From Hormuz to Bab el Mandeb: The Lesson the World Must Not Ignore

Tehran’s use of maritime chokepoints as leverage raises fears that the Houthis could threaten the Red Sea and global trade routes from Yemen

The recent war in the Middle East was not merely a passing military confrontation. It was a strategic test that revealed the nature of Iranian behavior and the mindset of the regime in Tehran when facing military, political, or economic pressure. Events showed that Iran does not view international maritime corridors as arteries of the global economy, but as tools of extortion and bargaining to be used against the international community whenever needed.

For many years, the Strait of Hormuz was the most important card in the hands of the Iranian regime. During the recent war, that card moved from political threat to practical action. Iran did not merely threaten to close the strait; it turned the threat into reality, disrupted navigation and energy flows, and forced the world into a harsh test of the cost of leaving international waterways at the mercy of a regime that uses geography as a weapon.

This precedent must be examined carefully in Washington and Western capitals. The closure of Hormuz was not an impulsive decision, but the result of years of military, security, and intelligence preparation. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) built an integrated system to threaten navigation: naval mines, suicide boats, guided missiles, drones, coastal surveillance networks, and the ability to create calculated chaos that disrupts markets and drives up the cost of insurance, transport, and energy.

More dangerous still, Iran tried during the crisis to impose a new reality in the strait by controlling navigation routes and seeking to enforce passage arrangements that serve its political influence. Those included discussion of alternative routes, fees, and security arrangements that would give Tehran an illegitimate position over one of the most important arteries of the global economy.

Even after the signing of the memorandum of understanding and the start of discussions about reopening the strait, Iran did not abandon the issue as a pressure card. It continued to threaten closure and retained its ability to disrupt navigation whenever doing so might improve its negotiating position. This confirms that the problem is not a passing crisis, but a political doctrine that treats blackmailing the world as a legitimate means of achieving gains.

The most important lesson, though, is not about Hormuz alone.

The real danger is that the Iranian regime may seek to replicate the same experience in the Bab el Mandeb Strait through its Houthi proxy in Yemen.

Iran and the IRGC threatened more than once during the war to close Bab el Mandeb and expand the confrontation to the Red Sea. This was not merely a media threat, but an expression of a strategic vision that sees control over maritime chokepoints as a way to give Tehran the ability to strangle the global economy from more than one direction.

What prevented the Houthi movement from taking a similar step during the war was a geopolitical fact of great importance: the Bab el Mandeb Strait, most of the Red Sea coastline, and the entire coastline of the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea are under the control of the legitimate Yemeni government. This protected not only Yemen but also international trade from a catastrophic scenario that could have linked Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb in a single crisis.

If Iran were able to impose direct or indirect influence over Bab el Mandeb, the world would face an unprecedented threat. Closing Hormuz strikes energy supplies from the Gulf, while disrupting Bab el Mandeb strikes the trade route between Asia and Europe, threatens the Suez Canal, and endangers supply chains and the movement of food, energy, and global commerce. If both straits were threatened at the same time, the consequences would not be regional, but global in every sense of the word.

For that reason, the security of the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden is not an internal Yemeni matter or a limited regional issue, but a direct international interest. Any leniency toward the Iranian project in Yemen means allowing Tehran to build a second version of the Hormuz experience, this time at the gateway to the Red Sea.

Experience has shown that temporary naval coalitions alone are not enough. Warships may reduce the danger, but they do not address its roots. The real root of the danger is the continued existence of the Houthi movement as an armed Iranian proxy outside the authority of the state, possessing missiles, drones, and explosive boats, while receiving support, funding, and technology from the IRGC.

More dangerously, any international leniency toward the Houthi movement today will not be interpreted in Tehran and Sana’a as a desire for de-escalation, but as a green light for further escalation. The Houthis are no longer merely a local threat or a coup movement inside Yemen; they have become an imminent danger to international navigation security and Iran’s most ready tool for replicating the Hormuz experience in Bab el Mandeb and the Red Sea.

Turning a blind eye to Houthi armament, treating the Houthis as a normal political actor, or rewarding them with negotiation tracks that do not require them to disarm and stop threatening navigation will grant them time and space to develop their naval and missile capabilities. At that point, the question will not be whether they threaten Bab el Mandeb, but when they decide to use it as a weapon of extortion against the world.

Leniency toward the Houthi movement is not a realistic policy, but a costly postponement of a confrontation with an expanding threat. Every day this Iranian proxy remains outside the authority of the Yemeni state is another day spent building the coming danger to one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

The most effective path to protecting international navigation does not begin only at sea, but with restoring the Yemeni state. The international community must support the Yemeni government’s efforts to extend its sovereignty over all Yemeni territory, dry up the sources of Houthi funding and armament, stop the flow of Iranian weapons, and treat the Houthis as a direct threat to maritime security and the global economy, not merely as a party to an internal crisis.

The Hormuz war gave the world a clear warning. If Iran used the strait as a weapon of global extortion, proving that it does not threaten chokepoints only as political rhetoric but prepares, plans, and acts when conditions allow, then the Houthi movement is the imminent danger that may try to turn Bab el Mandeb into a new Hormuz. It would be a mistake for the world to wait for the same scenario to repeat before recognizing the scale of the threat.

Maritime security policy is not built on reopening straits after they are closed, but on preventing their closure in the first place. If the world paid a heavy price to test Iranian behavior in Hormuz, it must not allow Bab el Mandeb to become the next test.

A strong Yemeni state is not only a Yemeni interest but an international guarantee for the security of navigation, trade, and energy.

Those who do not see this truth today may see it tomorrow at a much higher cost.