The Middle East Power Play in the Horn of Africa

Military agreements, port investments, and competing positions on Somalia, Somaliland, and Sudan are drawing the African and Arabian shores of the Red Sea into a single geopolitical arena

he Horn of Africa is becoming an increasingly important extension of Middle Eastern strategy as governments on opposite shores of the Red Sea deepen their involvement through military agreements, port investments, energy projects, diplomatic recognition, and political alliances.

Egypt’s new maritime cooperation memorandum with Somalia is one part of that transformation. Turkey has built an extensive military, economic, and institutional presence in Somalia while retaining strong ties with Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia is expanding its defense and maritime relationship with Mogadishu, while the United Arab Emirates has invested heavily in ports and logistics, most visibly at Berbera in Somaliland.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has added a diplomatic dimension with potential security implications because of Somaliland’s position on the Gulf of Aden. Sudan, meanwhile, offers the clearest warning of how external competition can deepen instability when it becomes entangled with a domestic war.

The emerging regional order cannot be divided neatly into two blocs. The same governments may cooperate to protect maritime navigation, compete for ports and influence, and take opposing positions on Somalia’s territorial integrity or Sudan’s civil war. African governments are also pursuing their own interests, using external partnerships to secure investment, infrastructure, military assistance, and diplomatic support.

The Horn of Africa has emerged as one of the most strategically significant regions in contemporary international politics

“The Horn of Africa has emerged as one of the most strategically significant regions in contemporary international politics,” Dr. Aly Tarek Metwally, a political affairs and regional security analyst, told The Media Line. “Positioned at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, the region has become a focal point where maritime security, international trade, geopolitical competition and regional diplomacy increasingly converge.”

Shiri Fein-Grossman, CEO of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and former head of regional affairs at Israel’s National Security Council, said the region now attracts powers pursuing a broad mix of security, economic and diplomatic interests.

“The Horn of Africa has become one of the principal intersections between African, Middle Eastern and global geopolitics,” Fein-Grossman told The Media Line. “Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Iran and Israel all have growing interests in the region, alongside China, the United States, the European Union and others.”

The Horn of Africa has become one of the principal intersections between African, Middle Eastern and global geopolitics

Those interests range from maritime security and trade to energy, infrastructure, food security, and diplomacy.

A Connected Red Sea Arena

Ships traveling between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean must pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and continue toward the Suez Canal. The route is vital to global commerce but has become increasingly vulnerable to war, piracy, and attacks originating from Yemen.

Middle Eastern involvement in the Horn is not new. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey have maintained relationships there for years. What has changed is the scale of their activity and the degree to which events in the Middle East now shape alignments on the African side of the Red Sea.

“Developments in the Horn of Africa can no longer be viewed in isolation from the wider strategic environment of the Red Sea and the Middle East,” Metwally said. “They form part of an interconnected regional security landscape in which stability, economic prosperity and international navigation are mutually dependent.”

Developments in the Horn of Africa can no longer be viewed in isolation from the wider strategic environment of the Red Sea and the Middle East

That interconnected map includes stronger Egyptian-Somali relations, Ethiopia’s search for maritime access, Turkey’s presence in both Somalia and Ethiopia, Israel’s growing interest in the Red Sea and expanded Gulf involvement.

Metwally said that competition need not be the region’s only organizing principle. The same developments could support a cooperative security framework based on international law, mutual respect and shared responsibility.

Israel and Somaliland

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a significant recent change to the region’s diplomatic landscape.

On Dec. 26, 2025, Israel became the first, and currently only United Nations member state to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Somalia rejected the decision as an attack on its sovereignty, while Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti and the African Union reaffirmed their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Somaliland has governed itself since 1991 and maintains its own institutions, security forces, and political system. Somalia continues to regard the territory as an integral part of the country.

For Israel, geography is central to the emerging relationship. Somaliland’s coastline faces the Gulf of Aden opposite Yemen and lies near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, placing the relationship squarely within Israel’s concerns over Red Sea shipping and the threat posed by the Houthis.

“Israel’s recognition of Somaliland should be understood as the convergence of diplomatic, security and economic considerations,” Fein-Grossman said. She pointed to Somaliland’s relative stability, functioning institutions, and interest in long-term international partnerships.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland should be understood as the convergence of diplomatic, security and economic considerations

“At the same time, its location on the Gulf of Aden, opposite Yemen and adjacent to the Bab-el-Mandeb, gives it exceptional strategic importance,” she said.

Somaliland’s defense minister said in June that Israel was helping train some police and military personnel, while denying that the sides were negotiating an Israeli base. Somaliland has also promoted potential cooperation in agriculture, water, renewable energy, healthcare, and technology.

Fein-Grossman said the Houthi threat had become more prominent in Israeli strategic calculations after attacks on commercial shipping and direct threats from Yemen, but cautioned against viewing recognition only through a military lens.

She also described an affinity between two societies that have struggled for security, international legitimacy, and national development under difficult conditions.

Egypt views the issue from a different starting point: the defense of Somalia’s internationally recognized borders.

“Central to Egypt’s regional policy is its unwavering commitment to the principles of territorial integrity and respect for the sovereignty of states,” Metwally said, describing those principles as pillars of both the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

The dispute reflects the central divide over Somaliland. Israel views its stability and institutions as grounds for recognition and cooperation. Somalia, Egypt, and most African Union members see unilateral recognition as a threat to Somali sovereignty and the wider principle of territorial integrity.

Fein-Grossman said Israel should manage those disagreements through sustained dialogue with Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi rather than expect regional actors to adopt a common view.

Berbera and the UAE’s Port Network

Israel’s relationship with Somaliland is developing alongside a much older Emirati presence centered on Berbera.

Dubai-based DP World, an Emirati multinational logistics company, has committed up to $442 million in a phased plan to develop Berbera Port, an associated economic zone and a transport corridor intended to connect the Somaliland coast with Ethiopia and the wider Horn.

The investment gives the UAE a long-term commercial position near one of the world’s most important shipping routes. It also strengthens Somaliland’s economic relevance despite its limited diplomatic recognition.

For landlocked Ethiopia, Berbera offers a potential alternative to its heavy dependence on Djibouti. For the UAE, the port is part of a logistics network linking the Gulf, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean. For Somaliland, it provides revenue, jobs, and a platform for attracting additional investment.

“Berbera has the potential to become one of the Horn of Africa’s most important logistics and commercial gateways, serving not only Somaliland but also landlocked Ethiopia and the wider region,” Fein-Grossman said.

Emirati investment and Israeli recognition do not necessarily represent a coordinated policy. The UAE has not formally recognized Somaliland. Still, its investments have strengthened the territory’s commercial position and increased Berbera’s relevance to Israeli calculations involving Red Sea security and maritime trade.

The arrangement also shows that outside governments do not always work exclusively through internationally recognized central authorities. The UAE has cultivated direct ties with Somaliland and other regional administrations, while Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have placed greater emphasis on Somalia’s federal government.

Egypt and Somalia Deepen Cooperation

Somalia’s cabinet approved a maritime memorandum with Egypt on July 9 covering transport, ports and the development of Somali maritime infrastructure.

The agreement follows a broader expansion of bilateral relations, including defense cooperation and Egypt’s proposed participation in African Union peace-support efforts in Somalia.

Cairo regards the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb as a strategic continuation of the Suez Canal. Its policy is also shaped by its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its opposition to actions that could weaken Somalia’s territorial integrity.

“For Egypt, engagement in the Horn of Africa is not driven by aspirations for regional influence but by an enduring commitment to safeguarding regional stability,” Metwally said, adding that Cairo has consistently viewed the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea as a natural extension of its strategic environment.

He described secure navigation through the Suez Canal and stability at Bab-el-Mandeb as components of both Egyptian national security and the global economy.

The memorandum, he said, goes beyond technical port cooperation. It forms part of a strategic partnership intended to strengthen Somali institutions, maritime security and economic development.

Egypt’s security role is also tied to the African Union’s operations and to cooperation with Somalia’s federal government. Metwally characterized that involvement as part of Egypt’s long-standing participation in collective African peacekeeping rather than a unilateral military deployment.

The relationship is nevertheless viewed partly through the prism of Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland, which triggered a sharp dispute with Mogadishu. Turkey later mediated between Ethiopia and Somalia through the Ankara Declaration. Both governments reaffirmed respect for sovereignty and agreed to pursue arrangements that could provide Ethiopia with access to the sea under Somali sovereign authority.

Metwally said Egypt’s closer relationship with Somalia should not be interpreted solely as an effort to counter Ethiopia. Cairo, he said, continues to advocate negotiations and international law as the proper framework for resolving regional disputes.

Turkey Works With Both Mogadishu and Addis Ababa

Turkey has built one of the most extensive Middle Eastern presences in the Horn.

Its relationship with Somalia began with humanitarian assistance and expanded into defense, infrastructure, education, healthcare, aviation, trade, and energy. Turkey operates a major military training facility in Mogadishu and signed a defense and economic cooperation agreement with Somalia in 2024 that includes maritime-security assistance.

At the same time, Ankara has preserved substantial political and economic ties with Ethiopia. Its ability to work with both governments enabled it to mediate after the Somaliland agreement caused a rupture between them.

“Turkey is one of the most significant external actors in the Horn of Africa, but its engagement should be understood within the context of a much broader, decades-long Africa strategy,” Fein-Grossman said.

Through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Maarif Foundation, Turkish Airlines, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, business associations, and an expanding diplomatic network, Ankara has built relationships extending beyond military or government-to-government contacts.

Its mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia also reflects an ambition not merely to participate in regional affairs, but to shape them.

Saudi Arabia Expands Its Somali Partnership

Saudi Arabia has accelerated its own engagement with Somalia.

The two countries signed a military cooperation agreement in Riyadh on Feb. 9, 2026, followed later that month by a separate agreement covering maritime transport and port development.

Saudi interests are driven by Somalia’s location opposite the Arabian Peninsula, the need to protect Red Sea shipping and concerns about instability spreading from Yemen and the wider Horn.

Riyadh has also supported Somalia’s territorial integrity, placing it closer to Egypt and Turkey than to Israel on the Somaliland dispute.

Fein-Grossman cautioned against portraying Saudi or Egyptian engagement as a response to Israel. Both countries, she said, have operated in the Red Sea and the Horn for decades because of geography, trade, food security and regional politics.

Metwally said Saudi and Emirati investments in logistics, food security and maritime infrastructure demonstrate the growing interdependence of Gulf and Red Sea security, even when the two states pursue different political relationships.

Sudan Shows the Dangers

Sudan represents the most destructive example of Middle Eastern interests becoming entangled with a domestic conflict.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are widely regarded as closer to the Sudanese Armed Forces. The UAE has repeatedly been accused by United Nations experts and American lawmakers of supporting the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Abu Dhabi denies backing the RSF or either side in the war.

Those differences have become part of a wider Saudi-Emirati rivalry extending across Yemen, Somalia and the Red Sea, although both Gulf governments continue to participate in diplomatic efforts seeking an end to Sudan’s war.

The experience of Sudan offers an important lesson for the wider region

“The experience of Sudan offers an important lesson for the wider region,” Metwally said. “Local conflicts can become considerably more complex when regional rivalries overlap with domestic political crises.”

Preventing external competition from reinforcing internal divisions, he said, is one of the central challenges facing African and Middle Eastern policymakers.

African Governments Are Not Passive

Describing the Horn solely as a contest among foreign powers risks reducing Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Sudan to passive arenas.

Somalia is diversifying its economic and security partnerships while defending its territorial claims. Ethiopia is seeking alternatives to its dependence on Djibouti for maritime trade. Somaliland is using Berbera, its political institutions, and its strategic location to seek recognition and investment.

“African governments are not passive participants in this process,” Fein-Grossman said. “They actively shape the strategic environment, diversify their partnerships and choose the relationships that best advance their national interests.”

She also warned that discussions of ports, bases, and strategic rivalry often overlook the people whose futures are most affected.

“The people of Somaliland, like people across Africa, seek peace, opportunity, education, healthcare, investment and the ability to build a better future for the next generation,” she said.

Metwally similarly argued that international partnerships can support development, security, and stronger institutions only when they preserve local ownership and sovereign decision-making.

Middle Eastern involvement can bring port infrastructure, investment, military training, energy development, and diplomatic mediation. It can also sharpen sovereignty disputes, deepen internal conflicts, and force African governments to navigate rival alignments.

Egypt’s agreement with Somalia, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Turkey’s position between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, Saudi Arabia’s expanding partnership with Somalia, and the UAE’s investment in Berbera are not isolated developments. They are part of a strategic realignment stretching from the Suez Canal and the Arabian Peninsula to Bab-el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

Whether that space develops through cooperative security or competing spheres of influence will depend not only on the ambitions of Middle Eastern governments but also on the ability of African states and societies to retain control over the decisions that shape their future.