Algeria and Mali, and the ‘one-egg’ diplomacy | Hatim Betioui

There is a French proverb that says, “All that fuss over one egg!” This certainly applies to Algerian-Malian relations, which returned to normal a few days ago after 15 months of tension. This tension had previously resulted in Algeria recalling its ambassador from Bamako, closing Algerian airspace to Malian aircraft, and halting security coordination between two countries that share a border stretching over 1,300 kilometers. Mali retaliated by taking the exact same measures.

Yet, here we are, seeing the level of tension recede between the two countries, with relations returning to how they were before—as if nothing had happened—and without achieving any of the intended goals of the rift.

This spectacle of Algeria’s deteriorating relations with Mali followed by a return to normalcy is a script that has repeatedly played out before with Spain and France. In March 2022, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced his explicit support for the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative, considering it “the most serious, realistic, and credible basis” for resolving the Sahara dispute.

At the time, Algeria fumed and raved, and its media launched a ferocious campaign against the Spanish position supporting Morocco. It recalled its ambassador from Madrid, suspended the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation signed with Spain in 2002, and froze commercial trade.

Despite these measures, the Madrid government did not budge an inch from its position supporting Morocco. At the same time, however, it remained keen to maintain a dialogue with Algeria as an important energy partner.

The striking thing is that the signs of a breakthrough between Madrid and Algeria began to appear quickly, and relations between them returned to their previous state, while the Spanish position on the Sahara issue remained steadfast without any change.

The exact same scenario was repeated with France following President Emmanuel Macron’s announcement in July 2024 of his country’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara. Algeria entered an arm-wrestling match with Paris, recalled its ambassador, escalated the tone of its hostile media discourse against France, and froze numerous official visits—not to mention the impact this had on security, economic, and migration cooperation files.

Despite the Algerian escalation, the French position remained steadfast, just like the Spanish position. It was further reinforced by French officials visiting the Moroccan Sahara and announcing the establishment of joint cooperation and investment projects, in a clear affirmation of a strategic shift in French policy regarding the Sahara issue.

Ultimately, Algeria’s use of the diplomatic rupture card did not achieve a single thing of its declared objective, which was to pressure Spain and France into changing their positions regarding the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative. Instead, the positions of both countries remained clearer and more steadfast than they had been in the past.

Returning to the tension in relations with Mali, everything began in early April 2025, when Algeria announced it had shot down a reconnaissance drone belonging to the Malian army in a border area, claiming it had violated its airspace by a distance of about two kilometers. Following this, Algeria announced the closure of its airspace to all flights coming from or heading to Mali. However, the authorities in Bamako rejected the Algerian narrative regarding the drone, asserting that it was flying inside Malian territory. They deemed the downing a hostile act and, in turn, closed their airspace to Algerian aviation—and the rest of what followed is well known.

The downing of the drone was merely the straw that broke the camel’s back. Relations between the two countries had been moving to the rhythm of tension for months due to a growing rift after Mali’s transitional authorities announced the termination of the 2015 “Algiers Peace Agreement” — an agreement brokered by Algeria between the Bamako government and armed movements in the north of the country. Furthermore, Mali repeatedly leveled criticisms at Algeria, accusing it of interfering in its internal affairs and hosting opposition figures. Meanwhile, Algeria believes that Mali’s military approach to handling the northern crisis threatens regional stability and undermines the chances for a political solution.

Despite the return of relations between Algeria and Mali, the core contentious issues have not been definitively resolved. The matter appears closer to a diplomatic normalization aimed at containing the fallout of the disputes rather than a comprehensive political settlement that ends the root causes of the tension.

In tandem with this, Bamako has continued to develop its relationship with Morocco, declaring on several occasions its support for the Moroccan Autonomy Plan. It has also continued its engagement in the Moroccan initiative directed toward Sahel states to grant them access to the Atlantic Ocean.

The reality of the situation has shown Algeria that pursuing a policy of rupture with these three countries did not succeed in altering their positions, but instead ended with the gradual return of relations with them. So, when will its rupture with Morocco end? And when will it respond to the “extended hand” initiatives that the Moroccan monarch, King Mohammed VI, has repeatedly extended to the rulers in Algeria?