Great Power Implications of the War in Iran

In discussions of great power competition, the familiar refrain typically focuses on the United States, China, and Russia. Some assessments go beyond the major powers and analyze so-called ‘Middle powers,’ including Iran, Israel, Türkiye, India, Indonesia, and others. And just as Russia’s war in Ukraine has led some observers to suggest that perhaps Moscow should not be considered a great power, given the performance of the Russian military on the battlefield in Ukraine, the war in Iran has led many analysts to reconsider the great power landscape. Without question, given the United States’ superior conventional military capabilities, the current state of affairs has come as somewhat of a surprise.

After roughly four months of fighting, the United States is engaging in discussions over a deal to finalize the conflict. And although the Trump administration would be loath to admit this publicly, Tehran has emerged from the conflict in a much stronger position. To begin with, Iran now recognizes that it has the ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz at any time, threatening the global economy by holding veto power over commercial maritime shipping. While many regional counterparts are exploring alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz — both overland and maritime — few contingency plans exist, enabling Iran to utilize its control over the Strait as a key instrument of power. With an emboldened leadership headed by hardliners from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Tehran stands to benefit from the windfall of cash that will accompany sanctions relief as part of a negotiated settlement. Israel has suffered greatly from the war, both in terms of its military and diplomatic prestige and given the ongoing battles with Lebanese Hezbollah, it remains clear that the shadow war between Israel and Iran will continue, no matter what agreement is or is not reached between Washington and Tehran.

The Iran War has further affirmed Beijing’s view that its ambition for global dominance need not stem from direct confrontation with the United States. Instead of weakening the position of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by choking off part of its oil imports and deposing a regime with which it maintains a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, the Iran War has demonstrated that the PRC’s mostly hands-off approach to the conflict pays off in its competition with the United States. While the PRC relies on discounted Iranian oil for about 13 percent of its imports, it has strategically stepped in to address energy disruptions felt by traditional U.S. allies in Asia, which are significantly more energy-import-dependent than the PRC. For example, while the Philippines and the PRC continue to be in conflict over various interests in the South China Sea, the Iran War has prompted Manila to engage the PRC to diversify energy and fertilizer supplies.

In the immediate aftermath of Operation Epic Fury, which kicked off the Iran War, Russia benefited from the open conflict between its strategic partner and its greatest adversary. The initial closure of the Strait of Hormuz provided Russia’s oil and gas industry with a much-needed boost after four years of Western sanctions had gutted its exports to Europe. Yet, overall, the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has been something of a mixed bag for Moscow. On the one hand, the Kremlin has reaped significant profits from the spike in energy prices. The price of Brent crude and the easing of some Western sanctions have been a vital lifeline for Russia’s economy, which many experts thought would help Moscow bankroll its war in Ukraine. However, in the zero-sum world of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, the rising security concerns of many of Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf — along with growing doubts about the U.S.’ ability to protect its regional partners — helped elevate Kyiv’s presence on the international stage. Ukraine’s experience in drone warfare, feted as an up-and-coming drone power, gave it a new audience with world leaders, including many in the Middle East. It also allowed Ukraine to make significant advances on the battlefield, marking a significant turning point in the conflict. Russia was also criticized when the Iran war broke out for not coming to the aid of Iran, its longstanding partner in the Middle East, but as the conflict dragged on, it came to light that Moscow was providing Iran with valuable intelligence, satellite imagery, and drone technology that was used for targeting U.S. assets. After all, in its four-and-a-half-year war against Ukraine, the Russians have received substantial assistance from Iran, especially with the provision of Shahed drones that Moscow has employed on the battlefield.

It is clear that the Iran War has fundamentally reshaped the relationship between Tehran and the Gulf states. In recent years, some Gulf governments have pursued rapprochement with Iran, including the China-brokered deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The logic behind incremental engagement between Gulf states and Iran — despite decades of regional competition and sectarian tension — was that the gradual integration of commercial relations and political engagement could prevent widespread regional conflict and deescalation. While Gulf states and Iran were able to put pen to paper to reopen diplomatic relations and reactivate economic relations, both sides still lacked a deep sense of shared consensus and vision of regional security. The recent conflict exposed the fragility of that rapprochement and revived concerns over regional security. These concerns were reinforced by Iranian missile and drone attacks on Gulf states such as the unprecedented strike on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, as well as significant strikes targeting the United Arab Emirates (UAE). At the same time, it is evident that Gulf leaders still favor diplomatic engagement. The Financial Times reported this week that a deconfliction hotline was established between the U.S. and Iran, in an effort to avoid confusion or misunderstandings, potentially setting the stage for cooler heads to prevail.

The truth is, how the Iran war ultimately impacts great power competition will take some time to discern, as geopolitical developments can take time to manifest. But what is clear is that change is afoot, and many of the untested assumptions held before the war in Iran no longer hold true. One outstanding question is whether the Gulf states will continue to trust the U.S. in terms of regional security, or, on the contrary, whether they will seek to hedge their bets by expanding their alliances and partnerships, including with some of Washington’s adversaries.