Somalia’s fight against Al-Shabaab is bigger than a map

By Hanad Mohamed Hussein
Monday July 6, 2026

For more than two decades, Somalia has confronted one of the world’s most persistent terrorist threats. The fight against Al-Shabaab has tested the resilience of our people, the endurance of our institutions and the commitment of our international partners. Every serious assessment of this struggle is valuable, particularly when it contributes to informed debate on security, governance and regional stability.

The recent International Crisis Group report, New Chapter, Same Stalemate: Somalia’s War with Al-Shabaab, provides a detailed overview of recent military developments and correctly identifies a number of challenges facing Somalia’s security sector. It argues that Al-Shabaab made significant gains in 2025, that the Federal Government later regrouped around Mogadishu, and that the conflict has returned to a form of stalemate. It also recommends improvements in military training, force retention, federal-state cooperation and non-military approaches to the conflict.

These are serious issues. The Ministry of Defence does not dismiss constructive analysis. Somalia’s security transition is complex. The terrorist threat remains real. Building a professional, accountable and sustainable national defence force after decades of conflict and state collapse cannot be achieved overnight.

However, the central conclusion that Somalia’s campaign has simply returned to a strategic stalemate does not fully capture the wider transformation taking place across the country’s defence architecture, operational planning, territorial stabilisation and democratic state-building.

The report relies heavily on territorial comparison, particularly the movement of frontlines between 2022 and 2026. Territory matters. No responsible defence institution would argue otherwise. But modern counterterrorism cannot be measured only by which side temporarily occupies a rural area. Insurgencies are fought not only on maps, but through intelligence, logistics, public confidence, institutional resilience, financial disruption, mobility, civilian protection and the state’s ability to reconnect communities.

By those measures, Somalia’s position is stronger than the report suggests.

During the past two years, the Somali Armed Forces, supported by international partners, have moved from largely reactive operations towards more coordinated, intelligence-led campaigns designed to degrade Al-Shabaab’s long-term operational capacity. Precision operations and ground offensives have targeted senior commanders, weapons depots, logistical networks, training sites, explosive capabilities and movement corridors used by the group. These cumulative effects are not always visible on a territorial map, but they directly affect the enemy’s ability to plan, move, recruit, tax, intimidate and attack.

The clearest example is Lower Shabelle, where Al-Shabaab attempted to build momentum towards the capital. Lower Shabelle is not just another front. It is the southern approach to Mogadishu, a vital agricultural region and a strategic corridor linking the capital to Marka and other key population centres. Control over this area affects not only military movement, but also food supply, local trade, civilian travel and the security of communities living along the Shabelle River.

The ICG report itself acknowledges that the group’s parallel offensive in Lower Shabelle was less successful, and that Somali and partner forces pushed the group out of a string of towns along the Shabelle River. That development was not incidental. It reflected improved coordination, stronger partner support and a more focused operational design.

Through Operation Silent Storm, Somali forces, supported by international partners, successfully liberated Sabiid, Anoole, Bariire and Awdheegle, reversing Al-Shabaab’s attempted advance in Lower Shabelle and securing key approaches to Mogadishu. These gains were not symbolic. They restored state authority in strategic areas, protected communities, disrupted terrorist movement and reduced the group’s ability to threaten the capital from the south-western corridor.

This progress was reinforced by Operation Rolling Thunder, which cleared and secured the Mogadishu-Marka corridor, restoring movement along one of the country’s most important routes. The safe movement of Somali forces by road from Mogadishu to Baidoa, and the securing of the Mogadishu-Jowhar route, are further evidence that the campaign is producing practical security outcomes.

Roads matter. When Al-Shabaab controls roads, it controls taxation, intimidation, movement and access. When the government secures roads, it restores trade, public services, military mobility and civilian confidence. The reopening of these routes has allowed military convoys, officials, traders and communities to move with greater confidence after years in which Al-Shabaab used checkpoints, extortion and intimidation to isolate towns and restrict normal life.

Reopening and securing the Mogadishu-Marka, Mogadishu-Baidoa and Mogadishu-Jowhar routes are therefore more than military achievements. They are political and economic achievements. They show that the state is re-establishing physical connection between communities that Al-Shabaab has long tried to isolate.

For families who can now travel with less fear, traders who can return to local markets, officials who can reach communities more safely and children whose daily lives depend on secure roads, security is not an abstract debate about maps. It is a daily reality.

These security gains have also enabled political and civic progress. In December 2025, Mogadishu residents elected their municipal leaders, marking an important step in local democratic participation. In May 2026, successful elections were held across 13 districts in South West State, including the recently liberated Awdheegle district. Further elections planned in Hirshabelle and Galmudug represent another stage in strengthening democratic governance under improved security conditions.

Holding local elections in districts recently affected by conflict is not a symbolic exercise. It is a direct challenge to Al-Shabaab’s political project, which seeks to replace public choice with fear. Every district that votes under improved security conditions shows that state authority is not only returning through military presence, but also through public participation, local leadership and democratic legitimacy.

This is not the profile of a state merely holding the line. It is the work of a government reconnecting cities, reopening strategic corridors, enabling elections and gradually restoring public confidence in state institutions.

The report also gives considerable attention to Al-Shabaab’s ability to adapt. It suggests that the group has adjusted its approach in areas under its control, including efforts to improve relations with local communities and reduce reliance on coercion. That assessment should be treated with caution. Tactical adaptation should not be confused with political legitimacy.

Al-Shabaab remains a terrorist organisation. It continues to rely on intimidation, illegal taxation, forced recruitment, including of children, restrictions on basic freedoms and violence against civilians. Any temporary adjustment in its behaviour is best understood as a survival tactic, not a genuine transformation. A group that extorts communities, recruits children, assassinates officials and attacks civilians cannot be presented as merely a political actor undergoing moderation.

The ICG report also recognises that Al-Shabaab’s public support remains weak and that its governance continues to generate serious grievances, including heavy taxation and forced recruitment. That point is essential. The group may adapt its tactics, but it has not changed its nature.

By contrast, the Federal Government’s campaign is increasingly based on the opposite logic: protecting civilians, restoring legitimate authority and building institutions that can outlast the conflict.

Since May 2025, the Ministry of Defence has prioritised defence reform across several areas, including command and control, force generation, logistics, specialised training, interoperability with partners, public accountability and operational discipline. These reforms are not yet complete, but they are real. They are part of a long-term effort to build a national defence force that is professional, sustainable and capable of assuming increasing responsibility from international security partners.

The ICG report rightly identifies force retention, training, equipment and holding capacity as critical issues. These are not foreign observations imposed from outside. They are priorities already recognised by the Ministry of Defence and embedded in ongoing reform efforts. Somalia’s military challenge has never been only about defeating terrorists in one operation. It is about building a force able to clear, hold and stabilise territory in coordination with federal member states, local authorities, police, Darwish forces and civilian institutions.

That is particularly important as Somalia prepares for the continued transition from African Union security support. The Ministry recognises the importance of AUSSOM, the sacrifices of troop-contributing countries and the continued role of international partners. But the strategic direction is clear: Somalia must progressively assume greater responsibility for its own national security.

That transition requires patience, resources and partnership. It also requires a realistic understanding of what progress looks like. In counterinsurgency, progress is rarely linear. Setbacks occur. Territory may change hands. The enemy adapts. But the decisive question is whether the state is becoming more capable, more coordinated and more legitimate over time.

Somalia is doing exactly that.

The Somali Armed Forces today are more experienced, more coordinated with partners and increasingly capable of conducting complex operations than in previous phases of the conflict. International cooperation has become more integrated across intelligence, air support, training, logistics, institutional development and strategic planning. Operational planning is increasingly intelligence-led. Strategic communications have improved. Public reporting on operations has become more consistent. Civilian protection has become a more visible part of national security policy.

The Ministry has also worked to strengthen public confidence by communicating more transparently about military operations, honouring the sacrifices of Somali soldiers and exposing the brutality of Al-Shabaab. This communications effort is not secondary to the military campaign. It is part of the campaign. Terrorist groups survive not only through weapons, but through fear, misinformation and psychological control. Countering that influence requires credible state communication, community engagement and a clear national narrative.

The fight against Al-Shabaab also cannot be separated from the protection of civilians. The legitimacy of the state depends not only on defeating terrorists, but on how the campaign is conducted. Civilian protection, respect for international humanitarian law and accountability remain central to Somalia’s security transition. The Council of Ministers’ approval of the Civilian Protection Policy marked an important step in strengthening the legal and operational framework for protecting civilians during security operations and armed conflict.

The report is right that Somalia cannot rely on military tools alone. Durable security requires political unity, functioning institutions, local governance, economic recovery and continued partnership. But recognising that there is no quick military solution should not lead to the conclusion that Somalia is trapped in an endless stalemate.

A more accurate assessment is that Somalia is in a difficult but real transition: from emergency counterterrorism towards territorial stabilisation, institutional consolidation and democratic state-building.

This transition can be seen in the liberation of strategic towns in Lower Shabelle. It can be seen in the reopening of roads linking Mogadishu to Baidoa, Marka and Jowhar. It can be seen in the successful conduct of local elections in Mogadishu and South West State. It can be seen in the continued reform of the Somali Armed Forces. It can be seen in the ability of Somali forces and partners to deny Al-Shabaab the freedom to threaten the capital as it once did.

None of this means that Somalia underestimates the scale of the challenge. Al-Shabaab remains dangerous, adaptive and determined. It continues to exploit political disagreements, local grievances, poverty, climate shocks and gaps in governance. It continues to use propaganda to exaggerate its strength and undermine public confidence in the state. It continues to target civilians, security forces, public officials and communities that reject its ideology.

But the existence of a threat is not the same as the absence of progress.

The Federal Government of Somalia has learned important lessons from previous phases of the campaign. Operations must be better sequenced. Liberated areas must be stabilised quickly. Local communities must be protected from retaliation. Holding forces must be strengthened. Federal and state-level security institutions must work more closely. Military gains must be followed by governance, reconciliation and service delivery.

These lessons are now shaping the next phase of Somalia’s national security approach. The objective is not simply to enter a town, raise a flag and move on. The objective is to restore legitimate authority, protect civilians, enable local administration, reopen roads, support humanitarian access and prevent Al-Shabaab from returning.

At the same time, partnership must continue to evolve. Somalia’s objective is not permanent dependency. It is a responsible transition in which Somali forces progressively assume greater responsibility while partners continue to provide targeted, coordinated and sustainable support. A premature withdrawal of support would risk creating gaps that Al-Shabaab would seek to exploit. A conditions-based transition remains the most responsible path.

The ICG report is correct to highlight the importance of military reform and improved coordination between the Federal Government and Federal Member States. The Ministry agrees that no lasting security outcome can be achieved without stronger cooperation across all levels of government. National security must remain above political competition. Al-Shabaab benefits when Somali institutions are divided; it weakens when they are coordinated.

For that reason, the Ministry of Defence continues to support a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. The fight against Al-Shabaab is not the responsibility of soldiers alone. It requires the involvement of local administrations, religious scholars, elders, youth, women, civil society, media, humanitarian actors and international partners. Terrorism is defeated not only when fighters are removed from the battlefield, but when communities no longer fear, finance or tolerate them.

The International Crisis Group has contributed to an important debate. Its report identifies real risks and challenges that deserve attention. But Somalia’s story cannot be reduced to a stalemate. It is the story of a state rebuilding itself while fighting terrorism, restoring roads while reforming its army, holding elections while conducting operations, and strengthening institutions while confronting an enemy that seeks to destroy them.

• The map tells one part of the story.
• The roads reopened tell another.
• The districts voting tell another.
• The soldiers holding ground tell another.
• The communities returning to normal life tell another.

Together, they show a Somalia that is not standing still, but moving through one of the most difficult phases of its security transition with determination, sacrifice and growing national capability.

Somalia’s struggle against terrorism is not defined by a single map, a single campaign or a single moment of battlefield movement. It is defined by the steady construction of a professional national defence force, the restoration of state authority, the reopening of strategic corridors, the protection of civilians and the strengthening of democratic governance.

Al-Shabaab seeks to isolate communities from the state. The Federal Government is reconnecting them.

Al-Shabaab seeks to replace civic life with fear. Somalia is restoring elections, local leadership and public participation.

Al-Shabaab seeks to weaken confidence in national institutions. The Ministry of Defence is building a force capable of protecting the sovereignty, security and future of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

That is the larger story beyond the battlefield. And it is a story that no map alone can fully tell.

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By Hanad Mohamed Hussein
Director of Communications and Public Relations
Ministry of Defence, Federal Government of Somalia
[email protected]