On July 6, China’s navy launched a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a nuclear-powered submarine into the Pacific Ocean, Chinese state media reported. The test immediately drew pushback from the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Beijing described the launch as routine annual training, “not aimed at any specific country or target.”
According to Japanese media reports, the impact point fell outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). That distinction matters, but only up to a point. The episode deserves attention far beyond the question of where the dummy warhead landed.
The more consequential story is that China is steadily expanding both the quantity and quality of its undersea nuclear deterrent in waters increasingly relevant to Japan, the United States, and the wider Pacific.
A Qualitative Leap in China’s Sea-Based Deterrent
SLBMs are prized precisely because they are difficult to detect, track, and intercept. Launched from submarines that can remain hidden underwater for extended periods, they provide the most survivable leg of a nuclear triad and help preserve a credible second-strike capability even under the most severe crisis conditions.
China currently operates Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines and is developing the next-generation Type 096, expected to be significantly quieter and harder to track. Chinese military commentators and outside analysts alike have suggested that the missile tested on July 6 was likely the JL-3, China’s newest submarine-launched ballistic missile.
That possibility is significant. With an estimated range of more than 10,000 kilometers, the JL-3 could place most of the continental United States within range from patrol areas much closer to China’s shores. Paired with the quieter Type 096, the missile would mark a major qualitative leap in Beijing’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.
Outside analysts have followed China’s submarine modernization program for years. What made the July 6 launch notable was less the existence of the missile itself than Beijing’s apparent willingness to publicly demonstrate the growing credibility of its undersea nuclear force.
Chinese military experts quoted by state media argued that the launch significantly enhanced the effectiveness of China’s nuclear triad and validated the reliability of its sea-based nuclear deterrent.
The test also followed China’s September 2024 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific. Taken together, the two events suggest that Beijing is increasingly comfortable publicly demonstrating both the land-based and sea-based legs of its nuclear deterrent.
Coming just two days after the United States’ 250th Independence Day, the launch carried symbolic weight. If the missile was indeed the JL-3, capable of reaching most of the U.S. mainland, it underscored China’s increasingly credible sea-based deterrent vis-à-vis the United States.
In a statement, the U.S. State Department said it had “monitored China’s test launch from a submarine of an unarmed intercontinental-range ballistic missile.” The statement criticized China’s missile launch, saying it raises regional and global concerns over Beijing’s “rapid and opaque nuclear weapons buildup.”
China’s nuclear expansion is not merely quantitative but increasingly qualitative. More credible Chinese strategic submarine patrols would complicate U.S. and allied planning and expand Beijing’s options during a crisis.
A Transparency Problem
The launch also highlighted persistent concerns about transparency.
Japan’s Coast Guard had been informed a day in advance that China had designated a hazard area – including part of Japan’s EEZ south of Wakayama Prefecture’s Cape Shionomisaki – for “falling space debris.” It was not until roughly 90 minutes before launch that China’s Ministry of National Defense clarified that the activity involved a ballistic missile test.
Japan subsequently expressed serious concern over the intensification of Chinese military activity and urged Beijing to reconsider actions that could threaten Japan’s security. “China’s military activities, including a lack of transparency, have become a matter of serious concern to Japan and the international community,” said Chief Cabinet Secretary Kihara Minoru.
Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong called the test “destabilizing to the region,” citing the rapid pace and insufficient transparency of China’s military buildup.
Similarly, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters described the test as an “unwelcome and concerning development,” and warned against allowing such launches to become routine. “We, like our neighbors in other Pacific countries, have no interest in China using the South Pacific as a testing site for missile capability,” he said.”
Notably, the test occurred only hours after Australia and Fiji announced a new mutual defense pact. There is no evidence that the timing was deliberate, but the coincidence reinforced the perception that Chinese undersea deterrent patrols are becoming an enduring feature of the wider Pacific security landscape.
The launch also came as China and Russia began their annual “Joint Sea-2026” naval exercise, after which elements of both navies are expected to conduct a joint patrol in the Pacific. These activities underscore Beijing’s growing confidence in operating farther from its shores and its increasing willingness to project military power across the wider Pacific.
Implications for Japan
For Japan, the issue goes beyond the risk of another missile landing in its EEZ, as occurred during China’s military exercises around Taiwan in August 2022.
The deeper challenge is that China’s undersea nuclear forces are becoming a more direct and permanent feature of the security environment surrounding Japan and the broader Pacific.
The Pacific is increasing a focus for Japan’s strategic orientation. The region is directly tied to the defense of the Nansei island chain, Japan’s southwestern arc stretching roughly 1,200 kilometers from Kagoshima toward Okinawa and Taiwan, as well as to the security of sea lanes, the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, and any future Taiwan contingency. Chinese submarines operating farther into the Pacific would affect Japan’s anti-submarine warfare requirements, maritime domain awareness, and crisis-response planning alike.
This reality argues for a debate Japan has long treated as taboo: whether it should eventually acquire nuclear-powered submarines armed solely with conventional weapons.
The case for nuclear propulsion rests on endurance and stealth, not warheads. A nuclear-powered boat can remain submerged far longer than a conventional submarine, offering a meaningful advantage for tracking Chinese submarines and sustaining a presence around the Nansei Islands and beyond.
However, Japan’s three non-nuclear principles remain a powerful political constraint. There are other hurdles as well. Developing nuclear-powered submarines would require decades of training, reactor infrastructure, and enormous investment. In the meantime, Japan could deepen undersea cooperation with the United States and AUKUS partners while investing in unmanned systems and seabed surveillance.
China’s undersea nuclear forces will continue to advance regardless of whether Japan chooses to hold this debate. The task now is to translate debate into a concrete national strategy – one that rigorously weighs costs, industrial capacity, alliance cooperation, and operational requirements against the changing undersea reality. What is no longer sustainable is treating the option of nuclear-powered submarines as unthinkable.