The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Steve Tsang – professor of China studies and director of the China Institute at SOAS University of London and co-author with Olivia Cheung of “China’s Global Strategy Under Xi Jinping” (Oxford 2026) – is the 524th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
What is China’s global strategy under Xi Jinping and specifically its two primary pivots?
China’s global strategy under Xi Jinping has a double pivot. Its primary pivot is to engage the Global South, in both country and population terms a clear majority in the world, to secure support for China to steadily reshape the existing international order by re-centering the U.N. in global politics. The idea is that under Chinese leadership the Global South can make the U.N. more responsive to them, the majority. Xi calls this the “democratization of international relations.” With the support of the Global South, Beijing seeks to forge “the common destiny for humankind,” implying transforming what remains of the “liberal international order” into the Sino-centric tianxia order.
To signal the advent of Chinese global preeminence or the tianxia order requires a stunning demonstration of China’s might. There is therefore a complementary pivot. This is for China to take Taiwan despite the U.S. committing, under its Taiwan Relations Act (1979), to help Taiwan defend itself against an externally imposed change of its status. Taiwan is geographically in the middle of the strategically vital First Island Chain in the Pacific Ocean and has avoided falling under Chinese control with U.S. protection since 1950. Unlike his predecessors who merely saw Taiwan as a legacy from the Chinese Civil War (1946-9) to be dealt with without a meaningful timeline, Xi has changed the paradigm. While he retains the irredentist language, taking Taiwan is part of his China Dream, to be completed by 2050.
Xi would prefer Taiwan negotiate for a “peaceful re-unification” and thus remove the raison d’être for the U.S. to intervene. Should this not materialize Beijing will use force. By taking Taiwan China will show the U.S. (and its allies) cannot prevent it from seizing the First Island Chain. It will acquire a critical springboard to project power well into the Pacific and make key U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea question if they can rely on their respective defense treaties with the U.S. It will establish dominance in the Western Pacific and mark the advent of Chinese global preeminence.
Examine the concept of “tianxia” as an alternative international order.
Tianxia consists of two Chinese characters, “sky” and “below,” meaning “all under heaven.” As a political concept it was applied when the empire in China was united, rich, powerful, and more advanced than others in organizational, civilizational, and technological terms. China was supposed to be so superior that others looked to it for guidance and inspiration, resulting in pax Sinica without China asserting hegemony. This is the new international order into which Xi would like to steer the existing one to transform. The historical reality of tianxia was different: Chinese empires behaved like other great empires in history and exercised hegemony by force when required.
To Xi, putting tianxia in place implies “restoring” Chinese global preeminence. He does not intend China to replace the U.S. as the global hegemon, not least because American hegemony also included delivering costly public services to the global community. He merely seeks preeminence for China, as it will ensure that the Communist Party system cannot be challenged.
Analyze China’s instrumental approach to global economic engagement.
This is the pragmatic side of China’s global strategy. Xi’s Sino-centrism is not entirely inward looking. He requires China to engage the world to generate an edge. He builds on the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing concept of comprehensive national power, implying he instrumentally builds up economic power to complement military power to assert Chinese preeminence. Beijing thus seeks to acquire a leadership position in new, particularly strategically important, technologies. It means China uses all means at its disposal to create a situation where acknowledging Chinese preeminence would be less costly than challenging it. China further aims to become a rule maker in the international community and in the global economy. Instrumentalism also applies to how China cultivates support from the Global South, at the U.N. and elsewhere. Xi does not see pragmatism as contradictory to his insistence that all Chinese cadres must ideologically adhere to Xi Thought.
Identify the strengths and weaknesses of China’s global strategy.
The greatest strength of China’s global strategy lies in its capacity to gain traction in the Global South. The reality that most countries in the Global South are not functioning democracies and their leaders are autocrats, and China does not carry a colonial legacy there, makes its rhetoric of the “democratization of international relations” sufficiently credible. In addition, what China asks of them, supporting China to change the U.N. system and securing control of Taiwan, are cost free to them. China being tightly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and Xi meant China adopts a disciplined approach when it engages Global South leaders, ensuring its message and personal cultivation efforts are effective.
Its greatest weakness is that the distinction between preeminence and hegemony is fundamentally a distinction without a difference. Few leaders in the Global South truly fail to understand its implications. Global South support for Xi’s agenda can only last if it is beneficial to themselves, and if the democracies cannot act in concert to offer a more attractive alternative.
Assess the effectiveness of Washington’s “America First” policy as a credible counterweight to China’s global strategy.
Washington adopting the “America First” policy is a godsend for Beijing, particularly over its engagement of the Global South. It corroborates China’s claim that the world suffers from Western domination centered around the U.S., as “America First” confirms that Washington is first and foremost about advancing American interests. It undermines the moral authority of the liberal international order, which provides a case for China to push for transforming it into the tianxia variant. It also weakens American allies’ solidarity with Washington. As messaging rhetoric “America First” is less appealing than the “democratization of international relations” to the Global South.