Iran’s Support of the Houthis: What to Know

The Houthis assist Iran by menacing Saudi Arabia’s border and protecting Iranian ships in the Red Sea, giving Iran room to evade sanctions on oil shipping by distracting its enemies and facilitating a shadow network, Iran expert Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar wrote for Foreign Affairs in 2024. At the same time, experts say Yemen offers a testing ground for Iranian weapons on its front lines and in the Red Sea. Like all axis of resistance members in Iran’s proxy network, the Houthis offer Iran plausible deniability: members routinely claim responsibility for attacks likely ordered or perpetrated by Iran. For instance, many experts blame Iran for attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities that the Houthis took responsibility for in September 2019.

Following the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, the group attacked U.S.- and Israel-linked targets in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandab Strait—which connects the sea to the Gulf of Aden—in what they called a show of support for Hamas and Palestinians. These attacks effectively blocked vessels and had ruinous effects for international shipping. Experts said it was unclear whether Iran or Houthi leaders ordered the initial strikes, but Tehran voiced its unequivocal support for the operations and reportedly assisted the Houthis in targeting vessels. 

The Houthi threat in the Red Sea concerned Washington especially, as freedom of navigation is a core U.S. interest. In response to the group’s initial attacks in 2023, the United States under President Joe Biden worked with the United Kingdom (UK) to launch a joint military campaign against Houthi targets in Yemen, while U.S. and European Union naval missions protected ships in the Red Sea. Israel conducted its own air strikes on Yemen in 2024, primarily targeting critical infrastructure.

In March 2025, the Trump administration launched a new offensive on Houthi military and strategic targets in Yemen, dubbed Operation Rough Rider. The U.S. military said the campaign struck more than eight hundred targets, including radar systems, air defenses, and ballistic and drone launch sites used by the Houthis to attack commercial ships and naval vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. 

The Houthis alleged the attacks killed women and children, while U.S. defense officials said the strikes eliminated top Houthi commanders alongside hundreds of Houthi targets. The Houthis launched retaliatory strikes on U.S. warships in the Red Sea later that month and announced they would resume attacks on Israeli ships as well after Israel missed a deadline to resume aid deliveries to Gaza. (Houthi attacks on Israeli ships had been briefly paused following an Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal in mid-January 2025.). This prompted a joint U.S.-UK response that April. 

In a statement on state television, General Hossein Salami, former head of Iran’s IRGC, denied any involvement in the Houthis’ retaliatory attacks. The two sides agreed to a ceasefire in May, but tensions escalated again in August when an Israeli strike in Sanaa killed Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi, the most senior Houthi official to be killed in the conflict. 

The Houthis have rapidly evolved from a state insurgent group to a state-level actor with strong—and growing—military capabilities. With training, intelligence, and weapons support from the IRGC and Hezbollah, the Houthis have gained control of critical Yemeni infrastructure like the Port of Hodeidah in Sanaa on the Red Sea coastline. This leverage facilitated their regular strikes on the Red Sea between 2023 and 2025, and enabled them to withstand retaliatory U.S.-UK strikes.