Morocco at the heart of the Africa-Europe equation | Fadel Manasfa

What happened in the city of Ceuta, with attempts at a mass crossing towards Europe, has raised a host of questions: does it really reflect a growing desire to leave Morocco, or are we witnessing a much broader phenomenon, rooted in the economic and social disparities between the two shores of the Mediterranean and in Morocco’s position at the heart of this equation?

To understand what happened in Ceuta, it is necessary to look at the journey that preceded the attempt to cross the border. By virtue of its geographical position, Morocco has become a major transit point for migration from sub-Saharan Africa. Many migrants travel long distances through several African countries before reaching northern Morocco, which, for many, represents the final stop before Europe. Much of what unfolds along Morocco’s borders is therefore the outcome of a journey that began far beyond Morocco itself.

This does not mean that Morocco is without its own internal problems. It faces genuine challenges related to unemployment, development and social inequality, and these cannot simply be dismissed or treated as though raising them were part of a campaign against Morocco. But reducing what happened in Ceuta to a purely Moroccan crisis would offer an incomplete reading of the situation. Most of the migration reaching northern Morocco is not Moroccan; rather, it forms part of a much larger movement that begins in different parts of Africa and finds in Morocco, by virtue of its geographical position, one of its final stopping points before Europe.

Perhaps more important than asking why some Moroccans want to reach Europe is to ask why Europe appears to many of them to offer a better future. The difference is not simply a matter of wages. It also lies in the quality of public services, standards of living and the opportunities available to those who are able to regularise their status and enter the labour market.

Moreover, Europe is not a single market for those who dream of reaching it. It is a collection of countries with different wage levels, employment opportunities and standards of public services. For someone seeking a better chance in life, Europe is therefore not simply one country, but a vast space of varying opportunities and conditions, where those who regularise their legal status can move in search of a relatively better life than they might find in an African or Arab country.

But Ceuta does more than reopen the debate over migration. It also brings to the fore another, more sensitive question for Morocco: if Ceuta and Melilla, which Rabat regards as occupied, represent a historic and sovereign issue for Morocco, why has the dispute not developed into a direct confrontation with Spain? Why do we not see Morocco placing the issue at the forefront of its political agenda, as it does with other matters it considers linked to its territorial integrity?

Perhaps understanding Morocco’s position on Ceuta and Melilla requires looking at the issue through the logic of states and their interests, rather than through slogans alone. Morocco maintains its historic position on the two cities, but at the same time recognises that Spain is not merely the power that controls them. It is also a neighbour, an economic, security and political partner, and a member of the European Union. The two countries have extensive interests at stake in trade, energy, migration and security.

Relations between Rabat and Madrid have also undergone a significant transformation in recent years, particularly following Spain’s shift on the Western Sahara issue and its support for Morocco’s autonomy initiative. It is therefore not in Morocco’s interest to turn the question of Ceuta and Melilla into an open confrontation that could jeopardise this relationship.

The two cities have also long been closely connected to their Moroccan surroundings through extensive commercial and human exchanges. Any sudden change in their status would therefore have implications far beyond politics, affecting the interests and livelihoods of thousands of people across the region.

For this reason, Morocco appears to have chosen to manage the dispute rather than allow it to escalate into confrontation. This does not mean that it has abandoned its historic position. Rather, it reflects the reality that states do not pursue their causes solely according to what they regard as a historic right; they also act according to what can realistically be achieved within existing balances of power and interests.

The experience of the United Arab Emirates and Oman perhaps offers a useful example. The complexities of borders and geography between the two countries did not become a permanent source of conflict or rupture. Instead, they were managed within a broader relationship shaped by shared interests, good-neighbourly ties and a common interest in stability.

In Morocco’s case, this pragmatism becomes even clearer when we move from the question of Ceuta and Melilla to migration, the very issue that has made Morocco and Europe dependent on continued cooperation despite the disagreements that persist between them.

Morocco, which faces criticism over its handling of migration, is also a country Europe needs precisely on this issue, because of its geographical position and proximity to the European continent. Rabat has consequently become a key partner for European countries in efforts to curb irregular migration and monitor the routes used by migrants heading north.

But the problem is that what happens along Morocco’s borders does not actually begin there. A large proportion of those reaching northern Morocco come from other African countries, having travelled long distances in search of a better life or to escape poverty, war and the absence of employment opportunities.

Treating Morocco merely as a barrier against migration therefore offers an incomplete reading of the problem. Borders may stop people from crossing, but they cannot stop the forces and circumstances that drive them towards those borders in the first place.