In President Kiir’s South Sudan, recycling talent sustains power
President Salva Kiir’s latest dismissal of Central Bank governor Johnny Ohisa and the return of Addis Ababa Othow to the post has reinforced a familiar pattern in South Sudan: a revolving door of sackings, reappointments and reshuffles at the heart of government.
The changes announced last week came against a backdrop of severe inflation, suggesting the President was responding to mounting economic pressure. But they also point to a broader habit of recycling trusted insiders, a practice critics say reflects either a shortage of fresh talent or a preference for loyalty over reform.
Kiir’s frequent sackings, rapid reappointments and Cabinet purges are also being read as part of a strategy to consolidate power ahead of planned elections this December. He has already moved against many of the lieutenants who backed suspended First Vice-President Riek Machar, who remains in detention facing treason charges. His administration has also amended the 2018 power-sharing peace deal, the country’s transitional framework, leaving out obligations to conduct a census and complete security reforms before elections are held.
Reappointing familiar veterans, such as returning Othow to the central bank, could thus demonstrate desire to continue with status quo.
In 2024, President Kiir made it clear that he was looking for the people who could effectively run his government.
However, a closer examination reveals a familiar pattern that observers have long lamented: staying close to political elites.
Amaju Ubur Yalamoi Ayani, a political commentator and teacher, says this process is not reform.
“It is a recycling aimed at creating an illusion of dynamism and responsiveness, while preserving the deeply entrenched political architecture of the ruling elites at the expense of the South Sudanese masses,” he says.
“When the strategy prioritises the appeasement of various political, ethnic, and regional factions within the government’s inner circle, service delivery for the populace is compromised.”
In May, President Kiir dismissed 47 lawmakers aligned with Machar’s SPLM-IO faction after an opposition walkout over amendments to the power-sharing deal, replacing them with figures from a rival faction.
First Deputy Speaker Oette Nathaniel Pirino and Council of States Speaker Deng Deng Akun were stripped of their posts. In response, the SPLM-IO acting chairman, Nathaniel Oyet Pierieno accused President Kiir’s regime of dismantling the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and undermining diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes.
“The guarantors have failed to protect the people of South Sudan and the R-ARCSS from President Salva Kiir. The culture of impunity and atrocities is entrenched in South Sudan,” said Pierieno.
Acting as the chairman of the SPLM-IO opposition faction, he has consistently rejected Kiir’s unilateral dismissals and proposed internal dialogues, insisting that genuine talks must occur at neutral venues under international mediation rather than under Kiir’s direct control.
Maj-Gen George Aggrey Owinow (rtd), the Interim Chairperson of peace monitors’ group, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), warned that Kiir’s unilateral sackings, reshuffles, and detention of opposition figures erode essential trust in the 2018 peace agreement (R-ARCSS) and risk plunging South Sudan back into widespread conflict.
“We urge President Kiir to restore SPLM-IO-held ministerial and legislative positions that were altered or stripped during government shakeups,” he said.
Critics view President Salva Kiir’s frequent sackings and recycling of familiar figures as superficial musical chairs that avoid real accountability, signalling a tightening grip on power amid economic collapse and deep uncertainty over the country’s political transition.
Notable sacked and reinstated leaders include General Santino Deng Wol.
He was sacked as army chief of defence forces in 2024; he was reappointed to his former post as the head of the military in May 2026.
Dr James Wani Igga was sacked from his position as Vice President in February 2025, he was later reappointed by President Kiir in November 2025 to head the economic cluster.
Dr Barnaba Bak Chol (Bak Barnaba Chol), initially removed from his role as Minister of Finance in March 2024, but was brought back and dismissed/re-rotated multiple times through subsequent financial sector adjustments.
General Akech Tong Aleu (Akec Tong Aleu) was shifted from assignments including national security director roles; he was later reappointed as Director General of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB).
James Pitia Morgan, previously left out of his Foreign Service placement, was reappointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs after earlier omissions.
Tut Gatluak Manime was reassigned from specific security advisory and diplomatic tasks before returning to core presidential advisory functions.
In an article titled, Decrees and Decline: A Presidency Reduced to a Book of Decrees, Dr Remember Miamingi pointed out that Kiir’s strategy is a method of sustaining power.
Dr Miamingi argued that Kiir’s decree book has become, “… the central manual of government in South Sudan.”
“Through it, he runs a political marketplace in which offices are traded for loyalty and access to money, and he uses the politics of hiring and firing to humiliate one rival through another in a circle of revenge within a ruling clique that was already fractured by design during the liberation war.”