Peace Through Diplomacy Desperately Needed in the Horn

Global powers must act immediately to prevent a devastating conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea centered on Tigray.

The Horn of Africa, long beset by instability, stands on the verge of another conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the main battleground set to be Tigray region, which has suffered immensely in multiple previous wars.  

The Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), signed on 3 November 2022 between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), brought quiet to the guns after two years of a Tigray war that left hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced.

That hard-fought peace is now under threat—and needs saving.

Today’s Addis Ababa propaganda, which presents the TPLF as Eritrea’s ally, risks undoing the Pretoria Agreement and triggering a war with even deadlier consequences.

The international community, above all the U.S. and the European Union, must act decisively to discourage incendiary rhetoric from all sides before the region sinks further into crisis. Saving the fragile peace is in U.S. interests as war will create a fertile environment for hostile actors to flourish and destabilize the region.

Pretoria Problems

The COHA signed in Pretoria was a massive breakthrough. It came after Ethiopian forces—despite approaching Tigray’s capital, Mekelle—faced heavy losses against the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and with mounting diplomatic pressure from Western governments and the Tigrayan diaspora. This led to a recognition by Addis Ababa that a military solution would be unsustainable.

But the renewed drumbeats of war suggest that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government has shifted its stance. This has occurred two years after Pretoria, with many unresolved issues. Chief among them has been the reluctance of Ethiopia’s electoral board to recognize the TPLF as a political party and the failure to restore territory to Tigray that was seized by Eritrean and Amhara fighters in the war—both key elements of the COHA.

Given its decades-long isolation, extreme authoritarianism, and multiple conflicts, it is no surprise to find Eritrea beating the war drums again. But the socioeconomic devastation of the Tigray war, plus ongoing conflicts in Amhara and Oromia, should have made it unlikely that Ethiopia would initiate a new front.

A ravaged, exhausted, still disconnected Tigray—it barely needs to be stated—can’t afford any more war. But, with tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea escalating, there is fear that Tigray could be caught in the crossfire and become a battleground once again.

Collision Course

Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and conflict between the Amhara Fano militias and Ethiopian government forces began rising following the Pretoria Agreement. Eritrea’s dictator Isaias Afwerki and the Fano wanted to see the TPLF’s total destruction, not a peace deal that left the party chastened but still with significant power in Tigray. This put Ethiopia on a collision course with Eritrea, which was seen to be backing the increasingly rebellious Amhara forces.

A flashpoint came when Abiy declared his country’s determination to access the sea, famously asserting: “A population of 150 million can’t live in a geographic prison.” Despite Addis Ababa’s reassurances that it had no intention of provoking Eritrea, the two countries embarked on a rush to secure regional alliances, with Eritrea lining up alongside Ethiopia’s arch-rival Egypt and also Somalia, which Ethiopia had fallen out with over Abiy’s demand for a sea port.

Port Search

The December 2024 signing of the Ankara Accord, which in effect ended Ethiopia’s prospects of gaining a foothold on Somaliland’s coastline, only hastened this course. Ethiopian state media soon ratcheted up nationalist rhetoric, reasserting claims to Eritrea’s Assab port and signaling a shift towards outright confrontation.

Relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have since deteriorated rapidly. Eritrea closed its embassy in Ethiopia following a conference in Addis Ababa by Brigade N’hamedu, a formidable youth-led opposition movement against Eritrea’s Isaias regime, which declared its intention to engage in armed resistance. This is a dangerous gamble by the Eritrean youth movement, which got a frowning face from the TPLF and Tigrayan commanders.

In the meantime, reports indicate that Ethiopia has mobilized mechanized divisions along the Eritrean border, with Eritrea reacting by issuing a national call-up of demobilized soldiers to report to military academies.

Incendiary Commentary

Ethiopian state-owned media has fuelled fears of a renewed Tigray war, this time with even broader regional consequences. Similar to 2018-19, state media are showing footage of a peace rally by Tigrayan residents of Addis Ababa, reportedly press-ganged into attending by the authorities.

Abiy has deployed key figures—including former President Mulatu Teshome and Minister of Irrigation and Lowlands Abraham Belay—to reshape the narrative on the Tigray war and justify impending military action against Eritrea, with Assab port as the ultimate prize.

Mulatu, in an op-ed in Al Jazeera last month, accused President Isaias of thriving on war “like a pyromaniac who can’t resist setting fires”, and also accused elements within the TPLF of conspiring with Eritrea to undermine the Pretoria Agreement.

Similarly, in a 25 February state television interview, Minister Abraham stated that the Ethiopian government was closely monitoring activities in Tigray, including “their interactions with external forces”—a veiled reference to Eritrea. The same allegation has been made by Lieutenant General Tsadkan Gebretensae, a key military figure in Tigray and ally of interim government leader GetachewReda.

Nevertheless, the accused faction of TPLF has strongly denied any relations with Eritrea. There is no tangible evidence that shows the alliance, which suggests the allegation may be designed to provoke strife. 

Tigray Predicament

Notably, Abraham Belay became the first Ethiopian government official to publicly acknowledge the continued presence of Eritrean troops inside Ethiopia. Though this long-overdue admission could have been a positive step towards implementing the Pretoria Agreement, it instead appears part of Addis Ababa’s overall strategy to legitimize a future war against Eritrea

Tigray is now caught in the middle of an Ethio-Eritrean struggle for dominance, with both sides hoping to capitalize on splits in its leadership. There is also rising federal pressure on the region, particularly in the form of the latest National Election Board of Ethiopia prohibition on TPLF engaging in political activities.

In tandem with federal resistance to restoring Tigray’s constitutionally mandated territories and providing secure return for displaced Tigrayans, these moves are causing many in the TPLF to lose trust in the peace process.

A recent statement from senior TDF commanders opposing the Getachew-led interim administration suggested that fault lines are growing in Tigray. This worsened when Getachew moved on 10 March to try and dismiss three of Tigray’s top commanders. It now looks like Getachew may be soon forced out by TPLF rivals. If that occurs, it is imperative that Abiy does not respond with force.

Familiar Tactics

The Ethiopian government’s tactics today bear an uncanny resemblance to those used in the lead-up to the 2020 Tigray war. Once again, Addis Ababa is politicizing state institutions to keep the TPLF frustrated and divided. It has continued to host potential U.S. lobbyists, for example Rev Franklin Graham, like it did with the late Senator Inhofe of Oklahoma.

Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for what was hailed as a historic reconciliation with Eritrea. But in reality, that agreement was little more than a war pact that unraveled Ethiopia, laying the foundation for the devastating conflict that followed.

Again, it is using diplomats like Mulatu to try and convince the international community to give its blessings for another devastating war. It is a bitter déjà vu.

Diplomacy Essential

A return to war in Tigray would have catastrophic consequences, extending beyond Ethiopia’s borders, inviting the involvement of regional and international actors. This is not a mere conjecture. It was seen in the 2020-2022 war.

Tigrayan leaders should not collaborate with genocidal forces in any conflict that occurs. In fact, they should work towards deescalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

If war did ensue, a belt of instability stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa would provide fertile ground for extremist groups like al-Shabaab to expand their influence, threatening the Red Sea, heightening risks for international shipping and security. It could also destabilize U.S. ally, Kenya, which is expected to play a key role in resolving the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.

Global powers cannot afford to be idle. The U.S., European Union, and others must urgently apply diplomatic pressure on Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Mekelle to de-escalate. The world has already witnessed the devastation of the last war, arguably the deadliest of the 21^st century—it cannot allow history to repeat itself.

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Main Image: The aftermath of an airstrike on Mekelle during the Tigray war.

While the opinions in this article are those of the author, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.

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