Ethiopia’s Untenable Red Sea Ambitions

Much has been said about PM Abiy’s ill-advised statements and dreams which need not be repeated here. But what about the litany of papers being authored by individuals closely aligned with Ethiopia’s ruling party?

While they have not gone unchallenged, I want to add my voice to those calling for the return of sanity to curb these wayward and strident political positions.

The people of Eritrea and Ethiopia can ill afford another misadventure! Sadly, it’s feared that the Ethiopian regime has irresponsibly and irreparably damaged the requisite trust that is the foundation of a successful, mutually beneficial partnership. Dangerous Ethiopian ambitions that squander every opportunity at building respectful and prosperous partnership must come to an end!

I focus on the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), which is funded by, and affiliated with, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

While I discuss specific articles written by IFA’s research associate, Blen Mamo Diriba, we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that this Institute, to an extent, is a proxy for Ethiopian foreign policy thinking. I highlight IFA’s Blen endeavoring to rationalize the Prime Minister’s unwarranted schemes that are laced with intensive disinformation as well as audacious claims devoid of factual or legal basis. I quote Blen’s writings extensively to deduce the implication and meaning of Ethiopia’s mysterious “strategic ambitions”.

The Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) has been busy churning out articles and YouTube discussions to drive dangerous narratives, including through its @HornDialogues and @HornReview where Blen is the Executive Director. @HornReview partners with Ethiopia’s Defense War College while its “Publication” section also vaguely references partnerships with Brookings and Chatham House.

The tone of Blen’s recent writings has gradually changed from bellicose musings to mellowed down mutations couched in ambiguous terms cloaking a hidden agenda.

Three themes or conclusions are noticeable in her writings:

The first revolves around Ethiopia’s purported difficulty in accepting Eritrea’s rightful assertion of control over its inalienable sovereign assets; even as the latter has always been willing to engage in good-faith bilateral arrangements for the use of its ports by any interested party on the basis of established commercial norms and practices.

The second theme flaunts Ethiopia’s ambition for direct sea coast ownership to protect mysterious, dubbed as existential, “strategic interests”; virtually overriding normative provisions for sea access allowed under international law and

The third approach mulls possible hedges to mitigate potential failure of achieving the second theme by sounding out a “Treaty with Eritrea” that is overseen and administered by dubious international institutions susceptible to its influence.

Overall, Abiy’s government sees ownership of a Red Sea coast as a necessary instrument to enable Ethiopia’s hegemonic power in the region, exercising that power at the discretion of its powerful masters and financiers.

Crimea Rhetoric

Blen’s irresponsible and warmongering language is reflected in her April 7th article titled “Ethio-Eritrea Tension-A Volatile History that Never Truly Ended: Could Assab Become Africa’s Crimea”. As the title transparently implies, Blen hypothesizes that Ethiopia has a path to “regain” Assab if another conflict breaks out. Her belief in Ethiopia’s military superiority – even while admittedly bogged down in numerous deadly, internal conflicts – in conjunction with their expectation of muted international condemnation represents the continuation of decades of miscalculations by Ethiopian politicians and their enablers. Miscalculations that have held the entire region hostage!

Ethiopia’s strategic ambitions

Blen’s article from April 9th helps shed light on Ethiopia’s designs represented by that mysterious, oft- repeated “strategic interests” mantra. Speaking of the putative “Assab-Addis pipeline initiative with UAE’s involvement”, she eerily notes that “the swift deterioration of diplomatic ties, exacerbated by Ethiopia’s shifting geopolitical priorities, rendered the pipeline project increasingly untenable.”

Bilen does not offer any details on these shifting geopolitical realities, apart from the vexing question whether the idea was in the first place discussed between all the concerned parties, that impacted specifically the pipeline project and generally the overall bilateral relationship. Was Abiy’s desire to take over neighboring ports one of those shifting priorities? Whatever the priorities may have been, it’s notable that IFA’s Blen admits that Abiy is responsible for the deterioration in the relationship. It also implies that Abiy’s “shifting priorities” violated whatever prior, cordial understandings the two countries may have had and thus absolves Eritrea from any blame. Audaciously, Blen still blames Eritrea for “obstructing Ethiopia’s strategic ambitions” by not cooperating with this shifting policy. Eritrea, as a country with its own strategic interests, has a right to chart its own path and oppose Ethiopia’s “strategic ambitions” if these ambitions endanger its own interests. That’s the international norm, a fact which is not lost on Blen!

One should also ask if Ethiopia’s “shifting geopolitical priorities” informed its refusal to entertain Djiboutian offer of a direct commercial port in August 2024. Clearly, the mysterious Ethiopian “strategic interests” override available solutions that facilitate commercial activities. Hence, the “strategic priorities” must be of military or naval nature, which are not rights granted to landlocked states under international law, without a coastal state’s consent. This Ethiopian ambition for direct sea coast ownership, then, stems from their desire to build a navy as an instrument of hegemonic power in the region.

Of rigid controls and angelic international guardians of treaty

Blen’s April 25th article was initially published on the government-affiliated Institute of Foreign Affairs website as well as their X (formerly Twitter) account. However, that article is now no longer available there for unknown reasons. Luckily, I took screenshots of the article before deletion. The article tried to convince readers that “legal access to the Port of Assab” can be achieved through “a choreography of international law, diplomacy, & mutual prosperity”. Needless to say, no choreography is needed to achieve legitimate sea access unless of course that is code-word for the absurd goal of port ownership! Incredibly, Blen suggests Ethiopia to let go of confrontational rhetoric and construct its approach “around respect for Eritrean autonomy while advancing the idea that legal access to Assab is not anti- thetical to sovereignty”.

As Americans like to say, her use of “Eritrean autonomy” is tone deaf while the “sovereignty” lecture is actually gaslighting – I was understandably triggered by the “Eritrean autonomy” phrase. Given the history and the preponderance of evidence in her articles, she used this phrase deliberately to reflect the regime’s dangerous ambitions. Eritreans have not forgotten that the USA and the Dergue tried, in vain, until the last second of our independence, to reinvent the autonomy wheel of the 1950s federation period. The people of Eritrea, through the leadership of the EPLF, exercised their right of decolonization and overwhelmingly voted for independence in the UN-observed referendum of April 1993. So whatever autonomy idea they have is a non-starter for Eritrea. Insofar as “legal access” is concerned, there is no one obstructing Ethiopia from obtaining port services anywhere in the Horn of Africa, including Assab based on bilateral agreements with its neighbors; Eritrea included!

Blen’s proposals to resolve “sea access challenge” reflect tell-tale signs of Ethiopia’s furtive, long-term scheme to attain port ownership. She proposes that “a bilateral treaty with Eritrea, grounded in UNCLOS principles and informed by Clause 267 (6) would affirm Ethiopia’s right of maritime interface without compromising Eritrea’s sovereign control. This treaty must delineate the parameters of use…mechanisms for dispute resolution under international arbitration”. Though not a legal expert, I believe many of the UNCLOS provisions are considered as customary international law so Ethiopia indeed can enjoy all the normative rights extended, in accordance with those provisions, to it by all the littoral states in the Red Sea or Indian Ocean. However, her use of “right of maritime interface” phrase deserves scrutiny given their dangerous ambitions as publicly voiced during the last two years. Since they have not been denied access/service for commercial activities, we can reasonably conclude that this “maritime interface” may include naval/military base. Clearly, this is a not an innate right embedded in international laws and norms. However, for the Prime Minister, his hegemonic ambitions can’t be achieved without a navy, so they believe. So his PR agents try to cloak their narratives using vague words and selective, inaccurate references.

IFA’s Blen continues by suggesting Assab special economic and logistical zone be “jointly administered or overseen by a credible international body such as the AU or UNCTAD” as well as IGAD to “serve as guardians of the treaty’s integrity”. This obviously infringes on Eritrea’s sovereignty, a non-starter for the fiercely independent country! But it is also strange coming from Blen since she was trivializing the influence of the UN and African institutions such as AU and IGAD in her Crimea article referenced above. Moreover, the Eritrean government, long ago, set-up Free Trade Zones in both Massawa and Assab that are capably operated by the Eritrean Free Zones Authority. They are open for business if Ethiopia desires. As we have seen above, however, this falls short of Ethiopia’s ridiculous ambitions to themselves exercise total control over the Eritrean ports.

I bring Blen’s colleagues at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (Henok Getachew, Gahaw Ayferam, and Amb. Rashid Mohamed) to highlight the grandiose ambitions. Her friends claimed how Ethiopia utilized institutions such as IGAD to execute its foreign policy in their July 2024 paper for the IFA (posted/promoted on their X account on April 23, 2025). The paper examined scenarios under which Ethiopia can “reclaim regional dominance” and its rivalry with Kenya to gain “hegemonic power” (their own words!) in the region, in an anchor state role. It is this belief that informs Blen’s desire for international institutions to supersede Eritrea’s sovereign right of assertion of control.

I include the following ambiguous quotes or phrases, found in Blen’s articles, as they illustrate Ethiopia’s reckless disinformation campaign to advance its hegemonic ambitions:

“Addis Ababa’s determination to secure an independent maritime route”. No coastal country would willingly cede control over its maritime So, how does a landlocked country attain independent maritime route without wresting control from a neighboring country?

“Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime autonomy thus remains a delicate balancing ” Again, how do you get maritime autonomy if you are landlocked? What legitimate problem does Ethiopia have that is only solved through this autonomy?

“the Red Sea, long a space of fracture and friction, holds the potential to be reimagined, as a maritime common”. How clever is this use of “Maritime commons”! What international legal doctrine supports communal property in this context? There is nothing reimagined here as she’d like us to believe – you can’t have what is not yours! Period!

Ethiopia’s approach must be “constructed around respect for Eritrean autonomy while…” Here goes that triggering word of “autonomy”.

Eritrea’s approach is “designed to preserve its leverage over critical maritime routes and maintain its sovereignty against external economic entanglements, by eschewing cooperative engagement in favor of a rigid assertion of control, Eritrea has effectively…”