Red Flags in the Red Sea Corridor as Sudan’s War Goes Beyond Borders — Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI)

Implications

Politically, the Sudan conflict is likely to intensify geopolitical competition across neighbouring regions. While the UAE has been accused of supporting the RSF, other regional and international actors, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, continue to maintain support for the SAF. Such external support has consequently prompted growing characterisations of the conflict as a proxy confrontation shaped by competing regional interests. External powers may continue to back rival political and military actors in order to preserve influence over maritime access, economic corridors and future governance arrangements in Sudan. However, involvement of external powers is likely to diminish the prospects for a swift and unified political settlement, which could create a political vacuum and further deteriorate governance capacity in the state.

The prolonged crisis risks institutional and infrastructure collapse across Sudan, with potential disruptions to transport corridors, port operations, and the distribution of emergency supplies. Sudan’s ports are particularly coveted because they serve as hubs connecting interior African markets to Gulf economies and international maritime trade routes. Any disturbances in this region can pose a serious risk to operational and trade flows.

From the security perspective, instability in Sudan is creating a more volatile and fragmented environment by creating favourable conditions for weapon proliferation, organised criminal activity, and cross-border militant movement across poorly governed regions, challenges that many neighbouring states are already struggling to contain. If the war continues or remains unresolved, its effects may add fuel to regional insecurity, not only within Sudan but also across other parts of Africa.

Civilian populations continue to endure armed attacks, looting, sexual violence, and forced displacement on a large scale. Fragmented territorial control, coupled with the erosion of state organisations, is paving the way for weapon proliferation, different criminal activities, and above all, cross-border militant movement across fragile regions. Such dynamics have also contributed to the growing influence of non-state armed actors and militias, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North and the Sudan Liberation Army – Mini Minawi (SLA-MM).

The war in Sudan poses a great economic threat to regional trade connectivity, maritime routes, and investment confidence throughout the Red Sea corridor. It is already causing damage to the state’s economy, with significantly undermined productive capacity and increasing food shortages. During the turmoil, substantial portions of gold production and trafficking have reportedly shifted into informal networks, such as the RSF-controlled mining operations and cross-border smuggling routes. Large-scale informal gold exports contribute to currency instability and financial outflows. The crisis is also exerting adverse effects on neighbouring states through disruptions to cross-border trade and regional economic activity. Continued instability may reduce commercial opportunities and constrain market growth in Sudan and its neighbouring states. For instance, in South Sudan, repeated disruptions to oil export pipelines running through Sudan have severely reduced its oil revenues. Moreover, refugee inflows into other states are placing additional pressure on government resources, labour markets and public services. Rising demand for housing, food, healthcare facilities, education and basic commodities increases fiscal burden, and may, over time, contribute to socio-economic struggle between host and refugee populations.

As Sudan’s war now enters its 4th consecutive year of conflict with no discernible resolution, the war has become increasingly intertwined with external economic and strategic interests, particularly surrounding its gold. A substantial proportion of Sudan’s gold is reportedly channelled towards the UAE, through both formal and informal trade networks, reinforcing broader patterns of regional influence and transactional engagement. The UAE’s role in this regard appears to be more than indirect commercial involvement, as multiple reports suggest that it has furnished support to the RSF, through financial assistance and advanced weaponry.