Tigray’s Hijacked Transition – Ethiopia Insight
The TPLF coup—where the Battle for Tigray went wrong
A recent Ethiopia Insight article, The Battle for Tigray, presents itself as a balanced account of Tigray’s post-war trajectory. In reality, it obscures the truth: a calculated and illegitimate power grab by the faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) led by Debretsion Gebremichael.
While the article rightly highlights Tigray’s immense suffering, it mischaracterizes the TPLF’s actions as a noble fight for sovereignty, masking their coercive consolidation of power.
This distortion is further clarified by an 18 April statement from the TPLF Central Committee faction led by Getachew Reda. The statement denounces the legitimacy of the so-called 14th Congress orchestrated by Debretsion’s group. This analysis offers a clearer picture of how Debretsion’s faction has used the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) to hijack Tigray’s recovery process.
What was characterized as a “remarkable resurgence” is, in truth, a strategic power grab. Multiple sources confirmed that Debretsion’s loyalists had effectively overthrown the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA), sidelining pragmatic leaders like Getachew and Lieutenant General Tsadkan Gebretensae—figures who prioritized constructive engagement with Ethiopia’s federal government.
Fabricated Mandate
According to the Getachew faction, Debretsion’s 14th Congress lacked democratic legitimacy on several fronts. Large parts of Tigray were excluded from participation, and entire zones were left unrepresented. Roughly half of the TPLF Central Committee boycotted the congress, joined by strong objections from the Control Commission and veteran party members.
Perhaps most damning were the procedural violations. The congress proceeded despite unresolved legal issues with the federal government and the election board, and was held without adequate deliberation or review of the party’s defensive strategy. As evidenced by the recent partisan takeover of the Tigray Development Association (TDA), the push to consolidate power reflects not democratic will, but a desperate bid for factional dominance.
The result has been institutional chaos. The Central Committee’s statement points to a deeply divided TPLF, a fragmented defense force, demoralized fighters, and plummeting public confidence—at a time when Tigray most needs cohesive leadership to navigate recovery.
Unmerited Gamble
The claim that TPLF’s “reckless gamble” paid dividends after Pretoria lacks factual basis. Military defeat, not strategic calculation, forced the Pretoria Agreement. With Mekelle under imminent threat of capture, eyewitness accounts and scholarly research document the TDF’s retreat in the face of combined Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Amhara offensives in late 2022.
Stripped of diplomatic language, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) constituted a military surrender, forcing the relinquishment of territorial control, combatants, fortifications, and mechanized weapons to the Abiy Ahmed administration. While it provided crucial respite from active combat, the agreement nonetheless represented a significant defeat for Tigray.
The Battle for Tigray – Ethiopia Insight
Why TPLF’s reckless gamble may actually pay off
In his April 2025 interview, Getachew disclosed that federal negotiators employed psychological tactics, overwhelming Tigrayan delegates with exaggerated battlefield loss projections to extract concessions. Contrary to the claims made, the TDF reportedly suffered significant losses in the days leading up to the Pretoria Agreement, while there is no evidence to support assertions that the resistance near Adwa had any meaningful impact.
The faction’s post-agreement control over Tigray-evidenced by their March 2025 seizure of TIRA positions derives primarily from military intimidation rather than popular mandate.
Mischaracterized Surrender
The Pretoria Agreement did not represent a “second chance” for TPLF as some suggest. Its terms required disarming the TDF within 30 days, dismantling TPLF’s administrative control of Tigray, and reinstating federal authority—conditions that reflect surrender rather than negotiation success.
By March 2025, only around 30 percent of the estimated 250,000 TDF fighters had been demobilized according to reliable assessments. Debretsion’s faction has deliberately obstructed this process. Thousands of fighters consequently remain in a dangerous legal and operational limbo, caught in the stalled Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process.
Some expressed widespread public disillusionment: “Pretoria promised peace, but our lands bleed.”
Meanwhile, Eritrean Defence Force abuses in Tigray have continued, with little indication that Eritrea is willing to curb human rights violations—a situation made more difficult by the lack of unified leadership among Tigrayan authorities.
TDF’s Disarray
The portrayal of the TDF as a unified, stabilizing force loyal to Tigray’s collective interests obscures its fragmented and contested nature. Lacking clear constitutional or interim legal recognition, the TDF remains susceptible to factional manipulation. This was starkly demonstrated when forces from “Army 26,” reportedly loyal to Debretsion’s faction, stormed the Seharti district administration, seized the official government seal, shot a farmer, and beat several others with rifle butts during a protest-underscoring the dangers of an unaccountable, divided military presence.
Historical analysis traces the TDF’s current fracture to its guerrilla origins. From 1975 to 1991, the TPLF developed as a clan-based insurgency before assuming regional and national power (1991–2018), a period notable for informal power structures and intensified factionalism. The pivotal 2001–02 split between Meles Zenawi and Siye Abraha established a precedent for prioritizing loyalty over competence.
Debretsion’s triumph at the contested 14th Congress came primarily through TDF intimidation rather than democratic processes, culminating in Getachew’s forced relocation to Addis Ababa. With “Core and Above Core” TDF commanders forcibly removing legitimate officials and seizing administrative buildings in Mekelle, Debretsion’s faction had effectively executed a military takeover of TIRA by 11 March.
Pragmatic Reformers
Contrary to their portrayal as opportunistic betrayers, Getachew and Tsadkan’s records reveal consistent efforts toward pragmatic reform and reconciliation. This description is now further validated by the April 18th Central Committee Statement, which emphasizes their commitment to Tigray’s broader interests above factional politics.
Getachew’s April 2025 UMD testimony details his practical initiatives for federal cooperation to rebuild Tigray’s devastated infrastructure—efforts systematically undermined by Debretsion’s faction. As TIRA’s head, Getachew was Tigray’s best hope for attracting international reconstruction aid.
Tsadkan—a former Ethiopian National Defense Force commander with extensive military expertise—advocated for TDF legalization under proper civilian oversight to mitigate factionalism and prevent civil conflict. Getachew’s leadership has received public support for improving socioeconomic affairs in the society.
Give Soft Power a Chance – Ethiopia Insight
Ethiopia should seek Red Sea access through persuasion not coercion
Samuel Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations helps clarify the risks posed by the TDF’s origins. As a former guerrilla force closely tied to the TPLF, the TDF lacked the institutional separation essential for civilian control. Huntington’s model of “objective control,” from The Soldier and the State, calls for a professional, apolitical military subordinate to civilian authority.
In Tigray, however, where political and military leadership have long been intertwined, this separation remains blurred. This tension surfaced recently when a dispute over control of the TDF sparked renewed escalations—Debretsion claimed that “authority for the forces does not fall under the [Tigray Interim Administration],” while Getachew Reda maintained that the TDF should be under civilian oversight.
Sebhat’s Exploitation
While TPLF elites like Fiseha Asgedom are often cast as principled negotiators, it is the protégés of ‘Aboy’ Sibhat Nega—the veteran leader revered by party loyalists as the ‘father of the armed struggle’—who have long held sway over Tigray’s political economy.
A 2024 report reveals that Tigray-based mining companies operated through a “complicated web of share transfers” and were “intentionally created with offshore accounts” to consolidate control among a narrow elite. This aligns with findings from Clingendael, which confirm the TPLF’s extensive grip over regional financial resources.
This entrenched leadership has severely impeded Tigray’s post-war recovery. According to Tigray Health Bureau statistics, only 27.5 percent of hospitals were functional by March 2025. UN assessments indicate 90 percent of Tigrayans face food insecurity, while the judicial system has operated without funding since 2023.
Legitimate Congress
The Getachew faction proposes a concrete solution: convening a legitimate congress that includes all TPLF members and broader Tigrayan representation—an approach aimed at fostering inclusive dialogue and charting a path out of Tigray’s political crisis. This proposal rests on several key pillars:
- Constitutional security integration: The TDF should not remain a parallel military force but undergo a phased transformation aligned with Ethiopia’s constitution. This includes: (a) integrating qualified personnel into the ENDF per the Pretoria Agreement; (b) transitioning others into regional forces under civilian oversight, as in Amhara and Oromia; and (c) demobilizing and reintegrating remaining fighters through structured rehabilitation.
- African Union–Led Disarmament Process: An intercontinentally supervised DDR process would help dismantle entrenched factional control by “Core and Above Core” commanders. The African Union’s Continental Early Warning System offers a credible mechanism for monitoring such transitions, while Ethiopia’s National Disarmament Committee provides a domestically legitimate framework—balancing international oversight with local ownership.
- Diaspora-Driven Reconstruction: Tigray’s global diaspora is a vital but underused asset for post-conflict recovery. Structured engagement—drawing on successful post-conflict models—could channel diaspora capital, expertise, and networks into reconstruction while bypassing factional control.
- Inclusive Political Dialogue: Broadening Tigray’s political landscape beyond the TPLF is essential for representative governance and curbing monopolistic claims over Tigrayan identity. Including parties like Salsay Weyane Tigray, the Tigray Independence Party, and Arena Tigray—partially reflected in the Interim Administration’s Advisory Council—is a start. Yet, the reported exclusion of diaspora and security sector voices undermines legitimacy. Expanding participation within the Interim Administration provides a practical basis for building a more inclusive political order.
Tigray’s Decision
The Getachew faction’s message is urgent: without a credible, inclusive congress, the TPLF risks dissolution—and the blame lies with Debretsion’s faction. Despite mounting evidence, The Battle of Tigray” romanticizes a factional power grab as a people’s victory. In truth, Pretoria was a defeat; the TDF has become a factional tool, and Debretsion’s group functions more as an extractive oligarchy than a representative leadership.
Getachew and Tsadkan offered a pathway to reconciliation and reform, only to be sidelined by a faction entrenched in outdated ideology. Their marginalization is a major setback for democracy and recovery.
Tigray’s future depends on a fundamental shift: bringing the TDF under civilian control, dismantling ethnic-based patronage, and empowering youth and the diaspora. The people are clear in their demands: “End this madness—our future awaits.”
Tigray stands at a defining moment. The road to peace and development lies not in preserving obsolete power structures, but in building inclusive, accountable institutions that honor the resilience of its people.
Query or correction? Email us
While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.
Main photo: Reception ceremony hosted by the Debretsion-led TPLF leadership in honor of General Tadesse Werede’s appointment. Left to right: Fetlework Gebreigziabher, Amanuel Assefa, Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede, Debretsion Gebremichael, 10 April, 2025
Published under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
Crédito: Link de origem