ImpACT International | Child Soldiers, Colombian Mercenaries, and UAE Complicity in Sudan

The Associated Press’s July 2026 investigation exposed a grim reality at the heart of Sudan’s conflict: the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have systematically recruited and trained children, with foreign fighters playing a direct role in turning minors into combatants. Teenagers detained at a government-run rehabilitation centre in Khartoum described being conscripted, chained to anti-aircraft guns, beaten for disobedience, and forced to fire artillery at targets identified by drones—often civilian neighbourhoods. Multiple children said fighters identified as “Colombians” instructed them on assault rifles, machine guns, and RPGs at RSF camps in and around Khartoum and in Darfur.

This pattern is not isolated. In the first half of 2025, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported on large recruitment drives throughout Darfur, especially in West Darfur, where the RSF exerted extreme pressure on communities to hand over men and boys. In May 2025 alone,

“credible sources from El Geneina reiterated concerns about the ongoing recruitment of children, and alleged that more than 300—most of them below the age of 16—had been undergoing military training at a recently established RSF camp near El Geneina airport,”

OHCHR found. The UN recorded an increase in reported child recruitment in Sudan, particularly by the RSF and its allied armed groups, with the large majority of this recruitment occurring in Darfur.

Foreign fighters and the mercenary pipeline

Beyond training, Colombian private military contractors (PMCs) have operated as infantry, artillerymen, drone pilots, and vehicle drivers for the RSF, playing a critical role in pivotal battles such as the October 2025 capture of El Fasher. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Conflict Insights Group (CIG) have documented this foreign fighting force in detail, tracing its recruitment, transit, and deployment. HRW’s 83-page report, From Bogotá to El Fasher, identifies an Abu Dhabi–based security company—Global Security Services Group (GSSG)—as the main recruiter and facilitator.

“An Abu Dhabi–based company with strong links to UAE authorities has apparently hired hundreds of Colombian military contractors… We also found evidence of Colombian contractors involved in the training of child soldiers by the RSF,”

HRW stated.

The report alleges that GSSG, whose CEO has strong political and familial links to senior UAE officials, routed Colombian fighters through UAE military facilities (Ghiyathi and Al Wathba) before sending them to Sudan. CIG’s geolocation work placed Colombian fighters at staging points and a UAE training facility, concluding they provided “critical military support” enabling the RSF’s El Fasher takeover. A UN Panel of Experts on Libya further reported that Libya’s Subul al-Salam Battalion (linked to the LNA) facilitated transfers of Colombian fighters, weapons, and fuel across the border to the RSF, using Kufra as a transit hub.

The Emirati nexus: evidence, denials, and strategic interests

The UAE’s alleged role sits at the heart of this network. Sudan’s government has repeatedly accused Abu Dhabi of supplying arms, financing, and logistical support to the RSF, even filing a case at the International Court of Justice alleging “complicity in genocide” over RSF atrocities in West Darfur. CIG and HRW evidence places UAE-backed mercenaries and drone capabilities at the centre of mass atrocities in El Fasher. Yet the UAE has consistently denied these allegations.

“The UAE does not allow its territory to be utilized for the recruitment, training, financing, transit of fighters to conflict, Sudan,”

the UAE’s foreign ministry stated. A senior Emirati official told The National that the country “categorically rejects” claims of having provided, financed, transported, or facilitated any arms, ammunition, vehicles, guided munitions, or other military equipment to the RSF, either directly or indirectly.

Despite denials, the UAE pledged $500 million in humanitarian aid for Sudan in February 2026—money that critics say is needed largely because of its history of enabling RSF atrocities. Analysts argue the UAE’s stake in Sudan is strategic and economic, combining long-standing ties to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) with incentives linked to Sudan’s gold reserves, which have flowed in increasing volumes through Emirati markets since the war began.

On 9 June, the UAE condemned the heinous attacks against civilians in El Fasher, labelling them as a

“dangerous escalation and a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law,”

and demanded the opening of humanitarian corridors and the urgent protection of civilians. In a statement published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 February 2025, the UAE also condemned the use of chemical weapons in areas of West Darfur, as revealed by UN reports, considering the use of such weapons against civilians a war crime that cannot be overlooked.

Human rights, accountability, and the limits of international response

The international response has been sharp but uneven. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned a transnational network (four entities, four individuals, primarily Colombian) in December 2025 for recruiting former Colombian soldiers and training soldiers—including children—to fight for the RSF. The UN has verified more than 2,000 grave violations against nearly 1,900 children in Sudan, including killing and maiming attributed mainly to the RSF (740 child casualties) and the SAF/SAF-aligned militias (277). The UN also recorded 212 children detained for alleged association with opposing parties: 136 by SAF (including 13 by Military Intelligence), 69 by RSF, and 7 by SAF-aligned militias.

The Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict has repeatedly condemned recruitment and use of children as young as seven by all parties, urging immediate release and handover to civilian child protection actors. The UN Secretary-General’s office has verified 16 cases of child recruitment by the RSF and placed the RSF on the UN “list of shame” for grave violations against children. Civil society groups have been equally vocal.

The Sudanese Alliance for Rights (SAR) condemned recruitment of children by all parties, called for urgent UN/AU/IGAD intervention, and demanded immediate cessation of child recruitment and safe access for humanitarian agencies. Columnists and researchers have urged the EU and UK to confront the UAE’s role more directly, noting that

“successive British governments have carefully ignored one of the main backers of the Sudan crisis,”

referring to the UAE’s support for the RSF through financial means, weapons, and mercenaries.

The human cost: El Fasher, displacement, and the business of war

The war’s human toll is staggering. The RSF’s October 2025 capture of El Fasher followed an 18‑month siege that cut off food, aid, and medical supplies; UN reports describe “widespread atrocities” amounting to war crimes and possible crimes against humanity. Overall war death estimates range widely; ACLED cites at least 59,000 killed, while other sources and analysts suggest figures up to hundreds of thousands. The conflict, which began on April 15, 2023, from a power struggle between the SAF and RSF, has produced the world’s largest displacement and humanitarian crisis.

In this context, the presence of foreign mercenaries and the recruitment of children are not isolated abuses but integral to how the war is fought. As one Colombian contractor put it,

“War is a business.”

 That business model—outsourcing violence, training child recruits, and leveraging regional logistics—has enabled the RSF to sustain its campaign despite international condemnation. The UAE’s foreign policy posture—condemning atrocities while allegedly facilitating the very forces accused of them—underscores the tension between humanitarian rhetoric and strategic interests.