Houthis in Port Sudan: Iran Expands Military Network into Sudan
Washington — A comprehensive report by the U.S.-based Century Foundation has revealed that Sudan, particularly its Red Sea hub of Port Sudan, is emerging as a central node in Iran’s expanding military and logistical network with Yemen’s Houthi movement.
The study, “From Peripheral Node to Network Hub: Houthis in Africa”, argues that the relationship has evolved far beyond supplying Sudan’s army with drones, munitions, and radar systems.
Evidence suggests the creation of a transnational network involving weapons transfers, personnel movement across the Red Sea, and the use of Port Sudan as a logistics and financing center. The report also points to the possible deployment of Houthi and Iranian experts to train Sudanese forces in drone operations and local manufacturing.
Iran’s Return via Sudan’s War
According to the findings, the civil war that erupted in Sudan in April 2023 gave Iran a low-cost opportunity to reassert influence in a country long tied to its regional strategy. Since then, Iran has reportedly supplied Sudan with Mohajer-6 drones, radar systems, and munitions, while IRGC trainers have been embedded to operate and instruct Sudanese forces.
The report links Sudan’s battlefield gains in early 2025 to improved drone capabilities, particularly Iranian systems. These conclusions echo U.S. Treasury statements in October 2024, which accused Sudan’s military of prioritizing Iranian drones and benefiting from Iranian and Russian support.
Islamist Factions Inside the Army
The study highlights that Iranian support flows not only through official military channels but also via Islamist networks within Sudan’s armed forces. These factions, rooted in the legacy of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, retain influence in defense industries and procurement. The U.S. sanctioned Defense Industries System chief Mirghani Idris in 2024, accusing him of spearheading arms acquisitions, including Iranian drones.
Such networks reportedly redirected Iranian support to allied militias, notably the al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, which was sanctioned in 2025 for receiving IRGC training and weapons. This dual-track approach allows Iran to cultivate influence beyond Sudan’s military leadership, embedding itself within ideological factions.
Houthis Enter the Sudanese Theater
The Houthis reportedly joined this network in mid-2024, initially as junior partners. Interviews with Yemeni and Western officials suggest they facilitated at least three shipments of small arms to Sudan on Iran’s behalf. Sources claim Houthi operatives are present in Port Sudan, managing logistics and financing, with weapons and personnel moving in both directions across the Red Sea.
Satellite imagery and shipping data reveal suspicious maritime activity, including vessels disabling tracking systems near Sudanese waters before docking at Houthi-controlled facilities in Yemen. One such vessel, carrying an estimated 3,500 tons of cargo, allegedly transported weapons. Sudanese sources told researchers that a shipment seized in May 2026 was destined for Houthi allies within Sudan’s army and for Hamas in Gaza.
Drone Technology Transfer
The report highlights Sudan’s unveiling of the Safarouk drone in 2025, noting its near-identical design to Iran’s Ababil-T and the Houthi-operated Qasef-2K. Weapons experts consulted by the researchers believe Safarouk is a derivative of the Iranian model, suggesting Houthi engineers may have trained Sudanese forces in production and operation.
Strategic Risks
The study warns that Iran’s direct ties to Islamist factions within Sudan’s military could deepen internal divisions and provide these groups with independent sources of weapons and training. A Houthi foothold in Port Sudan would also give the group a strategic presence on the western shore of the Red Sea, creating new supply routes beyond the heavily monitored Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandeb.