Rystad Energy cuts Russia crude output forecast to 8.95 million bpd for 2026 as sanctions and drone attacks deepen supply constraints

Russia’s crude oil production has entered what Rystad Energy calls “a new era of constraint.” In a statement sent to Rigzone in August 2026, the energy research firm revised its Russian output forecast down to 8.95 million barrels per day for 2026, declining further to around 8.6 million bpd in 2027 — a reduction of 90,000 bpd from its previous estimate.

The revision reflects mounting pressure from tighter sanctions, Ukrainian drone attacks on refineries, ports, and tankers, and growing disruptions at western Russian export terminals that have made seaborne shipments less reliable and more costly.

Rystad revises Russia crude forecast sharply lower

This isn’t a minor tweak. Cutting 90,000 bpd from a prior forecast signals that Rystad sees the pressure on Russian output as structural, not temporary. The firm pointed specifically to disruptions at western Russian export terminals, where seaborne shipments have become less reliable and more expensive to execute — and those logistics costs compound the revenue damage already caused by sanctions-driven crude discounts.

That brings Russia’s required September production target to 9.949 million bpd — nearly one million bpd above Rystad’s 2026 forecast of 8.95 million bpd.

Rystad was direct: even if operational constraints ease, a meaningful recovery in output appears unlikely. That’s a significant call. It suggests the damage isn’t just cyclical.

Sanctions and drone attacks drive production decline

A year of tighter Western sanctions has steadily restricted Russia’s ability to finance and operate upstream activities. The drone campaign has added a layer of disruption that’s harder to plan around.

Ukrainian strikes have hit refineries, ports, and tankers — compressing both refinery throughput and export capacity at the same time. Rystad VP Daria Melnik noted that refinery runs in June and July 2026 were among the lowest recorded in two decades. Throughput is forecast to average around 4 million bpd from July through December — nearly 30% below the 2016–2023 seasonal average of roughly 5.7 million bpd.

The downstream damage is bad enough on its own. But Melnik flagged something that cuts deeper than the refining sector.

“The increasing frequency and effectiveness of drone attacks on Russian oil and gas infrastructure is no longer affecting only refineries; it’s constraining the country’s upstream sector as well,” she said.

Every barrel a damaged refinery can’t process has to go somewhere — into exports, storage, or back into the ground. Russia absorbed that imbalance in June. By July, its export system couldn’t consistently handle the overflow, forcing faster and deeper production cuts at the field level.

Inventory pressure and spare capacity erosion limit recovery options

Russia’s ability to ride out disruptions depends on buffer capacity — in storage, in spare wells, in flexible logistics. Those buffers are shrinking fast.

Onshore crude inventories are already at levels where sustained production cuts become hard to avoid. Operators can no longer wait for export or refining capacity to recover before making field-level decisions; there’s simply no room to absorb another shock without cutting output further.

Rystad estimates Russia’s spare production capacity at around 620,000 bpd in 2026, rising modestly to 700,000 bpd in 2027. On paper, that sounds like a meaningful cushion. In practice, it’s more fragile than the numbers suggest. Much of that spare capacity comes from aging, high-water-cut wells shut in during recent production cuts — and the longer those wells stay offline, the harder it gets to bring them back. Extended shutdowns raise the risk of costly interventions, lower productivity, and in some cases permanent abandonment, when repair and water-handling costs simply outweigh the economics.

Rystad was explicit: part of the spare capacity created by recent cuts is expected to be permanently lost, limiting Russia’s ability to increase output from existing fields even if conditions improve.

Global surplus and buyer alternatives to pressure Russian revenues

The market backdrop isn’t helping. Rystad projects the global oil market will move into surplus in 2027 if Middle East conflict eases and disrupted supply flows normalize — a scenario that would push benchmark prices lower and directly erode Russia’s bargaining power with the buyers it still has.

Russia already sells its crude at deep discounts to account for sanctions risk. A softer price environment makes those discounts even harder to absorb. Buyers in China, India, Türkiye, Hungary, and Slovakia would gain greater access to non-sanctioned crude, improving their alternatives and reducing their willingness to accept the legal, financial, and operational risks that come with Russian barrels — unless the discounts go even deeper. Lower prices globally, steeper discounts required locally. It’s a squeeze from both directions.

Rystad’s conclusion is unambiguous: a meaningful production recovery in 2027 is unlikely given these combined pressures.

OPEC+ raises Russia’s production target despite structural limits

There’s a notable disconnect between what OPEC+ is asking of Russia and what Rystad thinks Russia can actually deliver.

On August 2, 2026, seven OPEC+ members — Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman — agreed in a virtual meeting to increase collective output by 188,000 bpd in September. Russia’s share of that increase is 62,000 bpd, the same monthly increment assigned to it in every OPEC+ statement from March through August 2026. That brings Russia’s required September production target to 9.949 million bpd — nearly one million bpd above Rystad’s 2026 forecast of 8.95 million bpd.

The gap is striking. OPEC+ targets reflect negotiated quotas, not physical capacity assessments, while Rystad’s forecast reflects what it believes Russia can actually produce given sanctions, drone damage, aging infrastructure, and inventory constraints. Those are very different numbers — and the difference tells you a lot about the structural bind Russia is now in.

Key takeaways

Rystad Energy’s revised forecast puts Russian crude production at 8.95 million bpd for 2026, declining to approximately 8.6 million bpd in 2027 — 90,000 bpd below its prior estimate. The downgrade reflects the combined weight of tighter Western sanctions, Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries, ports, and tankers, and growing disruption at western export terminals.

Refinery throughput is forecast at around 4 million bpd for the second half of 2026, nearly 30% below historical seasonal norms. Spare production capacity stands at roughly 620,000 bpd but faces permanent erosion as shut-in wells deteriorate. A projected 2027 global oil surplus would further pressure prices and reduce buyer willingness to pay a premium for Russian barrels.

Russia’s OPEC+ production target for September 2026 sits at 9.949 million bpd — roughly one million bpd above what Rystad forecasts the country can actually produce.