Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Ambitions , Influence Game in Yemen
By François Frisonroche
As global attention remains focused on the conflict between the United States and Iran and concerns grow over the security of global energy supplies, Saudi Arabia is quietly pursuing unilateral negotiations with the Houthi movement, which controls northern Yemen and continues to express its support for the Iranian regime.
To some observers, what appears to be routine political bargaining may in fact reflect a broader strategic maneuver one that comes at the expense of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, led by Rashad al-Alimi, Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council.
Based in Riyadh and backed by Saudi Arabia, Alimi’s government has been notably absent from the ongoing negotiations.
Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has intervened militarily in Yemen, relying primarily on air strikes while avoiding a direct ground campaign due to the challenging mountainous terrain controlled by the Houthis in the north.
Despite operating advanced U.S.-supplied military equipment, the Kingdom’s limited operational effectiveness has remained a significant constraint.
Another frequently overlooked factor is the longstanding network of cross-border tribal relationships between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, reinforced by decades of financial arrangements.
After more than a decade of political and military shifts, Riyadh appears to have consolidated its dominant position in Yemen, particularly by sidelining a key regional competitor the United Arab Emirates and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the southern separatist movement long supported by Abu Dhabi.
Against this backdrop, deeper strategic ambitions are becoming increasingly apparent.
Saudi Arabia is believed to be seeking to strengthen or even establish near-total control over southern Yemen.
At the heart of this strategy lies a long-standing project: the construction of an oil pipeline linking Saudi territory to the Arabian Sea through Yemen’s Hadramout and Al-Mahra provinces. Such a route would allow Riyadh to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic maritime chokepoint heavily influenced by Iran, while securing its energy exports.
Although the UN Special Envoy for Yemen stated in December 2025 that the Saudi-backed roadmap for reaching an agreement with the Houthis was no longer suited to the evolving situation, Riyadh now appears to have revived that initiative.
Taking advantage of the international focus on escalating tensions involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, Saudi Arabia has resumed direct talks with the Houthis, once again without the participation of Yemen’s internationally recognized government.
This exclusion raises significant questions. Does it point to an implicit understanding under which the Houthis would refrain from attacking Saudi Arabia’s southern border in exchange for de facto recognition of their territorial control and financial compensation?
The current situation also reflects Riyadh’s growing influence over Yemen’s sovereign decision-making.
Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which has operated from Saudi Arabia for more than a decade, increasingly appears dependent on Riyadh, with some observers arguing that it functions more as an administrative structure aligned with Saudi interests than as an autonomous national authority.
Despite this marginalization, Saudi Arabia appears to be counting on the tacit support of countries whose interests depend on the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Egypt, because of the revenues generated by the Suez Canal, Israel through the commercial traffic linked to the Port of Aqaba, and several European countries engaged in trade with China all share a strong interest in ensuring the security of this critical maritime corridor.
Neutralizing the Houthis’ ability to disrupt shipping in the region carries a significant cost—one that Saudi Arabia appears willing to bear. The remaining question is what political gains Riyadh expects in return.
In this complex geopolitical equation, the greatest loser remains, once again, the Yemeni people.