Al-Qaeda in Mali: The April 25th Attack as a Catalyst for the Establishment of an Islamic Emirate in the Sahel

The escalation of terrorism in the Sahel region—as evidenced in late April 2026 by the extensive terrorist offensive launched by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an affiliate of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), against several Malian cities including its capital—fuels a messianic vision for the revival of the Islamic Caliphate. The colossal success of the offensive, which resulted in the assassination of Mali’s Minister of Defense, inflicted significant casualties on the Malian army, and laid siege to major cities, is perceived by global jihadist operatives as the culmination of a decade-long strategic plan. This plan aims to establish an Islamic emirate in the Sahel upon the ruins of local regimes, serving as a steppingstone toward the ultimate realization of a future caliphate.

In late April 2026, Mali experienced one of the most severe and coordinated offensives since the outbreak of the conflict in the country in 2012. On the morning of April 25, hundreds of fighters affiliated with JNIM, under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghaly, alongside members of the rebel group the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), launched a large-scale assault on a series of military and governmental targets across the country. The offensive involved coordinated raids, massive gunfire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) targeting military bases, airports, and administrative centers. The city of Kidal, which holds immense strategic and symbolic importance in northern Mali, was one of the primary flashpoints of the fighting. The rebel organizations claimed they succeeded in seizing control of large parts of the city and forcing a retreat of government forces and their Russian allies.

It is worth noting that Mali is perceived by Al-Qaeda as the core locus of its operations and as a “home base” intended to facilitate the creation of a jihadist territorial contiguity across the Sahel and sub-Saharan regions. In 2012, AQIM published a guide titled “The General Guidance Document of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Regarding the Islamic Jihad Project in Azawad,” which outlined a series of recommendations and directives on how to seize control of Mali. Jihadist forums at the time even circulated an image depicting Mali as the central jihadist hub, meant to aid in expanding influence and establishing jihadist outposts throughout the Sahel region.

Right to left: Cover page of “The General Guidance Document of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Regarding the Islamic Jihad Project in Azawa” (2012); Map shared by jihadist operatives on Al-Qaeda-run forums, illustrating Mali as the group’s operational hub (2012).

The simultaneous assault on administrative centers and major cities in the northern part of the country is perceived by jihadist operatives as an extraordinary operational achievement, particularly in light of the military regime’s feeble response and the failure of Russian assistance and mercenary forces to repel the offensive. This milestone triggered enthusiastic reactions across Al-Qaeda-affiliated platforms, such as RocketChat, and telegram accounts associated with the organization. Furthermore, various Al-Qaeda affiliates praised the attack:

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expressed hope that the scenes of the liberation of Kabul in Afghanistan would be replicated in Mali’s capital, Bamako, as well as across the rest of the African Sahel states.[1] Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia/East Africa) emphasized that recent developments in Mali herald the beginning of a profound strategic shift, one that is reshaping the structure of governance and influence across the entirety of West Africa, while paving the way for the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Sahel. The group contends that JNIM is capable of liberating the Sahel region due to a combination of several factors: the erosion of legitimacy facing existing regimes, a governance crisis among the Sahelian states, the West’s failure to influence the Muslim world, the collapse of Western-backed security frameworks for the Sahel, and the strengthening of the Salafi-Jihadist movement within this space.

According to the organization, France’s 2013 military intervention against Al-Qaeda operatives in Mali was not genuinely intended to protect the Malian regime; rather, it was driven by a French interest to maintain its sphere of influence and secure access to natural resources. From its perspective, the unfolding collapse of the government in Mali is not merely military or political; it represents the demise of a Western-influenced client state that ruled the Sahel for many decades, now giving way to the rise of an Islamic alternative.[2]

JNIM, under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghaly

Alongside undermining the stability of the Malian regime, the operational intensification of JNIM carries significant implications for the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISGS) affiliate. JNIM’s military achievements in the April 2026 offensive and its demonstration of operational superiority are expected to disrupt the delicate balance of power between the two organizations. This development could either push ISIS into a defensive posture or, alternatively, incentivize it to execute its own brutal, high-profile attacks to prove its relevance. This portends a potential spillover into a violent round of internal infighting, which would exacerbate the suffering of the local population and deepen the governance vacuum.

An expression of the tension between the two groups was evident in a scathing critique published by the Islamic State condemning Al-Qaeda, titled “The Vacillations of Al-Qaeda!”, in its official weekly newsletter, Al-Naba, in late April 2026. The article accuses Al-Qaeda of forging an alliance with the “Azawad Liberation Front”—a nationalist, secular, and democratic movement seeking autonomy. According to the organization, this cooperation fundamentally contradicts Al-Qaeda’s stated doctrine, which rejects national borders and democratic regimes. It further asserts that to justify this alliance, Al-Qaeda’s leaders and supporters cling to excuses of familial and tribal ties, framing it as “political flexibility,” whereas they had previously condemned such conduct in other organizations.[3]

The Islamic State’s article regarding the JNIM offensive in Mali

The Offensive in Mali within Al-Qaeda-Centric Jihadist Discourse

Following the terrorist offensive in Mali, jihadists in Syria and Telegram accounts identified as Al-Qaeda supporters circulated a map in English outlining a tentative timeline for the restoration of the caliphate, titled “Restoring the Caliphate 2020–2035.” The map is attributed to an entity named the “Transatlantic Intelligence Consortium.” Although it is occasionally presented as a Western intelligence document, there is no evidence indicating that it represents an official assessment by Western intelligence agencies; rather, it appears to be an independent document of a highly speculative and propagandistic nature.

According to the map, the restoration of the caliphate is based on four tentative phases:

1. Creating New Islamic Emirates (2021–2026) The map identifies three Islamic emirates currently governed by Islamic leaderships: Iran (since 1979); the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (restored in 2021 with the Taliban’s return to power following the withdrawal of US military forces); and Syria, which is noted as an emerging Islamic emirate following Abu Mohammad al-Julani’s takeover of the country between 2024 and 2025. Additionally, the map highlights priority regions to focus on for the purpose of establishing future Islamic emirates, such as Nigeria, Yemen, and Bangladesh.
2. It is worth noting that the utilization of the term “Islamic emirates” as a prerequisite for the restoration of the caliphate is characteristic of Al-Qaeda and its supporters. In contrast, the Islamic State organization prefers the terminology of “provinces” (Wilayat) and had, in any case, already declared the establishment of an Islamic caliphate back in June 2014.

• The Arab Spring 2.0 (2026–2030) The map identifies countries where the establishment of Islamic emirates is deemed likely to occur between 2026 and 2030. For instance, it highlights Niger and Burkina Faso (2026–2027) as well as Egypt (2026–2030).

• Re-establishing the Caliphate (2030–2035) During this phase, the Islamic emirates are projected to unite and subsequently persuade or attack other nations—such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—to compel them to join the emerging territory of the caliphate.

• Period of Peace… Preparing for Global Expansion During this phase, the caliphate is required to prepare for a broad global confrontation with the camp of infidels across the rest of the world, including the Americas, the remainder of the African continent, Australia, Russia, and Central Asia.

While this map presents a pretentious, apocalyptic-messianic vision, it should be viewed as a clear manifestation of the global jihadist movement’s propaganda and recruitment efforts, which seek to generate a sense of urgency and historical momentum. In this context, the marking of Israel in a distinct orange color is not coincidental; it positions the country as a central and permanent theater of conflict within this messianic vision, designating it as a supreme target that demands continuous focus until its eventual conquest.

Conclusion

The offensive of April 25, 2026, marks a strategic turning point, illustrating JNIM’s transition from a phase of survival and guerrilla warfare to one of undermining sovereignty and dictating a new territorial reality within the Sahel region. The tactical cooperation between Al-Qaeda, characterized by a global-religious vision, and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), defined by localized national-territorial aspirations—alongside the resounding failure of the local military and the Russian assistance apparatus—has exposed an absolute governance vacuum in northern and central Mali.

For the global jihadist propaganda apparatus, the operational success in Mali is not an isolated local incident, but rather a concrete realization of the operational plans formulated as early as 2012.[4] The maps and visual documents circulating across online networks, spearheaded by the “Restoring the Caliphate 2020–2035” map, reflect burgeoning self-confidence and a messianic mindset that seeks to exploit the erosion of existing regimes to establish an Islamic governance alternative.

This vision heavily echoes the “Seven-Stage Plan” published by Al-Qaeda supporters as early as 2005, which proposed an operational roadmap with a tentative timeline—beginning in 2000 and concluding in 2020—on how to restore the caliphate and strive for global dominance.[5] The publication of new maps and a revised timeline for that very same vision is, in effect, an adaptation to recent developments in the geopolitical arena. Furthermore, the focus on jihad against the “near enemy” as a prerequisite for establishing an Islamic emirate and restoring the caliphate aligns precisely with the doctrine of Abdullah Azzam, the father of global jihad.[6]

In any case, even if the timelines and targets shown in these maps are speculative and apocalyptic, the developments in Mali prove that the gap between propaganda and geopolitical reality in the Sahel is shrinking. This trend directly threatens the stability of West Africa as a whole. At the same time, the strengthening of Al-Qaeda’s branch is expected to worsen the local split and bloody conflict with the ISIS affiliate in the Sahel, which is fighting it for regional hegemony, resources, and recruitment.

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[1] May 8, 2026. RocketChat.

[2] May 12, 2026. RocketChat.

[3] “The Vacillations of Al-Qaeda” [in Arabic], Al-Naba, Issue 545, [April 30, 2026], p. 3.

[4] Michael Barak, Will 2026 Mark Al-Qaeda’s Strategic Breakthrough in the Sahel?, The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, May 2026. https://jstribune.com/the-countdown-starts-nowwill-2026-mark-al-qaedas-strategic-breakthrough-in-the-sahel/

[5] Michael Barak, “Al-Qaeda’s Operational Strategies – The attempt to revive the debate surrounding the Seven Stages P”, ICT Insights, July 12, 2009. https://ict.org.il/UserFiles/JWMG_Al-Qaeda_Operational_Strategies.pdf

[6] See: Thomas Hegghammer, The Caravan Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad, Cambridge University Press: 2020.