Silvana Guerrero: The ELN Commander Who Became a Priority Target for the Colombian Government
For years, Luz Amanda Pallares appeared before the public from an unusual setting for a member of a guerrilla organization: a negotiating table. Under the war name “Silvana Guerrero,” she took part in talks between the Colombian state and the National Liberation Army (ELN), participated in discussions on citizen participation and gender issues, and became one of the organization’s most visible voices. Today, however, her profile is associated with a very different reality. Colombian authorities identify her as one of the main leaders of the ELN’s Northeastern War Front, a structure with a strong presence in Norte de Santander and in strategic areas near the border with Venezuela. Her position within the group, her political and military experience, and the operational capacity of the structure she leads help explain why her name now appears among the priority targets of President Abelardo de la Espriella’s security strategy.
Pallares’ case also offers a useful window into how the ELN operates. Unlike a fully centralized organization, the guerrilla group functions through different war fronts that retain significant decision-making power in the territories where they are present. In that structure, leading a regional front means much more than exercising command over fighters. It also involves influence over political and logistical networks, strategic corridors, illegal economies, and areas where the state has historically struggled to establish a lasting presence. In the case of the Northeastern War Front, much of that power is concentrated in Catatumbo, a border region that has once again become one of the main epicenters of Colombia’s armed conflict.
A leader with decades inside the ELN
“Silvana Guerrero” is the alias of Luz Amanda Pallares Pallares, originally from Catatumbo; she joined the ELN more than two decades ago and gradually moved into positions of greater responsibility within the organization. Before consolidating her guerrilla career, she worked as a teacher, an aspect of her personal history that stands in sharp contrast to the role she would later assume within one of Latin America’s oldest armed groups. Her trajectory, however, did not develop exclusively on the military side. Pallares also built a political profile that allowed her to represent the ELN in different negotiation processes with the Colombian state, giving her national and international visibility that is relatively uncommon among territorial commanders.
During peace talks held under the government of Juan Manuel Santos, she was part of the ELN delegation that participated first in Quito and later in Havana. In those spaces, she was involved in discussions related to civil society participation and gender issues, and years later she was again connected to dialogue efforts resumed under the administration of Gustavo Petro. That experience gave her a distinctive profile within the ELN because Pallares has firsthand knowledge of the organization’s territorial dynamics while also having experience in diplomatic settings, direct interaction with state representatives, and exposure to international actors. That combination helps explain why authorities now attribute to her a relevance that goes beyond the leadership of a regional armed structure.
Her name has also appeared for years in judicial investigations. In 2019, Colombian authorities issued an arrest warrant against her as part of investigations related to the bombing of the General Francisco de Paula Santander Police Cadet School in Bogota on Jan. 17 of that year. The car-bomb attack, claimed by the ELN, killed 22 cadets as well as the person who carried out the bombing, and it led to the definitive breakdown of talks that the government of Ivan Duque had maintained with the organization. At this point, an important legal distinction must be made, as an arrest warrant, an investigation, or an accusation by authorities does not in itself amount to a conviction establishing individual criminal responsibility, and any specific attribution of wrongdoing must ultimately be determined through the appropriate judicial process.
Pallares’ situation gained renewed relevance after the latest escalation of violence in Catatumbo. Authorities reactivated legal actions against several ELN commanders linked to the region, and her name once again became prominent within the state’s security strategy. By then, “Silvana Guerrero” was no longer seen only as a former negotiator or political figure within the organization, but as a leader with command influence over an armed structure operating in one of Colombia’s most sensitive territories.
Catatumbo, the region that explains much of her power
For an international audience, understanding the importance of “Silvana Guerrero” first requires understanding what is happening in Catatumbo. Located in the department of Norte de Santander along the border with Venezuela, this mountainous and predominantly rural region has for decades been shaped by a particularly complex combination of factors: limited institutional presence, high levels of poverty, coca cultivation, routes used by illegal economies, and the persistent presence of different armed organizations. Its geography is also crucial. The border between Colombia and Venezuela has numerous informal crossings that facilitate the movement of people and goods, but they also pose a challenge for authorities seeking to control criminal activity or pursue armed structures that can move between both sides of the border.
The most recent crisis worsened dramatically in January 2025, when the ELN launched an offensive against Front 33, a dissident structure that emerged after the demobilization of the FARC. The confrontation triggered killings, mass displacement, and the confinement of rural communities, creating one of the most serious humanitarian emergencies Colombia has experienced in recent years. Tens of thousands of people were forced to leave their homes, while others became trapped in areas where fighting and threats restricted movement. Civilians once again found themselves caught in the middle of a struggle over territorial control, strategic routes, and illicit economies, highlighting the difficulties Colombia still faces in establishing lasting security in regions where armed actors have competed for decades to impose their authority.
For those observing Colombia from abroad, the Catatumbo crisis illustrates one of the central paradoxes that followed the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC: although that accord led to the demobilization of the country’s largest guerrilla force, in several regions the spaces it left behind were occupied or contested by other armed actors. The result has been a more fragmented conflict map, with the ELN, dissident groups formed from the former FARC, and criminal organizations competing for strategic territory and sources of financing. In that context, the Northeastern War Front holds particular importance because of its knowledge of the territory, its ability to mobilize, its long-standing presence, and its position in a border region that is strategically important for ELN operations.
Colombian authorities identify Pallares as one of the main leaders of that structure and attribute to her command influence over fighters, militias, and support networks. Estimates of the group’s size come primarily from intelligence reports and should therefore be understood as approximations rather than independently verifiable figures. Even so, the front’s importance does not depend only on the number of people within its ranks. Its significance is also tied to its coordination capacity on the ground, knowledge of border routes, and influence over areas where state presence remains limited. Pallares herself has reappeared publicly from the territory during periods of heightened tension, reinforcing the image of a leader who is no longer confined to the negotiating role she once held, but who now exerts direct influence within a structure involved in one of the country’s most delicate confrontations.
Why “Silvana Guerrero” is now under great pressure
The renewed focus on “Silvana Guerrero” coincides with a tougher security policy under the government of Abelardo de la Espriella. After an attack attributed by the Army to the ELN against a military facility in Ocaña, Norte de Santander, in early September, the president announced a strategy specifically aimed at Catatumbo that would focus not only on armed structures, but also on their commanders, sources of financing, and illegal economies. “We are going to strike their structures, their commanders, their finances, and the illicit economies that feed their criminal machinery,” De la Espriella publicly said on Sept. 5. Although the president did not publicly mention Pallares by name in that announcement, her role as one of the main leaders of the Northeastern War Front naturally places her among the commanders likely to face increased operational pressure.
Subsequent government actions suggest that this strategy is not limited to pursuing fighters on the ground. On Sept. 9, De la Espriella confirmed an operation in Aguachica, Cesar, that resulted in the seizure of thousands of rounds of ammunition that, according to authorities, were destined for armed components operating in Catatumbo and other parts of northeastern Colombia. The president said security forces would follow the trail of the material in order to identify those who finance, transport, and receive these supplies, signaling that the offensive is designed to weaken the logistical networks that sustain the ELN’s operational capacity rather than focus exclusively on its armed units.
That approach is particularly relevant in the case of a leader such as Pallares. Her importance within the ELN does not rest solely on her seniority, but also on the influence authorities attribute to her over a structure operating in one of the country’s most complex strategic corridors. Weakening that front could affect its mobility, supply lines, and coordination capacity, which helps explain why the government has made Catatumbo a security priority. During its first month in office, the De la Espriella administration also reported the neutralization of 23 commanders from different criminal and armed organizations, reinforcing the idea that the new strategy is intended to directly target leadership levels.
The offensive is also unfolding as Colombia seeks to strengthen security cooperation with the United States. During U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Bogota on Sept. 8, the two governments discussed expanding cooperation against drug trafficking and other security threats, while Colombia requested U.S. support for capabilities such as drones and radar systems. There is no public evidence that this cooperation is specifically directed at “Silvana Guerrero,” but it is part of a broader scenario in which Colombia’s armed forces are seeking to expand their technological and intelligence capabilities against illegal armed organizations.
Pallares brings together several characteristics that help explain why her name carries particular weight in that context: a long trajectory within the ELN, deep knowledge of Catatumbo, experience in high-level political settings, and a command position within one of the organization’s most strategically important fronts. Her name had already appeared among the targets of Colombian authorities before the current administration, but what has changed is the intensity of a strategy designed to simultaneously attack military structures, supply networks, illicit economies, and senior commanders.
Her trajectory also reflects one of the deepest complexities of Colombia’s conflict. Pallares spent years sitting across from state representatives exploring possible paths toward negotiation, and today she is once again at the center of the national agenda from a completely different position, as one of the commanders on whom the state is seeking to exert greater pressure. That contrast shows how attempts at dialogue have coexisted for years with armed organizations that retain military capacity, territorial control, and independent sources of financing, a reality that has complicated efforts to achieve a stable peace with the ELN.
The government’s challenge in Catatumbo, however, goes far beyond capturing or neutralizing a single leader. The region needs security, but it also needs permanent institutions, social investment, economic alternatives for rural communities, and a state presence capable of remaining in territories that have been exposed for decades to different armed actors. Without those elements, weakening one organization can simply create space for another to take its place. For that reason, the struggle surrounding “Silvana Guerrero” represents only one part of a much larger problem. In Catatumbo, Colombia’s real challenge will continue to be ensuring that the presence of the state is stronger, more durable, and more effective than that of any of the armed groups that have historically competed to control the region.
It also remains to be seen how significantly this issue could shift for Colombia under the renewed bilateral relationship with the United States and the new government of Abelardo de la Espriella.