Morocco… the ‘nation-state’ and ‘the envy of some’ | Khairallah Khairallah

Why can Morocco overcome difficulties and challenges, including the recent events in Ceuta—a Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory that must return to the Kingdom sooner or later?

In this regard, one must note two phrases in King Mohammed VI’s speech on the occasion of the Moroccan Throne Day that summarize a broad aspect of this country’s experience: “the nation-state” and “the envy of some.” The first explains where the Moroccan rise stems from, and the second describes the impact this rise has created outside the Kingdom.

Morocco does not act like a makeshift state searching for a place, but rather as a state with deep historical roots that has accumulated institutions and governing traditions, preserving a rare political continuity amidst a highly turbulent region.

As for “the envy” spoken of by Mohammed VI, it expresses the frustration of certain parties with a state that is changing its position and advancing—unlike its neighbour, Algeria—in areas that, according to these parties’ calculations, it was supposed to stay far away from.

Morocco has succeeded in making itself more present in the calculations of others without raising its voice too loudly. Tangier Med Port and Dakhla Port in the Moroccan Sahara reflect this simple reality, as do the automotive and aerospace industries, the economic expansion into West Africa, energy projects, continental interconnections with Europe, and balanced relations with the United States, China, and the Gulf states. Morocco has treated these issues as parts of a unified policy aimed at transforming the Kingdom into a state through which indispensable, hard-to-ignore interests pass and are tied.

This, at its core, is the Moroccan way of building influence: expanding the state’s tangible value on the ground before demanding the expansion of imaginary roles.

Rabat does not present an ideological project to the region, nor does it claim to possess a formula suitable for others. It rarely speaks in the language of leadership or guardianship. Its ambition is more specific: protecting its national interests, solidifying its territorial integrity, diversifying its partnerships, and raising the cost of bypassing it in regional and international calculations.

This approach was clearly demonstrated in managing the Sahara issue. The file is no longer merely a dispute in which Rabat explains the justice of its position; it has become an integral part of shaping its foreign relations. Under the direction of King Mohammed VI, Moroccan diplomacy shifted from defending the cause to constructing an international environment that ties the Moroccan stance directly to other countries’ interests, investments, security, and plans in Africa and the Atlantic.

Rabat realized with sharp realism that political support unsupported by mutual interests remains subject to retreat as governments and circumstances change. What protects Morocco, its issues, and its files today—in a complex region full of complicated actors—is that it has become a partner to most of the world’s influential players in trade, energy, security, migration, and investment. Consequently, major capitals have automatically aligned their positions on the Sahara issue with Morocco’s vision and interests.

Tanger Med, for example, is a declaration of the position Morocco holds in international trade. The automotive industry, alongside supporting exports and job opportunities, connects the Kingdom to European and global supply chains, making its stability part of the stability of companies and markets beyond its borders. The same applies to aerospace, renewable energy, fertilizer production, and Atlantic-oriented projects.

Even the gas pipeline project extending from Nigeria along the African coast toward Morocco and Europe—despite the surrounding financial, technical, and political challenges—reveals the scale of Morocco’s vision of its role. The project is an attempt to redraw the connection between West Africa and European markets, placing Morocco at the center of an energy, development, and infrastructure network that extends beyond its immediate borders and redefines energy security in Africa in a way that bypasses the security challenges of the Sahel region and its current transit lines.

Rabat has kept its doors open to diverse powers. Its close relationship with Washington did not prevent it from expanding cooperation with Beijing. Its economic ties to Europe did not restrict its movement solely within the European space. Its Gulf partnerships did not come at the expense of its African presence. Furthermore, its return to the African Union in 2017 reflected a decision to calmly defend its interests against opponents after realizing the extent of the damage caused by leaving the arena open to them.

The recent royal speech on Throne Day embodied a political doctrine: that an international presence begins with the internal solidity of the state and its ability to offer something the world needs.

This does not mean Morocco faces no challenges, particularly regarding the time required for major projects before their benefits are fully felt by everyone.

However, the general trajectory is clear. The Kingdom is solidifying its position as a trade nexus, a manufacturing hub, a security partner, a gateway to Africa, and an Atlantic extension for Europe, all while maintaining its strategic independence.

As for “the envy of some,” it will remain a side effect of Morocco’s rise, even if it takes on more dangerous forms targeting the image of stability upon which Morocco built a significant portion of its influence, as revealed by the events in Ceuta.

Coinciding with the Throne Speech, tens of thousands of Moroccan youths rushed toward the enclave under Spanish control—which Morocco considers part of its national territory—in a scene intended to overshadow the entire speech and turn Throne Day from an occasion to showcase state achievements into an occasion to put the state on trial.

However, what the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior announced afterward placed the event in a context beyond immediate social interpretation. According to the ministry, the crossing was fueled by organized disinformation campaigns across digital platforms, the activity of human trafficking networks, and the promotion of a false interpretation of a Spanish court ruling, which led thousands to falsely believe that reaching Ceuta by sea would grant them residency in Spain and Europe.

This does not negate the social questions exposed by the scene regarding youth, unemployment, inequalities, and awaiting the fruits of major projects—issues the King himself addressed a year prior when he emphasized the need for all of Morocco to move at a single pace.

Yet, what followed the surge demonstrated the strength of the Moroccan state structure. The security forces regained control of the border, the major waves of crossings ceased, legal traffic resumed, and cooperation took place with Spain to return the vast majority of those who entered Ceuta. The Spanish Foreign Minister confirmed that Rabat provided immediate, unconditional security support, allowing for the return of most individuals within a few days.

Most importantly, the crisis did not turn into internal political division, an open confrontation with Spain, or a diplomatic rift that reshuffled Morocco’s relations with Europe. This success confirms the Moroccan state’s ability to absorb shocks, prevent known adversaries from dictating the narrative, and scale the event back down to its actual size without denying its gravity. In this, the full meaning of the “nation-state” is realized.