysian security analyst Munira Mustaffa, Executive Director of Chasseur Group and Senior Fellow at Verve Research, echoed similar sentiments – expressing cautious skepticism towards dependency on Russia for Malaysia’s long-term energy security.

“Diversification is sensible, however, dependence is just reckless,” she said.“What Russia promises on paper, in contrast to what Russia can deliver under wartime conditions, are two very different things.

“If we consider the sequence of events, President Vladimir Putin at the Kazan meeting assured Malaysia of long-term fuel supplies – but merely a few weeks later, Moscow had then imposed a full ban on diesel exports because Ukrainian drone strikes crippled its refining capacity.

“Hence, any planning built on Russia’s assurance, will need to price in sudden supply shocks of exactly this kind,” she explained.

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, China, India and Turkey have been by far the largest buyers of Russian oil, combining for about 93% of sales over that period – following sanctions from the United States, European Union, and its Western allies.

Within Southeast Asia, Singapore remains the largest purchaser of Russian energy commodities, despite its public condemnation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and imposition of sanctions on Russian financial institutions.

Meanwhile, Indonesia’s island of Karimun, located less than 40 kilometres from Singapore, has also successfully funnelled at least US$1.6 billion of Russian oil products into major markets across the region.

However, in March this year, the United States had temporarily eased sanctions against Russian oil, owing to significant global supply chain disruptions as a result of Iran’s Hormuz Strait blockade.

Nevertheless, supply chain disruptions from both its war in Ukraine and due to ongoing tensions in the Middle East have also led to domestic shortages, further eroding Russia’s credibility as a long-term energy supplier to its trade partners.

In July, Reuters reported that Russia had began seaborne imports of gasoline from India, in efforts to mitigate local fuel shortages due to Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian news reports also cite that Russia’s oil refining had been driven to a 21-year low, with local refineries meeting only 65 percent of domestic petrol demand – leading to rationing and long queues at local gas stations.

Yet, despite these figures, there is still an overwhelming consensus amongst experts that Asean’s relationship with Russia has always been, and will likely remain “asymmetrical” – highlighting that in overall trade terms,  Russia still remains a marginal partner for the region.

‘Russia needs Asean more than Asean needs Russia’ 

From a comparative standpoint, Asean’s trade volume exceeds over US$3 trillion annually – yet Russia’s US$22 billion share of this volume amounts to less than 1 percent of this total. 

ISEAS’ Lin highlighted that while large Asean economies like Singapore and Malaysia could also afford to limit engagement with Russia more sharply if they wanted to, doing so would only reduce their room for diplomatic manoeuvre, and would not necessarily produce major gains with Western partners.

“I would not say Asean–Russia ties are worth strengthening solely for economic reasons. The economic relationship is still modest. The value for Asean is more pragmatic and strategic, such as in keeping Russia as one additional option in energy, food security, technology and diplomacy, without depending on it,” she said.

Lin also suggested that Asean should instead “engage selectively”, and that while Asean countries can buy where the price, compliance and logistics make sense, they should avoid building critical dependence on Russian energy or infrastructure.

Similarly, Indonesia’s Radityo Dharmaputra, Head of Centre for European and Eurasia Studies at Universitas Airlangga, echoed similar assessments on Russia’s asymmetrical relationship with Asean.

“Russia needs Southeast Asian countries to maintain their diplomatic position as a major power… it is much more important for Russia to show that they still have partners around the Global South,” he said.

Despite this, Radityo also forecasted that Indonesia’s relationship with Russia will continue to grow, highlighting how the Indonesian government has also repeatedly focused on historical narratives of both countries having deep historical ties.

“Prabowo seems to be very keen on developing   personal connections with Putin, and Putin knows exactly what he should do to keep Prabowo on his side,” he said.

Separately, Munira also described Malaysia and Asean as part of Russia’s “shrinking pool of respectable trading partners,” highlighting how Russian expansion in Asean markets plays a significantly more important role to Russia, than it does for Asean as a whole.

“Russia absolutely needs Asean more than we need them. This asymmetrical relationship is very clear because Asean sits in the most consequential energy and trade arteries in the world.

“Russia, by contrast, needs what Asean can provide right now – which is markets, diplomatic normalcy, and visible proof that it is not isolated.

“So we should negotiate accordingly, and we should be smart about it because the leverage sits with us, and not with Moscow,” she said.

Further, she emphasised that Malaysia’s relationship with Russia is “nowhere near the scale of its relationship with China, the US, or any of our Asean neighbours,” and highlighted how there does not seem to be a “realistic path” for Russia to displace any of these much larger trading partners.

“However, where Russia has made itself relevant to us, is energy. Putin has assured Malaysia of long-term oil, gas and diesel supplies, he claims that he can do that for the next 20 years. In a period of genuine global supply uncertainty, that assurance has political value to us.

“But assurance is not a guarantee,” she stressed.

This article is the first part of a two-piece examination of Asean-Russia relations. Next, ANN asks: Assessing Asean-Russia relations: The question of principled, pragmatic non-alignment