Getachew is a Traitor, Not a Reformer
How the former Tigray leader’s rhetoric fuels anti-Tigrayan narratives
Few things are more dangerous than a narrative that cloaks betrayal in the language of reform—especially when it comes from within. Tigray’s Hijacked Transition, published in Ethiopia Insight as a response to The Battle for Tigray, claims to offer a Tigrayan perspective.
Yet in its effort to sanctify Getachew Reda, it ends up parroting the very rhetoric that once vilified Tigrayans as looters, criminals, and warmongers—a moral and logical inversion that echoes Getachew’s own political realignment. That such a distortion of Tigray’s tragic recent history appears in a respected outlet like Ethiopia Insight is not just troubling—it demands a direct and urgent response.
The Battle for Tigray—articulated along the lines of my earlier work—reframes the Pretoria Agreement not as a mere power struggle, but as a profound political rupture requiring serious analysis. Eschewing rhetorical excess and emotional appeals, it sets a high bar for thoughtful engagement—a standard that Tigray’s Hijacked Transition conspicuously fails to meet.
Most troubling, its arguments risk reinforcing the dehumanizing narratives that fueled the genocidal war on Tigray. In doing so, it doesn’t just misinterpret the past—it actively endangers the future.
Echoing Genocidal Rhetoric
The article’s central claim—that the TPLF is singularly obsessed with power and financial resources—ironically confirms the core premise of The Battle for Tigray: that the conflict is political at its root. Reducing the TPLF’s motives to mere self-interest depoliticizes the crisis while simultaneously affirming its political nature.
Allegations such as Sebhat Nega exploiting Tigray’s economy are presented without verifiable evidence, drawing instead on recycled rhetoric. This undermines the article’s credibility and mirrors the very narratives used to obscure the political roots of the war. By echoing Getachew Reda’s public line and exonerating the federal government, Tigray’s Hijacked Transition affirms what it seeks to deny: that Tigray’s current crisis is an unresolved political confrontation.
The Battle for Tigray – Ethiopia Insight
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Its focus on “reforming” the TPLF—ironically glamorizing a man who has since become the spokesperson for a regime arguably more despotic than the TPLF ever was—aligns it with Prosperity Party [PP] talking points, downplaying Tigray’s dire humanitarian crisis and diverting attention to internal power struggles.
But this is not simply about power—it is a calculated effort to dismantle the TPLF and, in doing so, leave the region without any serious organized force capable of negotiating its legitimate demands for self-determination, territorial integrity, and justice.
Self-contradictions
Rather than offering a balanced analysis, the article repeats Getachew Reda’s arguments, treating them as authoritative even as he routinely contradicts himself. As The Battle for Tigray and my own writings have shown, Getachew has strategically distanced himself from the TPLF’s mandate.
His own admission—”I knew collaboration would be tough, if not impossible. As an outlier among the party’s five executives, I wasn’t part of the armed struggle tradition”—reveals a conscious departure from the collective position of the party he was entrusted to represent. By positioning himself as uniquely capable of grasping the demands of “peace,” he discredited the TPLF and framed its legacy as inherently anti-peace.
His narrative of military collapse — used to justify the Pretoria Agreement — is repeatedly contradicted, not only by his own conflicting statements but also by senior military figures such as General Guesh Gebre. At various points, he claimed, “Our soldiers were fighting with stones and knives,” and, “I would have liked to continue fighting for a couple more months, but it was impossible to keep going while losing fighters.”
In another instance, he stated, “I consider the signing [of the agreement] an advantage because we did it out of fear that Tigray’s remaining capacity might be completely destroyed.”
Yet, when pressed by Reyot Media about reports that he had once said the Prosperity Party could have fully taken over Tigray but instead offered a generous political deal, Getachew offered a contradictory account: that the federal government had in fact signed the agreement because it knew it could not win a military victory over Tigray.
More critically, his justification was directly challenged by General Guesh Gebre. General Guesh—whom Getachew publicly acknowledged as being in contact with during the negotiations—stated that he had advised Getachew not to be pressured into signing a flawed agreement, insisting that the military situation on the ground did not justify such a concession. According to Guesh, the TDF was holding its ground, and any tactical retreats were strategic—not indicators of imminent collapse.
These inconsistencies reveal a political, rather than military, basis for Getachew’s decision. He admitted, “We went to negotiate a ceasefire”, but claimed the federal government introduced political demands, and “the situation on the ground necessitated it”—a stance that marked a break from his party’s collective position.
Abiy’s Wingman
Getachew’s willingness to dismantle the TPLF is further underscored by his enthusiastic endorsement of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia’s [NEBE] decision and his pursuit of a new political party. On 31 May 2024, he publicly welcomed the new proclamation on party registration, describing the Council of Ministers’ resolution as “a step in the right direction in consolidating peace.”
This response indicates that Getachew initially supported the TPLF’s effort to seek registration through the NEBE. However, when the Board rejected reinstatement and instead offered registration as a new party under the revised law, he distanced himself from the process, framed it as Debretsion’s blunder, and ridiculed the TPLF’s objection. This shift suggests he may never have been sincere in his initial endorsement of the party’s full reinstatement.
In an interview with Fana Broadcasting, he remarked, “They went to the Electoral Board for recognition, but when some people made noise, they claimed they rejected it. You can’t have it both ways.” However, it is a matter of public record that the Electoral Board formally denied the TPLF’s request for reinstatement—making his narrative misleading.
Crucially, Getachew himself has admitted that the idea of forming a new political party was not his own, but was initially proposed by none other than Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
Tigray’s Hijacked Transition – Ethiopia Insight
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His advisory role to the Prime Minister, described as a self-defined position that he will use to fight what he calls the backward TPLF and TDF leaders, is evidence that his role is not technocratic but overtly political.
Getachew’s embrace of PP rhetoric is increasingly visible. He promotes its development agenda—focused on luxury resorts, urban beautification, and corridor-based economic schemes—as a way to renew ‘Ethiopianness’ in Tigray.
His public endorsements of these projects signal a troubling alignment with the federal vision—one centered on luxury developments that have drawn criticism for contributing little to the livelihoods of ordinary citizens while increasing debt burdens and heightening vulnerability to foreign manipulation.
Anti-Tigrayan Narratives
Even more disturbing is the fact that Getachew has effectively embraced the anti-Tigrayan narratives that were used to justify the formation of the PP. The three parties that broke away from the EPRDF did so by promoting claims that fueled hostility toward the TPLF—alleging Tigrayan supremacy, orchestrating all major human rights abuses, and looting the country’s resources.
In an interview with Fana, Getachew Reda appeared to suggest that Tigray should abandon its aspirations for involvement in national leadership “after everything that had happened.” He recalled that while drafting a transitional charter—at a time when Tigrayan forces were advancing toward Addis Ababa—his team deliberately avoided appointing a Tigrayan to any top national position, citing the need for ethnic inclusivity.
Getachew’s stance—that the TPLF should distance itself from national leadership due to its alleged past overreach—closely aligns with Prosperity Party rhetoric, which frames TPLF influence as synonymous with Tigrayan domination.
In another interview, he remarked that the assassinations occurring in Tigray were merely a continuation of what had already been normalized in Oromia—an unmistakable validation to the PP narrative that the TPLF was solely responsible for orchestrating state-sponsored abuses across the rest of Ethiopia during the EPRDF era.
In a press briefing held in Addis Ababa, Getachew went further, accusing the TPLF of continuing to loot Ethiopia—this time from within Tigray itself—thus repeating one of the central accusations long used to vilify the organization. With such statements, he has fully aligned himself with the PP’s foundational anti-TPLF rhetoric, which has fueled ethnic slurs portraying all Tigrayans as thieves and corrupters of Ethiopian society .
These actions reveal that Getachew acted not on behalf of the TPLF but as a proxy of the federal regime. The Pretoria Agreement was less a negotiated settlement and more a strategic repositioning aligned with Abiy’s political interests.
Championing Insurgency
As The Battle for Tigray rightly argues, Getachew has abandoned Tigray’s political struggle. He dismisses past sacrifices, accuses TPLF leaders of exploiting youth for power, and aligns himself with the PP’s divide-and-rule tactics—strategically manipulating local identities, as demonstrated by how his supporters fueled alienation among the Raya in Southern Tigray to consolidate control over the area.
He is now organizing an armed movement against the TDF with federal backing. He characterizes resistance as criminal—repeatedly warning that TPLF and TDF leaders must not “hold the public hostage to protect a few criminals.” This framing sets a dangerous precedent, echoing the same logic that enabled genocide under the guise of law enforcement.
Abiy and Isaias Fight Over Tigray – Ethiopia Insight
A struggle is underway to control Tigray’s military forces
Before closing, one point deserves clarification. The Battle for Tigray unfairly reduces General Tsadkan’s political vision. His stance on dismantling the TPLF cannot be understood merely as a desire to take Assab or revive the legacy of Alula. Rather, Tsadkan envisions a Tigrayan nationalism that transcends the current borders of Tigray—one that regards both Isaias Afwerki and the TPLF as obstacles to a broader, strategic realignment. His perspective is rooted in the belief that a unified Tigray and Eritrea could have prevented the atrocities that unfolded.
Alarming Signs
Over two years of war brought starvation, mass killings, and sexual violence, under a complete siege. These atrocities were structural, not incidental. They emerged from a social atmosphere in which “TPLF” came to symbolize all that was evil—corruption, criminality, tribalism. As a Durkheimian social fact, the term “TPLF” shaped national perceptions, dictating what a Tigrayan must disavow to be considered fully human in Ethiopia. That’s why many failed to see genocide coming. “Law enforcement operation” seemed apt.
Today, similar rhetoric resurfaces. The same dismissive language used to deny past atrocities is now used to legitimize Getachew Reda’s current actions. By aligning with PP narratives, he now embodies the internal threat that external actors once posed. Tigray’s Hijacked Transition unwittingly validates this betrayal.
What has truly been hijacked is not just the transition—but Tigray’s core political interests. Interests that could have been protected, had the Pretoria Agreement, with all its shortcomings, been implemented in good faith.
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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.
Main photo: Left to right: Abreham Belay, Getachew Reda; Addis Ababa, May 2025.
Published under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
Crédito: Link de origem