King’s vision charts Morocco’s role in rebuilding, stabilising Gaza | Tarek El Bouzidi

The debate over Morocco’s role in Gaza is moving beyond humanitarian assistance and political positions towards a more complex question: what happens after the war, and how can the transition from a cessation of fighting to restored security and services, and ultimately reconstruction, take place within a political framework that preserves Palestinian institutions and decision-making?

This shift is increasingly evident in official contacts between Rabat and Ramallah. Most recently, on August 29, 2026, Palestinian Minister of Public Works and Housing Ahed Bseiso met Morocco’s ambassador to Palestine, Abdelrahim Mezian, to discuss how Morocco’s expertise in housing, roads, infrastructure, urban planning and the reconstruction of damaged areas could contribute to Gaza’s recovery. The talks also drew on Morocco’s experience in managing the reconstruction effort following the Al Haouz earthquake.

The meeting builds on earlier cooperation. In May 2024, the two sides discussed involving Moroccan experts and companies in reconstruction projects, as well as sharing expertise in affordable housing, the rehabilitation of vulnerable areas and construction technologies. That cooperation is now gradually moving beyond an exchange of expertise towards exploring a more practical Moroccan role in the broader effort to rebuild Gaza.

A joint assessment by the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank in April 2026 put Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction needs at around $71.4 billion over the coming decade. Behind that staggering figure lies an entire system that must be rebuilt, from housing, water and electricity to healthcare, education, roads, the local economy and public institutions.

That interconnected approach is central to the vision King Mohammed VI has articulated on the Palestinian cause throughout the war. In his message to the United Nations Committee on the “Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People” in November 2025, the king linked consolidating the ceasefire and ensuring the unhindered flow of humanitarian aid to launching reconstruction, strengthening the Palestinian Authority and pursuing a political settlement based on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Under this vision, reconstruction does not replace politics, just as the absence of a political settlement should not halt efforts to restore the basic conditions of everyday life.

On the ground, Morocco has followed the same approach throughout the war. Through the Bayt Mal Al-Quds Al Sharif Agency, and under King Mohammed VI’s chairmanship of the Al-Quds Committee, the kingdom has maintained its longstanding engagement with the Palestinian cause while delivering food and medical aid to Gaza on several occasions under royal instructions.

Some of those operations reached the enclave through a direct land route, highlighting Rabat’s ability to draw on its political channels to facilitate humanitarian access in exceptionally difficult circumstances.

During 2026, Morocco’s engagement broadened to include a security dimension. The kingdom announced its readiness to contribute to an international force tasked with helping to stabilise Gaza and, on July 15, signed an agreement establishing the framework for its participation.

The proposed contribution includes officers from the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces, personnel from the Royal Gendarmerie and members of the General Directorate of National Security, alongside plans for a field military hospital and missions focused on training, coordination and support for the Palestinian police.

This places the strengthening of Palestinian security capabilities at the heart of Morocco’s role, alongside the immediate demands of stabilisation and humanitarian assistance.

Experience from post-conflict settings suggests that rebuilding physical infrastructure alone is not enough. In its “Building for Peace” report, drawing on experiences in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, the World Bank concluded that successful reconstruction is closely tied to the strength of institutions, security, the local economy and public services.

In Gaza, where physical destruction has been compounded by the weakening of vital sectors and core institutions, that relationship becomes even more critical.

Morocco’s accumulated experience extends well beyond the reconstruction effort following the Al Haouz earthquake. For decades, the kingdom has pursued broad programmes in social housing, the eradication of substandard housing, neighbourhood rehabilitation and the development of new urban centres, while seeking to link urban expansion with the provision of basic infrastructure.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development highlighted the scale of Morocco’s accumulated reforms and projects in its 2025 review of the country’s urban policy. The kingdom’s Cities Without Slums programme has also received international recognition from UN-Habitat as a significant effort to address inadequate housing and improve urban living conditions.

The Al Haouz experience provides a more recent test of the state’s capacity to manage multiple reconstruction programmes following a major disaster, spanning housing, roads, water, healthcare and education.

The point, however, is not to draw a direct comparison between Al Haouz and Gaza. The enclave faces an entirely different reality, shaped by prolonged war, extensive destruction of its urban and institutional fabric, unexploded ordnance and severe restrictions on the movement of people and supplies.

The relevance of Morocco’s experience lies instead in the capacity of its institutions to coordinate multiple interventions, set priorities, link housing to essential services and basic infrastructure, and mobilise engineering expertise alongside public- and private-sector actors.

But expertise is not the only factor.

Morocco enters such efforts with a reservoir of political and institutional credibility built over decades of engagement with the Palestinian cause, as well as an ability to communicate with multiple parties while maintaining close ties with Palestinian institutions.

Significantly, the current push for expanded cooperation in housing, roads, urban planning, construction and training is coming from the Palestinian side itself. This suggests that Moroccan expertise is increasingly being viewed not simply as technical assistance, but as a form of partnership that can be translated into concrete projects.

Morocco therefore brings together the legacy of the Al-Quds Committee and the Bayt Mal Al-Quds Al Sharif Agency, its longstanding relationships with Palestinian institutions, channels of communication with Israel, recognised security and training expertise, and practical capabilities in healthcare, relief, housing and infrastructure.

It is this combination of political credibility and implementation capacity that could make Morocco a sought-after partner as complex files move from political declarations to the harder task of putting plans into practice.

The political framework, however, remains decisive.

Rebuilding Gaza without a political horizon risks reproducing a cycle the territory has experienced repeatedly, in which what has been destroyed is rebuilt only to be demolished again in a subsequent confrontation.

By contrast, linking reconstruction to the restoration of Palestinian institutions, the political and territorial unity of Gaza and the West Bank, and a credible path towards Palestinian statehood would give the rebuilding process a purpose extending beyond repairing the damage of war to laying the foundations for a sustainable peace.

Morocco’s role in the next phase will not be measured solely by the funding it provides or the number of personnel it can deploy.

Rabat’s influence will instead be determined by its ability to bring together humanitarian action, support for stability, institution-building and technical expertise within the vision that King Mohammed VI has consistently advanced: that Gaza’s stability cannot be separated from Palestinian rights, and that rebuilding the territory’s physical fabric cannot be complete without rebuilding the political and institutional conditions that enable Palestinians to govern their land and shape their own future.