Somali Pirates Sustain Hijackings; Drc Strengthens Ties With Israel: Africa File, September 10, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Somalia. Somali pirates have sustained an elevated rate of hijackings since April 2026 with possible support from the Houthis and al Shabaab, further increasing insecurity in key Red Sea shipping lanes. Competing Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Puntland state responses have layered onto their preexisting political dispute, and Turkey’s growing involvement with the FGS has only widened the divide.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). DRC President Félix Tshisekedi traveled to Israel for his first state visit to the country since October 2021 to strengthen relations and increase bilateral security cooperation. Tshisekedi’s visit to Israel and push to further deepen ties with the country is also likely part of a broader political strategy to align the DRC strategically with the United States and its allies and to further isolate Rwanda diplomatically.

Figure 1. Africa File, September 10, 2026

Source: Emily Bjerke

Assessments:

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

Somali pirates have sustained an elevated rate of hijackings since a spate of attacks in April 2026, further increasing insecurity in key Red Sea shipping lanes. Somali pirates have hijacked at least four international commercial vessels off the coast of northern Somalia’s Puntland state during this period, including two in mid-August. Three of the vessels were fuel tankers, while the other—the Cameroonian-flagged Lutuf—was a cargo ship reportedly carrying Turkish military equipment.^[1] Suspected Somali pirates have also attempted at least four additional hijackings since May, according to the UN International Maritime Organization.^[2]

Figure 2. Pirates Sustain Hijackings in Northern Somalia

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

This level of piracy has not occurred since the peak of Somali piracy over a decade ago. Somali pirates averaged 33 hijackings annually from 2005 to 2011 and conducted 15 hijackings in 2012.^[3] The United States, European Union (EU), and NATO responded by bolstering their naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.^[4] International efforts helped drastically reduce piracy, as Somali pirates had only one successful hijacking from 2014 to 2022 and scattered hijackings from 2023 to April 2026.^[5] Somali pirates have hijacked at least six international commerical vessels since April, however.^[6] Agence France-Presse analysis of International Maritime Organization data also showed that Somali pirates have conducted at least 15 attacks in 2026, compared with five in 2025 and scattered attacks in the preceding years.^[7]

Figure 3. Somali Pirate Hijackings of International Commercial Vessel Since 2023

Source: Michael DeAngelo

Sustained piracy is an additional burden on the already stressed Red Sea shipping lanes, which have become more important amid the Iran war. Disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, through which over 20 percent of global oil and natural gas shipments normally pass, have forced Saudi Arabia—currently the world’s third-largest fuel exporter—to reroute exports through the Red Sea since March.^[8] The Yemeni Houthis began enforcing a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia in late July, however, causing an initial drop in vessels transiting through the Bab el Mandeb Strait.^[9] The increased tensions have since escalated into open conflict, with both sides launching ground operations near the Yemeni Red Sea coastline in early September and the Houthis conducting missile and drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities.^[10] Oil prices reached $100 per barrel on September 9 for the first time since July, and economists have previously forecasted that oil prices could rise to $150 per barrel if the Houthis close the Bab el Mandeb Strait as part of a conflict with Saudi Arabia.^[11] Somali piracy previously increased transit times and global shipping costs by approximately 8 percent in the early 2010s.^[12]

The fallout from the Iran war, including possible direct involvement from the Houthis and al Shabaab to exploit the situation, may be contributing to the surge. Multiple analysts have reported that the Iran war has spurred naval redeployments that have caused security gaps to the benefit of Somali pirates.^[13] The commander of the EU’s Operation Atalanta—a counter-piracy initiative in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean—warned in May that the Iran war could indirectly worsen piracy due to ensuing security gaps, although Operation Atalanta continued anti-piracy operations.^[14] The commander also stated that the Combined Maritime Forces—a US-led maritime security coalition—had temporarily paused anti-piracy operations, but the coalition itself claimed to have maintained its operational tempo.^[15] Somalia has responded to the fallout by seeking to bolster anti-piracy cooperation with its immediate neighbors through bilateral meetings with senior Kenyan defense officials in mid-July and a UN-facilitated dialogue with Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Yemen in late August.^[16] Somalia joined a new Saudi-led Red Sea naval task force, which could eventually serve to address piracy, in late July.[17] Somalia also agreed, along with 19 other countries, to create an additional anti-piracy task force in mid-August.^[18]

The Houthis may be working with Somali pirates to exploit the Iran war and advance Houthi objectives to gain greater leverage over the Bab el Mandeb and the Red Sea. The Critical Threats Project and Institute for the Study of War (CTP-ISW) have assessed that the ongoing Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia is primarily tied to Houthi interests in extracting wide-ranging concessions from Saudi Arabia, although the campaign also supports Iranian regional objectives to increase the cost of continued fighting for the United States and its allies.^[19] The Houthis’ recently launched ground offensive in Yemen is meant to gain direct control of the northern entrance to the Bab el Mandeb Strait, and supporting pirate groups could allow the Houthis to indirectly disrupt the southern entrance to the Bab el Mandeb.^[20] The internationally recognized Yemeni government reportedly claimed in a private intelligence report that Houthi officials had met with Somali pirates in mid-June 2026 to discuss targeting vessels.^[21] The deputy intelligence director for the Puntland Maritime Police Force, Puntland’s leading anti-piracy force, stated in January 2026 that the Houthis had supplied Somali pirates with weapons and GPS satellite devices.^[22] The Guardian cited Somali officials who said that the pirates have recently improved their technological capabilities, including through the use of Starlink.^[23]

The Houthis may also be collaborating with al Shabaab to support the pirates, which would benefit al Shabaab financially and support Houthi objectives to harass vessels in the Red Sea. Al Shabaab has long-standing ties to piracy networks, and the Houthis have increased cooperation with al Shabaab through training, weapons smuggling, and personnel exchanges.^[24] UN reports have claimed that Houthi links with al Shabaab are part of a Houthi strategy to evaluate options to carry out maritime attacks from the Somali coast and “wield increasing influence in the region.”^[25] A UN report from February 2025 claimed that al Shabaab had offered to increase piracy operations within the Gulf of Aden—specifically targeting cargo vessels, disrupting vessel movement, and collecting ransoms—in exchange for al Shabaab receiving weapons and training from the Houthis.^[26] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data analyst Mohamed Daud stated on August 27 that al Shabaab and the Islamic State Somalia Province have trained and provided weapons to pirates.^[27]

Historic socioeconomic grievances and large ransom payments continue to fuel local incentives to engage in piracy, although many of these conditions are not unique to the latest resurgence. Overfishing by foreign trawlers was a major driver of piracy in the first decade of the 2000s and early 2010s, as Somali fishermen saw diminishing returns.^[28] Foreign trawlers have continued operating near the Somali coast despite the passage of federal legislation restricting them in 2024.^[29] Somalia is also experiencing a worsening drought that has further harmed local economies, including in Puntland.^[30] The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime separately cited counter-piracy officials who linked the resurgence to an over $1 million ransom payment that Somali pirates received after hijacking a Chinese trawler in January 2026.^[31] Pirates previously received even larger payments after hijacking the same Chinese trawler and a Bangladeshi vessel in 2024.^[32]

The Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS’s) and the Puntland state government’s contested responses to resurgent piracy have layered onto their preexisting political dispute. Puntland is a member of the national opposition coalition due to concerns that the FGS’s political agenda will threaten Puntland’s autonomy and influence within Somalia’s federal system.^[33] The two sides’ long-standing dispute turned into an armed standoff in mid-2026.^[34] The FGS attempted to co-opt security forces in Puntland from June to August to ensure compliance with its agenda, causing both sides to mobilize forces across the state.^[35] Puntland countered the FGS by seizing FGS-backed bases in August, however, at least temporarily foiling FGS plans to weaken the state government.^[36]

Both sides have claimed jurisdiction over the Puntland waters and the piracy issue as part of this political dispute. The Puntland state government had already rejected on July 5 the FGS’s claim to Puntland waters and any potential deal allowing a Turkish commercial or naval presence.^[37] The state government then accused “external actors”—presumably including the FGS and Turkey—of “seeking to exploit and reactivate” piracy networks through financial support on August 23 and followed up to claim that the FGS and Turkey had paid a ransom to free the Lutuf.^[38] The Somali defense ministry had claimed on August 29 that it had forcibly retaken the Lutuf with Turkish support, killing 14 pirates and destroying four pirate vessels.^[39] The Puntland state government held a security conference on September 1 in which it reiterated its control over all security forces in Puntland and its responsibility to combat piracy.^[40] The Somali foreign ministry later stated on September 6 that it has the sole authority to combat piracy off the Puntland coast.^[41]

Key FGS backer Turkey likely conducted strikes against suspected pirates as it expands the scope of its air operations in Somalia. Strikes related to the Lutuf hijacking on August 17 reportedly occurred off the coast of Puntland’s Bandarbeyla and Eyl districts on August 18, 20, and 23, killing at least 13 people.^[42] The Lutuf was reportedly transporting Turkish military equipment to Mogadishu, the Somali capital, and multiple Somali news outlets reported that Turkish naval vessels deployed to the Puntland coast immediately following the hijacking.^[43] The Puntland state security ministry accused Turkey of conducting the strikes on August 18 and 20 against civilian fishing vessels, although multiple Somali outlets reported that at least some of the vessels were associated with the hijackers of the Lutuf.^[44] A Turkish diplomat denied on August 24 that Turkey conducted the strikes, although the Turkish defense ministry acknowledged on August 27 that it provided support to the FGS related to the hijacking.^[45]

Turkey has increased airstrikes throughout Somalia in support of the FGS in mid-2026. The Turkish military conducted more strikes from July to August than it did from January to June after having only conducted two strikes in 2025, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.^[46] The strikes have primarily targeted al Shabaab in central and southern Somalia.^[47] Actors opposed to the FGS’s controversial political agenda have claimed that some of the strikes have targeted them amid increased nationwide tensions, however.^[48] Opposition forces aligned with the former South West state president, whom the FGS deposed in March 2026, accused Turkey of conducting strikes in South West in early July and September.^[49] The Jubbaland state government, which is a member of the leading national opposition coalition, accused Turkey of striking the residence of a former senior Somali security official now opposed to the FGS in Dolow—a town on the Ethiopian border—on September 4.^[50] Jubbaland state lawmakers and former South West state lawmakers called on September 6 for Turkey to stop its alleged strikes.^[51]

Figure 4. Turkey Increases Airstrikes in Somalia Throughout 2026

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi traveled to Israel for his first state visit to the country since October 2021 to strengthen relations and increase bilateral security cooperation. Tshisekedi made a three-day working visit to Israel at the invitation of Israeli President Isaac Herzog between August 31 and September 2.[52] Thérèse Wagner, the Congolese foreign minister, arrived in Tel Aviv, Israel’s biggest city and economic capital, on September 1 and held meetings with the Israeli foreign minister and the speaker of Israel’s parliament.[53] Tshisekedi met with Herzog and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, the Israeli capital, on September 1.[54] Congolese and Israeli delegations then convened for an expanded meeting to discuss areas of mutual interest and cooperation.[55] Wagner had signed two memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on diplomatic cooperation with the Israeli foreign minister during an official visit to Jerusalem in late July.[56] Herzog had previously visited Kinshasa, the Congolese capital, in November 2025, for the first state visit to the DRC by an Israeli president since 1984.

The Congolese government is likely seeking closer cooperation with Israel to bolster its military capabilities in the war against M23 and Rwanda. Tshisekedi’s office said ahead of the trip that the bilateral discussions in Israel would focus on “security, defense, agriculture, infrastructure, energy and advanced technology.”[57] Netanyahu said on social media that he and Tshisekedi agreed to strengthen bilateral security and economic ties.[58] Independent French journalist Christophe Rigaud reported on social media that Tshisekedi’s visit enabled the DRC and Israel to finalize an agreement under which the Israeli army will begin training for a special brigade of the Congolese army (FARDC) commanded by an FARDC colonel by the end of September.[59]

The Israeli government has become an important military partner for the DRC. The former Congolese defense minister and the former head of the Maison Militaire, which is the unit attached to the Congolese presidency that manages military affairs, signed agreements covering military training and technical support with Israel during Tshisekedi’s previous October 2021 visit to the country.[60] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that an Israeli defense manufacturer supplied the FARDC with fixed-wing aerial reconnaissance drones that collected intelligence documenting alleged coordination between the Rwandan army (RDF) and M23 in 2022.[61]

The Congolese government likely also views closer security ties with Israel as means to improve domestic intelligence and regime protection efforts. The Congolese government is constantly seeking to enhance its domestic intelligence and surveillance capabilities to counter potential threats of regime destabilization and protect government and telecommunication systems from intrusion. Insecurity in Kinshasa and the city’s peripheral areas has worsened since late 2024, marked by rising violent crime, spillover from communal conflicts, and political demonstrations, despite repeated efforts by Congolese authorities to address these issues. Congolese security services and agents from a surveillance and intelligence unit that answers to Tshisekedi’s office escalated an arrest, abduction, and intimidation campaign—reportedly using advanced digital surveillance technology—against anyone suspected of disloyalty to the regime or suspected links or sympathy with the political opposition, former DRC President Joseph Kabila, and M23 in early 2026.[62]

Congolese officials have sought to deepen preexisting ties with Israeli cyber, defense, and tech sectors. Tshisekedi’s private adviser, Kahumbu Mandungu Bula, who is also known as Kao, and a delegation of senior FARDC officials led by the FARDC chief of staff reportedly had traveled to Tel Aviv in October 2025 for discussions with Elbit Systems, an Israeli military technology company and defense giant.[63] The delegations discussed the terms of a “potential large contract” covering 120-mm mortar rounds, vehicle-mounted anti-drone systems, and radio and communications equipment, according to Africa Intelligence.[64] Kao and Tshisekedi’s brother, who oversees security for Tshisekedi’s office, reportedly had met with representatives of several Israeli cyber defense companies in Tel Aviv in March 2025, following the Congolese government’s acquisition of Israeli interception and communications surveillance systems.[65] The Congolese government has long been a client of Israeli intelligence-technology providers, which have supplied communications infrastructure and equipment and supported Congolese intelligence services.[66]

Israel has been providing regime security for Tshisekedi for several years. Security cooperation between the two countries has grown since 2021, when David Barnea, the former head of Israeli intelligence, tried to establish a new framework for security and intelligence cooperation with Tshisekedi to distance Israel from earlier controversies involving Barnea’s predecessor and several Israeli business figures closely linked to Kabila’s inner circle.[67] Congolese intelligence services had suspected Kabila of using a network of associates and foreign nationals across the country to destabilize Tshisekedi’s regime for several years. Operatives from several private Israeli private military companies (PMCs) and arms brokers deployed to the DRC in coordination with the Maison Militaire in 2022 to modernize armored vehicles, supply equipment, weaponry, and drones, and also to train FARDC units, including the Garde Républicaine (GR) and several elite GR units, which are responsible for protecting Tshisekedi and his family and are also sometimes deployed to active combat zones and major mining sites.[68] Africa Intelligence reported that Tshisekedi fired one Israeli security firm and used a Belgian diamond dealer as an intermediary to hire another Israeli firm that began providing bodyguards for Tshisekedi’s personal security detail in 2023.[69]

Tshisekedi’s visit to Israel and push to further deepen ties with the country is also likely part of a broader political strategy to align the DRC strategically with the United States and its allies and to further isolate Rwanda diplomatically. The Congolese government has significantly strengthened ties with the United States since early 2025. CTP assessed previously that Tshisekedi has likely traded access to Congolese mineral reserves for US security assistance and diplomatic backing to ensure his regime’s survival and exert diplomatic and political pressure on Rwanda.[70] The DRC has aligned itself with the domestic immigration policies of US President Donald Trump’s administration and agreed to accept US deportees from Latin America and potentially the Middle East.[71] The DRC signed an extensive economic and minerals partnership known as the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with the United States that granted US companies preferential access to the DRC’s industrial mining sector under the Washington Peace Accords (WPA) in December 2025.[72] The DRC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a major critical minerals deal in March 2026, however, which CTP assessed at the time likely reflected the DRC’s strategy to balance its external partnerships and maintain partner diversity, so that it does not become as reliant on its new partnership with the United States as it has been on China.[73]

The SPA makes the DRC a key piece of a strategic US effort to counter PRC dominance of critical mineral supply chains in the DRC. PRC-linked mining firms and cartels hold majority stakes in six of the DRC’s 10 largest copper-exporting operations, accounting for roughly 40 percent of national copper output and 70 to 75 percent of cobalt production in 2025.[74] The SPA broadly seeks to rebalance the DRC’s commercial relationships by facilitating a growing number of deals backed by the United States between the DRC and US companies and redirecting critical mineral exports away from informal networks and Chinese-dominated supply chains into formal, Western-controlled channels, primarily through the US-backed Lobito railway corridor that links major mining centers in the DRC and Zambia to the port of Lobito on Angola’s Atlantic coast. The China Global South Project assessed in early 2026 that the SPA “alarmed” Chinese mining industry analysts, who view the partnership as a threat to the PRC’s grip on mineral supply chains in the DRC and across Africa.[75] Congolese government officials signed a new major concession agreement with a Portuguese construction company to upgrade a key stretch of the Lobito corridor in late August.[76] Reuters reported in early September that US demand for Congolese copper has risen sharply, with total imports reaching over 53,000 metric tons in July alone—up from less than 32,000 tons for all of 2024—now accounting for almost 24 percent of US copper imports.[77]

The United States has in turn increased diplomatic, economic, and defense support to the DRC. The United States has hardened its stance toward Rwanda, which has been a long-standing US ally in Africa, and endorsed or directly imposed sanctions on Rwanda, M23, and Kabila on six occasions since March 2026.[78] Rwandan or M23-linked persons and entities account for 13 of the 14 individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in Africa’s Great Lakes region in 2026. The United States has framed these actions as enforcement measures to support the implementation of the WPA. The United States and the DRC also signed an undisclosed MOU for an expanded security partnership during the WPA’s signing in December 2025.[79] PMCs linked to American citizen Erik Prince, who has close ties to the Trump administration, and Israeli military instructors hired privately by the Congolese government reportedly began increasing their support for elite FARDC units and pro-Congolese government forces against M23 and M23-allied forces in South Kivu province in the eastern DRC in early 2026.[80] CTP assessed in March 2026 that the US-DRC security MOU had already led to greater state-to-state defense cooperation and could materialize into a formalized defense agreement, which would reportedly entail US training support, arms transfers, and intelligence sharing.[81]

Figure 5. M23 Advances in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford

Doubling down on relations with Israel allows the Congolese government to increase its standing with the United States. Tshisekedi is among a small group of African leaders to maintain close diplomatic ties with Israel, a strategic US partner, especially since the war in Gaza that began in October 2023. Only 16 of the 54 total African Union member states have a resident embassy in Israel. The Congolese foreign ministry said after Tshisekedi’s recent visit to Israel that it would move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.[82] The DRC would join the United States and six other countries that have relocated their embassies to Jerusalem—becoming the first African state to do so—if it follows through with the relocation. Israel also said that it would open an embassy in Kinshasa.[83] The French magazine Jeune Afrique quoted members of Tshisekedi’s inner circle who said after the announcement that strong ties between the DRC and Israel contribute to the “smooth functioning” of the DRC’s partnership with the United States.[84] Jeune Afrique noted independently that “very specific diplomatic and strategic considerations” likely motivated the decision to move the embassy to Jerusalem.[85]

Tshisekedi has made similar political gestures in the past to curry favor with the Trump administration related to Israel and US Middle East policy. Tshisekedi had said that he wanted to “build strong ties” with Israel and announced plans to appoint an ambassador to Tel Aviv and open a business liaison office in Jerusalem during a March 2020 speech at a conference hosted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which advocates for public policies that strengthen US-Israel relations.[86] Religious leaders and advisers close to Tshisekedi, who associates with revivalist evangelicalism—adherents of whom are generally supportive of Israel—reportedly encouraged him to adopt this position ahead of his speech at AIPAC.[87] Tshisekedi was the only African leader and among the first in the world to publicly endorse a previous US Israeli-Palestinian peace plan under Trump in 2020.[88] Africa Intelligence assessed in several reports in 2020 and 2021 that Tshisekedi’s initial moves to upgrade diplomatic relations with Israel and back some of the first Trump administration’s policy positions likely pleased the administration and aimed to secure a private meeting with Trump, although this did not occur.[89]

The Congolese government may also be seeking to strengthen ties with Israel to incentivize Israel to reduce its support for and engagement with Rwanda. Rwanda is one of Israel’s main allies in East Africa, particularly in the security sector. The Israeli ambassador to Rwanda reportedly met with the Rwandan defense minister and the RDF chief of staff to discuss ways to strengthen cooperation in March 2026.[90] In three reports since 2024 the UN Group of Experts has documented M23 and the RDF’s use in the eastern DRC of lethal equipment similar to matériel manufactured by Elbit Systems, along with tactical communications gear and GPS jamming and spoofing systems possibly manufactured in Israel.[91] The UN Experts have also claimed that RDF soldiers received training in Israel to operate jamming and spoofing systems.[92] Rwandan intelligence services have allegedly used Israeli military-grade digital surveillance tools to spy on a range of actors and political opponents domestically and abroad.[93] Rwandan President Paul Kagame has denied that the Rwandan government uses Israeli spyware but said that Rwanda has “always conducted intelligence-gathering operations” and “keeps tabs on our enemies and those who support them,” as do other sovereign states.[94]

The DRC likely seeks to use strengthened ties with Israel to put pressure on Israel’s relationship with Rwanda. Tshisekedi said that he discussed the security and humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC with Israeli officials during his latest visit.[95] M23-aligned journalist Steve Wembi claimed in a report that Tshisekedi expressed “growing reservations” to Netanyahu about the role of Qatar, which has frequent diplomatic friction with Israel and is a close economic partner to Rwanda, in its mediation in ongoing talks with M23 during his recent visit.[96] Tshisekedi’s administration has long pressed Israel to distance itself from Rwanda. Israel has refrained from criticizing Rwanda publicly for its military actions in the eastern DRC. Africa Intelligence reported previously that Tshisekedi told the second-most-senior Israeli official working on Africa that he “expected stronger support” from Israel against Rwanda following his political overtures in 2020.[97]

Africa File Data Cutoff: September 10, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

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