Saudi Arabia doubles down on its failed Yemen strategy – Israel & Jewish News

(Aug. 11, 2026 / JNS)

Saudi Arabia’s newly announced Red Sea maritime coalition is a striking example of diplomatic self-delusion. After nearly a decade of failing to subdue the Houthis, Riyadh is doubling down on the same strategic fallacy that has defined its failed Yemen strategy.

The fatal strategic error behind Saudi Arabia’s approach is misdiagnosing the Houthi threat as a maritime problem. It is not.

The Red Sea crisis is only the symptom; the real source of power is the Houthis’ territorial control inside Yemen. Their ability to threaten global shipping comes from their grip over territory, ports, missile launch sites, supply networks and command structures. Until that land-based military infrastructure is dismantled, no maritime coalition can permanently restore deterrence.

Riyadh presented the initiative to 51 countries; 43 participated in the meeting, and only 14 have joined the coalition so far. But the problem is not a lack of countries. The problem is that this broad coalition lacks the strategic alignment, military capability and political commitment required to defeat a hardened adversary. Saudi Arabia built this coalition out of desperation rather than as part of a capability-driven strategy.

The most important question about this coalition is not who joined. It is who was left out. In many respects, it is weaker than the previous Saudi-led coalition, which included substantial military involvement from the United Arab Emirates and stronger Yemeni ground capabilities. Expanding the number of participants cannot compensate for the absence of the actors and capabilities that previously formed the core of the campaign.

Three of the region’s most capable, operationally experienced and directly invested anti-Houthi actors are conspicuously absent: the UAE; Southern Yemeni forces that have borne the brunt of ground fighting; and Israel, which continues to face missiles and drones. These are not minor omissions. They are strategically significant.

The UAE brings extensive combat experience, deep local intelligence networks and one of the Arab world’s most capable militaries. Southern Yemeni forces possess battlefield experience, local legitimacy and intimate knowledge of the terrain where the Houthis operate. Israel contributes advanced intelligence networks, sophisticated air-defense systems and precision-strike capabilities.

Yet these assets were weakened by political divisions within the anti-Houthi camp, particularly tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen’s future. Later efforts by Riyadh to pursue accommodation with the Houthis further contributed to the fragmentation of the coalition that had previously confronted them.

Meanwhile, Oman has its own strategic calculations and has chosen to avoid joining the coalition. Without the region’s most capable anti-Houthi actors, the coalition becomes a diplomatic facade rather than a credible military alliance.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a NATO-style mutual-defense pact on Aug. 7, declaring that an attack on one will be treated as an attack on all. Yet militarily, the agreement does not solve Riyadh’s central problem in Yemen: Neither Turkey nor Pakistan provides the capable, willing ground force needed to defeat the Houthis. Pakistan previously refused to send ground troops to help in Saudi Arabia’s Yemen war, underscoring the gap between diplomatic commitments and willingness to fight the Houthis.

The maritime coalition’s limitations are most evident in its composition. Some members have little direct relevance to the Red Sea theater, while even strategically located states such as Djibouti, Eritrea and Egypt raise serious questions about their willingness and ability to project meaningful military power.

Djibouti sits beside the Bab el-Mandeb strait and hosts major U.S. military facilities. Yet when Washington sought to use its bases for offensive operations against the Houthis, Djibouti refused, insisting the bases were for defensive purposes only.

Sudan is consumed by a devastating civil war and cannot secure much of its own territory, becoming another arena for regional rivalry. Somalia remains preoccupied with al-Shabaab. Ironically, Somaliland could provide vital intelligence and logistical access near Yemen, yet Saudi Arabia has opposed its independence, limiting a potentially valuable partner. Egypt has suffered severe Suez Canal revenue losses from Houthi attacks, but Cairo’s focus remains fixed on the Nile dispute with Ethiopia, complicating a unified Red Sea strategy.

Eritrea, located just across from Yemen and controlling numerous islands, presents perhaps the greatest contradiction. Because of its strategic location, military capacity and direct interest in Red Sea stability, Eritrea could be a critical player in any serious Red Sea security architecture. However, politically, its dictator Isaias Afwerki has maintained close relations with Iran, and in his 2024 Independence Day keynote speech, publicly framed Houthi attacks within the broader narrative of the “resistance” axis.

Under its current political orientation, Eritrea is unlikely to emerge as a committed military partner against the Houthis.

The Houthis understand this distinction. When the coalition was announced, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, its leader, did not respond with caution or restraint. Instead, the Houthis escalated their threats and continued targeting Saudi Arabia, including airports and energy infrastructure. That confidence is not surprising.

The Houthis survived years of a Saudi-led military campaign, American and British naval and air strikes, and repeated Israeli attacks while continuing to launch missiles and drones at Israel and disrupt Red Sea shipping. If those far more substantial military efforts—air and naval strikes without a credible ground force—failed to defeat the Houthis, why should a broader but less capable coalition suddenly succeed?

Defeating the Houthis requires combining Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states’ financial resources with American and European naval and air capabilities. It would integrate Israeli intelligence and precision-strike capabilities; empower Southern Yemeni forces as the principal ground component; and incorporate Eritrea’s ground military capabilities and strategic interest in securing the Red Sea. But the Eritrean dictator is unlikely to join such a coalition.

The United States is making the same strategic mistake with Iran: Trying to secure the Strait of Hormuz without removing the Islamist regime that threatens and weaponizes the waterway will not eliminate the threat. Likewise, securing the Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea requires more than maritime patrols; it means defeating the Houthis through a ground offensive and restoring Yemen’s territorial stability.

Diplomatic coalitions will not deter the Houthis. Saudi Arabia needs a coalition capable of defeating them militarily and stabilizing Yemen politically. Until Riyadh adopts such a strategy, the Houthis will continue to dictate the terms of the conflict and threaten Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea.