Moscow Pushing North Caucasians To Adopt A Common Civic Russian Identity – Analysis – Eurasia Review
The Kremlin is expanding its efforts to force the North Caucasians to change their ways of thinking and to adopt a common civic identity (RBC, June 9; OC-Media, June 11). Moscow is alarmed by new data showing that the non-Russian nations of the North Caucasus lag far behind others in the Russian Federation in identifying primarily as civic Russians rather than continuing to identify as members of separate nations (Natsional’niy aktsent, June 10). This is part of a broader effort Russian President Vladimir Putin began more than a decade ago to get non-Russians in the Russian Federation to downplay or even give up their ethnic identities and adopt, in their place, a common civic Russian identity, lest the continued vitality of the former threaten Moscow’s dominance and the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. (On that earlier effort and criticism of it, see Window on Eurasia, March 4, 2017.)
Given the new figures from the North Caucasus, the Kremlin has decided to redouble its efforts in this direction. Ethnic identities have intensified since the start of Putin’s war against Ukraine (Komi Daily, March 26). Growing ethnic Russian objections to such a move have increased given that the Kremlin has now recognized them as “the state-forming nation” and any talk of a civic nation threatens that status (Kasparov.ru, April 19; Svobodnaya Pressa, May 30). As a result, the debates of a decade ago are likely to resume, and conflicts, including, quite possibly, in the streets of the North Caucasus, are likely to break out.
A new report by Russia’s Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs (FADN) shows that the percentage of citizens of the Russian Federation who identify primarily as civic Russians rather than by ethnicity has risen from 57 percent in 2014 to 93.9 percent now (FADN, June 8). Russian officials and commentators are celebrating this increase as an indication that the nationality policies of the Russian government are working as the Kremlin intends and producing the kind of unity capable of resisting outside efforts to undermine Moscow’s power and the territorial integrity of the country (Absatz, June 9; Natsional’niy aktsent, June 10).
These countrywide figures, however, hide an enormous range, and it is this range that is now driving Russian policies. In predominantly ethnic Russian areas, the share of the population prepared to say they identify as civic Russians is in the high 90s. In the non-Russian regions of the North Caucasus, it is 10 to almost 20 percent lower, with this metric being 88.2 percent in Dagestan, 85.4 percent in Adygeya, and 82.7 percent in Chechnya.
While those figures are high, the fact they continue to be so much lower than in ethnic Russian areas has alarmed the Kremlin. It has prompted it to develop a variety of programs intended to overcome this divide. Based on interviews with Kremlin insiders, Moscow experts, and officials in the North Caucasus, nearly all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity, the RBC news agency describes what is happening in some detail (RBC, June 9). As that report is behind a paywall, however, the best readily available source on these developments is a new article by Prague-based nationalities expert Elizaveta Chukharova on the OC-Media portal, which both summarizes the RBC story and comments on it (OC-Media, June 11).
According to Chukharova’s article, Moscow officials are focusing their efforts on promoting Russian state symbols in the North Caucasus, insisting that identifying as civic Russians is not a threat to their ethnic identities, and opposing radicalism “in all its forms.” These sources say that in so doing, Moscow hopes to “demonstrate a link between strengthening a common Russian civic identity and the development of tourism, economic growth and improved living standards” and that the center has now tasked deputy heads of the leaders of federal subjects in the North Caucasus and elsewhere to oversee the implementation of these programs. According to RBC, he says officials in the North Caucasus confirm that efforts in these directions have now begun on the ground.
Moscow feels compelled to promise North Caucasians that they will not have to give up their ethnic identities if they adopt the civic Russian one the Kremlin prefers. This shows just how potentially explosive such a policy can be. The FADN report numbers are worrisome enough, but there can be little doubt that they understate the extent of non-Russians’ opposition to such a change. Like others in the Russian Federation, they have learned to give “correct” answers to the questions government surveys ask, and Moscow is aware of this. Consequently, opposition to what the Kremlin hopes to achieve is certainly far larger than the FADN reports suggest, and the reasons for Kremlin concern are far greater. Other pollsters have found beyond a doubt evidence of just how serious the situation is.
Earlier this year, Vedomosti reported on one set of Russian Field poll results that supports such a conclusion (Vedomosti, April 2). It found that residents of the two remaining bi-national republics of the North Caucasus are far more likely to identify as civic Russians than residents of the multi-national neighbors, with 48 percent of those in Karachayevo-Cherkessia now saying that their primary identity is as citizens of the Russian Federation and 43 percent of those in Kabardino-Balkaria making that declaration, compared to only 36 percent of the population of the North Caucasus as a whole. While Moscow may decide that amalgamating republics is a good thing for the center, North Caucasians are likely to conclude that such a move would threaten them even more and resist it even more strongly. Another finding is likely to be even more disturbing in Moscow. This Russian Field poll found that younger people are less likely to list as their primary identity citizenship in the Russian Federation than their elders and instead will identify in ethnic or even religious, that is Muslim, terms.
Given that, Moscow is likely to press ahead and see the emergence of a new debate on the utility and dangers of pushing for a civic identity over all others. This is one that will recapitulate the one from nearly a decade ago, when opposition from non-Russians and ethnic Russians alike forced the Kremlin to back away from pursuing this goal as rapidly as it had planned. (On that debate and its outcome, see Window on Eurasia, March 3, 2017 and the numerous sources cited therein.)
In today’s super-heated atmosphere, when the Russian nationalism the Kremlin has been promoting in the course of its lengthening war against Ukraine is growing, that debate may prove more explosive than it was earlier. Ever more non-Russians and especially North Caucasians are resisting the push for a civic Russian identity in place of their traditional ethnic ones, and ever more ethnic Russians are angry about what that portends for themselves. This is yet another problem for Putin and the Kremlin as Russia heads toward Duma elections in September (Window on Eurasia, March 27).
