On 11 May, an Italian-supplied Libyan Coast Guard patrol boat opened fire on the NGO rescue vessel Sea-Watch 5 just half an hour after it had picked around 90 people up from a floundering boat in international waters off the coast of Libya. There were no injuries or fatalities, but the attack endangered the lives of the 30-member crew and the rescued people onboard.
Far from an isolated incident, the shooting was part of a broader, well-documented pattern of violence involving the EU-supported Libyan Coast Guard against migrant boats and humanitarian rescue vessels.
Interviews and internal documents show that European institutions have repeatedly acknowledged the risks associated with their migration cooperation with Libyan authorities, even as they have continued to defend and expand it publicly.
Following the Sea-Watch 5 shooting, the European Commission said in public statements that EU support had contributed to a reduction in violent incidents involving the Libyan Coast Guard. When The New Humanitarian asked what evidence underpinned that claim, the commission did not provide any data to support it.
Instead, it said EU-funded programmes strengthen compliance with international maritime law and human rights standards through training, technical assistance, and the development of standard operating procedures.
In contrast, the EU’s own internal planning documents for migration management projects involving Libya have long acknowledged the entanglement of authorities with armed groups and the potential of EU support contributing to human rights abuses.
Rather than decreasing violence, human rights groups and humanitarian organisations argue that EU support, which began in 2017, has made it complicit in human rights violations committed against asylum seekers and migrants by the Libyan Coast Guard.
Amnesty International warned recently that the EU is deepening migration cooperation with authorities in both eastern and western Libya (the country has had rival governments since 2014) even as those authorities intensify a “xenophobic and racist crackdown on refugees and migrants”.
A coalition of search and rescue NGOs called the Justice Fleet has documented at least 79 incidents of severe violence by the Libyan Coast Guard and militia units since 2016 towards migrant boats and humanitarian rescue vessels. Twenty-one of the incidents took place in 2025 alone. The organisations stress that this is likely only a fraction of the total number, as many incidents at sea go undocumented.
“For years, the commission has been saying it has very little control over Libyan Coast Guard structures,” said Frey Lindsay, a Libya researcher with the NGO Statewatch. “You can’t then turn around and claim that this same cooperation is demonstrably preventing violence without providing any evidence.”
A system built on surveillance
Since 2015, the EU has built a system of search and rescue in the central Mediterranean with the aim of preventing asylum seekers and migrants from reaching Europe.
Planes and drones from the EU border agency Frontex routinely monitor the central Mediterranean between the coast of Libya and EU member states Malta and Italy. When they detect migrant boats, the agency shares information with national rescue coordination centres (RCC), including the RCC in Libya’s capital Tripoli, which was created with encouragement and support from the EU.
Human rights organisations have long argued that such notifications contribute to interceptions and returns to Libya, where asylum seekers and migrants face a cycle of torture, extortion, and abuse. Frontex, however, maintains that informing the responsible rescue authorities is required under international maritime law, while also acknowledging that notifying Libyan authorities could potentially put lives at risk.
Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer Jonas Grimheden described the situation as a dilemma. “The only thing we could do is say we don’t fly, or that we should not notify the Libyans,” he told The New Humanitarian. “Which we do not recommend, because then it could very well be that people are rescued too late – or not at all. Then basically they are drowning on our watch.”
In September 2025, the Sea-Watch 5 was shot at in another incident. As it was rescuing 66 people from a boat in distress, a Libyan patrol boat repeatedly ordered the crew via radio to abandon the rescue and leave the area. After the rescue operation was completed, the Libyan vessel approached the Sea-Watch 5 and opened fire.
During that incident, a Frontex surveillance aircraft – Eagle 2 – arrived on scene shortly after the shooting. Its presence triggered an internal Serious Incident Report (SIR) by Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Office, a confidential mechanism used within the agency to assess possible fundamental rights violations during operations.
That report, released publicly just a week before the Sea-Watch 5 shooting in May this year, warned that violence and the endangering of lives by Libyan authorities during rescue operations could have put lives at risk and is “a frequent practice”. The report recommended that cooperation with Libyan authorities should be made conditional and accompanied by strong safeguards.
The report also refers to an earlier case in which a Frontex surveillance aircraft detected an overcrowded migrant boat in Libya’s search-and-rescue zone in September 2024 and transmitted its coordinates to rescue coordination centres, including Libyan authorities, roughly 50 minutes before a shooting incident occurred. According to eyewitnesses, armed men aboard a Libyan Coast Guard vessel fired at the migrant boat during an interception attempt in international waters.
The Fundamental Rights Office, in a review of the incident seen by The New Humanitarian, later concluded it was “likely” that members of a Libyan Coast Guard vessel had fired the shots, putting lives at risk. While the office said it could not determine whether Frontex was the first or only actor to alert Libyan authorities, it noted that the Coast Guard’s subsequent arrival at the scene may have been linked to information shared through European aerial surveillance.
A Frontex surveillance aircraft also observed Sea-Watch 5 carrying out the rescue before the shooting in May. According to Frontex, the aircraft did not issue a mayday relay or communicate with the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre because Sea-Watch 5 was already alongside the migrant boat at the time of the sighting. The agency said the aircraft was not in the vicinity when the shooting occurred, although it did contact the Sea-Watch 5 afterwards to ask if it needed assistance. Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Office is currently reviewing the incident.
Little room to opt out
Through a Freedom of Information request, The New Humanitarian asked Frontex for internal guidelines or standard operating procedures governing notifications to Libyan authorities. The agency replied that it “does not hold such documents”, which appears at odds with Frontex’s own description of its aerial surveillance operations.
Grimheden described a coordination process involving multiple actors inside Frontex’s aerial surveillance control room in Warsaw. When an aircraft detects a boat in distress, Frontex team leaders coordinate the agency’s response, while representatives from EU member states – including Italy and Malta – are also present and may relay information to their national authorities.
“What they do back home, of course, is very difficult for us to prohibit,” Grimheden said. He described the coordination structure as “a bit confusing” and “a bit complex”. “We don’t have any command over the Libyan Coast Guard to tell them not to shoot at migrant boats,” he said.
The only thing Frontex can do is push the European Commission and member states to strengthen safeguards and oversight, he added.
Sea-Watch and other rescue organisations argue that informing Libyan authorities can itself conflict with international law. Yet rescue organisations have little room to opt out. In 2023, Italy adopted a decree widely seen as aiming to hinder the work of rescue NGOs and that penalises organisations with fines and vessel detentions if they fail to follow instructions from authorities, including requirements to notify Libyan authorities about their rescue operations.
Fourteen rescue organisations came together to form the Justice Fleet to resist these policies, including by refusing to inform Libyan authorities about rescues. Italian authorities responded by fining organisations and detaining vessels that failed to comply. Although several NGOs later won preliminary court rulings challenging those measures, the decree remains in force, and organisations still risk having their vessels detained.
Sea-Watch eventually resumed notifying Libyan authorities, which they also did before the rescue in May this year. “We couldn’t take that risk,” said Sea-Watch spokesperson Julia Winkler, referring to the punitive measures. “But we still believe these notifications can contribute to pushbacks and serious human rights abuses. That is why we continue to challenge the policy in court.”
Risks of continuing cooperation
Since 2015, the EU has spent hundreds of millions of euros on migration management in Libya. Far from reducing violence, this support may be creating incentives that contribute to violence by the Libyan Coast Guard, according to Lindsay from Statewatch.
“Libyan Coast Guard structures are rewarded for stopping migrants,” Lindsay said. “As long as that cooperation continues, the incentive remains to take a harder line against migrants and NGO rescue vessels.”
Libyan actors are using Europe’s fear of migration to both gain favour and put pressure on the EU, according to Lindsay. “The EU is terrified of another 2015,” he added.
And so the cooperation continues to deepen. On the day Sea-Watch 5 came under fire for the second time in less than a year, the EU naval mission in the central Mediterranean announced technical inspections in Benghazi for the possible establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in eastern Libya, where departures toward Europe have increased since 2025.
For humanitarian rescue crews – and the people they are trying to save – the EU’s cooperation with Libyan authorities continues to carry real risks. On 11 May, when the Libyan Coast Guard opened fire on Sea-Watch 5, first officer Bob Bouhof was handing out blankets to people who had just been rescued when bullets suddenly began whizzing above his head.
“Everything suddenly slows down,” Bouhof recalled. “You lie as low as possible on the deck and think only one thing: where is that boat, and is everyone low enough?”
By the time the shooting stopped, Sea-Watch 5 had turned north towards Italy. But the ordeal was not over. The Libyan Coast Guard came back on the radio, ordering the crew to stop and change course for Tripoli. “They said, ‘Stop or we start shooting again,’” recalled Egyptian cultural mediator Yasmin Ibrahim Elzanaty, who was communicating with them in Arabic.
While Elzanaty tried to buy time, other crew members contacted the German and Italian authorities. Sea-Watch 5 sails under the German flag and was heading towards Italy. Both authorities advised the crew to continue north as quickly as possible.
When the ship reached the port of Brindisi in southern Italy, Italian police boarded the vessel. Dutch captain Anne van Dam expected to be questioned about the attack. Instead, Italian authorities questioned him as if he had done something wrong.
Hours later, Van Dam learned that he was under criminal investigation for allegedly facilitating irregular migration. The case concerns provisions of Italian immigration law that have previously been used against humanitarian rescue organisations operating in the central Mediterranean. Although similar cases have been dismissed by Italian courts, legal proceedings can take years and are costly for NGOs.
Responding to questions from The New Humanitarian, Frontex indicated that aerial surveillance conducted by its aircraft is part of the Italian investigation. “What the aircraft observed that morning raises questions that go beyond the shooting, and those questions are part of what that investigation will need to examine,” a spokesperson wrote. The agency declined to provide more information while the investigation is ongoing.
“It’s a topsy-turvy world,” Bouhof said. “We’re being fired upon and then punished on top of that. I wonder if the Italians questioned the Libyans as well.”
This article was made possible with the support of the JournalismFund Europe. Edited by Eric Reidy.
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