Ethiopia’s Maritime Dilemma: Why MOU With Somaliland Risks Diplomatic Fallout, Undermines Regional Stability

Addis Abeba — This article serves as a rebuttal to the opinion piece written by Adam Daud Ahmed titled “Ethiopia’s Maritime Gamble: Seize Opportunity with Somaliland’s Offer or Yield to Somalia’s Pressure?” which was published recently in Addis Standard. While the original article presents Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland as a strategic breakthrough, a careful examination of the geopolitical, legal, and economic realities suggests otherwise.

Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions must be grounded in international law and diplomatic engagement, not unilateral agreements that could provoke regional instability and diplomatic backlash. Ethiopia has every right to seek alternative maritime access, but its approach must align with recognized international norms and regional cooperation, rather than bypassing sovereign states and engaging in legally questionable agreements.

The opinion piece by Adam Daud Ahmed describes Somaliland as a “stable strategic partner,” but it downplays a critical fact: no country in the world–including Ethiopia–officially recognizes Somaliland as an independent state. This fundamental reality means that any agreement concerning maritime access must involve the Federal Government of Somalia, which holds internationally recognized sovereignty over Somaliland’s territory.

By bypassing Somalia and signing an agreement with an unrecognized entity, Ethiopia risks undermining its own diplomatic credibility. Worse still, Ethiopia’s actions set a precedent that could be used against its own territorial integrity in the future. If Ethiopia endorses Somaliland’s breakaway status through an MoU, what stops others from supporting separatist movements within Ethiopia itself?

This is not just a matter of diplomatic optics–it is a matter of legal responsibility. Ethiopia has long upheld the principles of territorial sovereignty, including its stance on Tigray and Oromia’s self-determination debates. Yet, in this case, Ethiopia appears to abandon its traditional respect for sovereignty when it suits its own maritime ambitions.

Somalia’s Sovereignty, Ethiopia’s Legal Obligations

In his article, Adam Daud Ahmed argued that Somalia’s opposition to the MoU is “an outdated defense of colonial borders,” but this interpretation ignores the core principles of international law. Somalia is a recognized UN member state, and its territorial sovereignty is upheld by the African Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations.

Just as Ethiopia defends its borders against external interference, Somalia has the same legal right to oppose agreements that threaten its territorial unity. Ignoring Somalia’s concerns could complicate Ethiopia’s diplomatic engagements–not only with Somalia but also with international actors who support Somali sovereignty.

Furthermore, the African Union’s principle of non-interference explicitly prohibits unilateral actions that undermine the sovereignty of a fellow African state. Ethiopia, as a key AU member, is contradicting the very principles it has historically defended.

Economic, Logistical Realities

While the MoU promises Ethiopia access to a 20-kilometer stretch of Somaliland’s coast, the economic feasibility of this alternative route remains highly questionable. Ethiopia currently relies on Djibouti for over 95% of its maritime trade, and Djibouti’s ports provide world-class infrastructure with well-established global shipping routes.

Just as Ethiopia defends its borders against external interference, Somalia has the same legal right to oppose agreements that threaten its territorial unity.”

Switching to Somaliland would require billions in investment to build new port infrastructure, trade corridors, and logistical networks–a process that could take decades. The idea that Somaliland could immediately replace Djibouti’s strategic importance is not based on economic realities but rather on wishful thinking.

Moreover, Ethiopia’s deepening economic ties with Djibouti mean that any abrupt shift in trade routes could lead to unintended financial and diplomatic consequences. If Ethiopia prioritizes Somaliland over Djibouti, Djibouti could retaliate by increasing tariffs, restricting Ethiopia’s port access, or deepening its economic ties with Ethiopia’s regional rivals.

In short, the MoU does not provide an immediate solution to Ethiopia’s maritime challenges. Instead, it introduces new risks that Ethiopia may not be ready to handle.

Geopolitical Implications, Regional Stability

Ethiopia’s decision to sign an MoU with Somaliland has already triggered diplomatic pushback from Somalia and its allies, including Turkey, Egypt, and the Gulf States.

Turkey, which has a strong security partnership with Somalia, could increase its military presence in Mogadishu in direct response to Ethiopia’s actions.

Egypt, Ethiopia’s historical rival, now has even more justification to deepen its ties with Somalia as part of its ongoing tensions with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

The Arab League, which explicitly recognizes Somali sovereignty, could pressure regional and international actors to take a stronger stance against Ethiopia’s unilateral moves.

Instead of strengthening its position in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia risks increasing its diplomatic isolation by antagonizing key regional actors. Ethiopia’s long-term security interests require stability and cooperation, not provocation and unilateralism.

Ethiopia’s desire for maritime access is legitimate and understandable, but it must be pursued through internationally recognized legal frameworks and diplomatic engagement. Rather than viewing Somalia’s objections as a barrier, Ethiopia should seek constructive negotiations that respect Somali sovereignty while also addressing Ethiopia’s strategic and economic concerns.